Building and developing a specialised, core force for safeguarding the Party’s ideological foundation in the military in general, grassroots units in particular, are one of the most important tasks, key to quality and effectiveness of performing this pivotal task. Therefore, increased research and recommendation on close-to-reality, scientific, synchronous solutions are an urgent matter.

Over the past few years, party committees, commanders, commissars, and political organs at all echelons have paid regular attention to building and development of a leading, specialised, core force for defending the Party’s ideological foundation in grassroots units. Of note, they have attached importance to propagation and education with a view to raising this force’s awareness and responsibility; selection of members with political steadfastness, good theoretical and practical competence, knowledge, and skills to produce news and articles for struggling against and denying hostile, false perspectives, and so forth. Many departments and units have provided good professional training and invested in infrastructure and equipment. Thus, the specialised, core force has grown in both scale and operational quality, affirmed its position and role, and truly become the military’s specialised, core force for safeguarding the Party’s ideological foundation and rejecting hostile, false perspectives, contributing to maintenance of cadres’ and soldiers’ political, ideological stability and guidance of public opinions.

Nevertheless, the building and development of this force in the entire military have certain limitations. Some party committees, commissars, commanders, and political organs pay insufficient attention to this vital work. The training in writing skill for the specialised, core force is not conducted regularly and purely nominal in character in some departments and units. The force shows certain limitations in terms of theoretical competence and knowledge in some aspects. The material basis, budget, and preferential policies for this force are not enough and spread. To tackle those limitations requires party committees and commanders at all echelons in the entire military to constantly lead and direct the establishment and training of the specialised, core force, which enable them to play the leading role in protecting the Party’s ideological foundation in units. This article aims to propose the following fundamental solutions.

First, party committees and commanders at all levels must strengthen their leadership of building and developing the specialised, core force for defending the ideological foundation of the Party. This solution is extremely important and key to quality and effectiveness of safeguarding the ideological foundation of the Party and rejecting hostile, false perspectives. Therefore, party committees and commanders at all echelons must deeply grasp resolutions, directives, conclusions, projects, plans, and instructions from the Party Central Committee, Central Military Commission, Ministry of National Defence, General Political Department, and functional departments regarding the protection of the Party’s ideological foundation and struggle against hostile, false perspectives. This lays the basis for establishing and developing the specialised, core force at their own levels appropriately. On closely sticking to functions, missions, and objects of management, party committees and party organisations at all echelons should include the building and training of the specialised, core force in termly, annual, theme resolutions and content of regular meetings. They must also concretise the resolutions into plans of the commanders to ensure implementation with focuses and elimination of shortcomings.

Review conference of task performance of 2023 of the 35th Steering Committee under the Central Military Commission (Photo: qdnd.vn)

Additionally, it is necessary to successfully bring into play the role and responsibility of functional organs, directly the political departments and cadres, for building and training of the specialised, core force. Of note, importance should be attached to the recommendation, instruction, inspection, supervision, and encouragement of the building and training of the force, especially the selection of right members of the force; regular formulation of training plans aimed to improve the force’s professional competence; timely discovery of difficulties departments and units are facing in order to work out effective remedies. Moreover, party committees and commanders at all echelons need to lead, direct, and instruct mass organisations to actively participate in establishing and training the specialised, core force. The mass organisations should proactively recommend party committees, leaders, and commanders at all echelons to select and train cadres, young people, and members for this force; regularly encourage and create every favourable condition for them to tapping into their ability and completing their tasks successfully.

Second, quality has priority over quality during the process of building the specialised, core force. Currently, given hostile forces’ increasingly subtle, direct, drastic, and complex sabotage, the protection of the Party’s ideological foundation places higher requirements in terms of thinking, competence, spirit, enthusiasm, and implementation methodology. Thus, party committees and commanders of departments and units in the entire military need to pay regular attention to strengthening of this force in terms of quantity while enhancing their quality, ensuring that they are always the standing, leading force for task performance. Accordingly, the specialised, core force must be cadres and party members who are selected carefully in terms of dignity, competence, morality, lifestyle, political steadfastness, enthusiasm, courage, and determination to safeguard ideological foundation of the Party. Moreover, they must have good theoretical and practical competence, good command of information technology and foreign languages, creative thinking, ability to apply theory to practice, skills to look for information, ability to produce news and articles for struggling against and denying hostile, false perspectives, ability to analyse and assess plots and acts of sabotage of the enemy. They are to directly recommend party committees and commanders of units to adopt measures to organise and mobilise forces to prevent, struggle, and defeat enemy sabotage, firmly upholding the Party’s ideological front in units. Furthermore, this force should be capable of understanding attitude, confidence, feelings, and opinions of cadres and soldiers in their units as well as those of people about sensitive, complex issues, emerging flashpoints, or distorted information aimed at doing damage to the Party, State, and military, thereby recommending party committees and commanders of units to work out measures to guide ideology and public opinions timely. More importantly, party committees and commanders at all levels need to firmly grasp quantity and quality of the specialised, core force in units; appraise actual state correctly to clearly identify strengths, weaknesses, causes, and limitations, thereby timely adopting leadership measures to deal with weaknesses, contributing to enhanced quality and operational effectiveness of this force. The specialised, core force must also be strengthened in a timely manner, ensuring sufficient number, good quality, and competence in meeting requirements and missions of departments and units.

Third, the specialised, core force must be training regularly to improve their political steadfastness, knowledge, methodology, and skills. To deserve the leading, core force for protecting the Party’s ideological foundation in units, party committees and commanders at all echelons should pay regular attention to training of the specialised, core force, which aims to promote their political steadfastness, revolutionary vigilance, and high sense of responsibility without fluctuation in ideology and standpoint. The specialised, core force must also be equipped with necessary knowledge, especially the knowledge about protection of the Party’s ideological foundation, thereby enabling them to selectively acquire information and be immune to harmful information; actively participate in the struggle against hostile, false perspectives in cyberspace. Importance should be attached to training in professional skills; the ways to identify hostile, false perspectives and harmful information; methods to use social networks and experience in handling situations; skills to produce propaganda news and articles; and skills to use instruments and techniques to participate in the struggle. More importantly, the specialised, core force for cyber operations must be trained in cyber technology, cyber recconnaissance and offense techniques, and some experience in responding to media crises; improve technological measures to prevent, identify, address, and remove harmful information; step up research and application of information technology and artificial intelligence to this work.

Fourth, provision of material bases, budget, equipment, vehicles, and preferential policies for the specialised, core force. Departments and units need to pay constant attention to investment in material bases, provision of budget, and acquisition, repair, and modernistion of technical equipment for this force. Of note, it is necessary to make full use of existing technical equipment of units; focus on upgrading servers controlling websites and processing and storing data in support of propagation and struggle; set up and perfect the military data network that connects all MND-affiliated units; and assist departments and units in establishing the local area network. These solutions will create favourable conditions for the specialised, core force to access and exploit information and data to participate in the struggle against hostile, false perspective in a rapid, timely, and secure manner. Effort should be focused on establishing digital libraries that connect the entire military; create rooms for accessing the Internet and Military Science Information Net in units, which helps cadres and soldiers in general, the specialised, core force in particular to conduct research, search for information and data, and take part in the struggle for safeguarding ideological foundation in cyberspace. Additionally, departments and units need to well implement policies, especially the special allowances for the specialised, core force, with a view to timely encouraging this force to actively participate in the struggle for defending the Party’s ideological foundation.

The aforementioned solutions are results of practical protection of the Party’s ideological foundation and struggle against hostile, false perspective. Thus, departments and units are to learn and apply to building of their own specialised, core force, contributing to firm defence of the Party’s ideological foundation right from grassroots units.

Senior Colonel, Doctor NGUYEN KHAC LUYEN, Propagation Directorate, General Political Department