During the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, the Military Logistics - Technical Sector stood shoulder to shoulder with troops and people across the country to overcome all difficulties and hardships, making a miracle of support work, greatly contributing to completely liberating the South and unifying the country, providing us with a lot of valuable lessons for today’s Fatherland construction and protection cause.

The 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign as its peak, victoriously ended our people’s resistance war against the US for national salvation. That great victory marked a new development in Vietnam’s military art and people’s war art, including logistics - technical support work. The Logistics - Technical Sector, for the first time in history, had to provide urgent support for an unprecedentedly large-scale strategic decisive battle, with joint campaigns successively taking place across Central - Central Highlands and Southern battlefields, thereby imposing new, extremely demanding requirements on logistics - technical work. However, under the sound leadership and direction of the Party, the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the Ministry of National Defence (MND), with their great resolve, all-level logistics - technical forces proactively maintained coordination with other forces to surmount all hardships and successfully fulfil their functions and assigned tasks.

Transporting thousands of tons of supplies for the South battlefield (file photo/ VNA)

1. Proactively building a solid, inter-connected logistics - technical posture in each strategic direction and area, meeting the requirements of support work for the General Offensive and Uprising. Under Resolution No.21 by the Party Central Committee and the Resolution of the CMC’s Meeting on 18 December 1972, the General Department of Logistics designed a three-year logistics plan (1973 - 1975), proactively making preparations for our favourable opportunities. To that end, we developed strategic-level, operational-level transport lines and prepared battlefields in logistics and technical terms. Between early 1973 and April 1975, strategic logistics units transported materials to the battlefield twice as many as they had done in the previous 13 years, creating substantial reserves for large-scale operations. In September 1974, General Department of Technology was founded as a strategic office in charge of providing advice, command, and direction for technical support work. Right after the Politburo’s decisions on liberating the South in the two years of 1975 and 1976 and then in 1975 only, the General Department of Logistics and the General Department of Technology quickly adjusted their forces and logistics - technical posture on each battlefield in accordance with the new combat requirements; first and foremost, they made preparations for Central Highlands Campaign. More specifically, logistics forces of Tri - Thien Military Region and B5 Front (Route 9 - North Quang Tri) were merged with one another and deployed to the three bases, namely A Sau, A Luoi, and Ba Long. Logistics units of Military Region 5 were deployed to reinforce H1 base in Dai Loc (Quang Nam), H2 base in Binh Son (Quang Ngai), and H3 base in Hoc Den - North of Route 19 (Binh Dinh). On Central Highlands Front, logistics - technical forces and posture were adjusted; logistics base in Ta Xeng - Dak To was responsible for Kon Tum direction; logistics base in Chuplo - Phuno was tasked with providing support for Playku direction; logistics base in Playme - Chu Pong was assigned to give support to Southern Route 19 direction; K10 Depot in Ia Suc and K20 Depot were established to provide support for attacking Duc Co (and then Buon Ma Thuot). Besides, a majority of B2 Front’s logistics forces were deployed from Cambodia to South Vietnam to reinforce logistics - technical forces of Military Regions 8 and 9. The General Department of Technology decided to establish new depots, such as L850, L852, and L854 in Hoa Binh and Nghe An provinces. Those depots were capable of reserving 6,000 to 12,000 tons of weapons and technical equipment for the South battlefield, providing support for military regions, the MND’s mobile forces, and the Lao People’s Army, creating a solid, inter-connected logistics - technical posture for Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

During Ho Chi Minh Campaign, based on the South battlefield’s logistics - technical posture and forces together with all-round reinforcements from the General Department of Logistics and the General Department of Technology, operational logistics - technical offices and units quickly adjusted their posture and supplemented their personnel, weaponry, and logistics materials; coordination was maintained between logistics - technical offices and units from military regions, army corps, and localities to increase support capability in each area and achieve a solid, inter-connected, highly mobile logistics - technical posture for the 5 wings of our Army to advance towards Saigon.

2. Opportunely providing logistics - technical support for units to quickly manoeuvre their forces in the Campaign. In response to rapid battlefield developments, especially after the victory of Central Highlands Campaign, under the Politburo’s resolve and motto of “lightning speed, daring, surprise, certain victory”, logistics - technical forces focused on ensuring support for strategic manoeuvre, opportunely transporting main corps and divisions together with their weaponry and tens of thousands of tons of materials to the battlefield. Prior to the Campaign, Army Corps 1 was reinforced with technical cadres and employees from Department of Weaponry. At the same time, the General Department of Technology deployed its reinforcements for maintaining and repairing all weapons, tanks, armoured vehicles, and pieces of technical equipment of Army Corps 1. Meanwhile, Army Corps 2 received T153 Station from the General Department of Technology; it was provided with technical materials, cadres, and employees for repair stations by the Department of Weaponry. Under that support, Army Corps 2 carried out inspections and repairs of its guns, artillery, and military hardware prior to the Campaign. Army Corps 3 was founded after the victory of Central Highlands Campaign; it was then provided with 2 mobile repair teams, construction vehicles, technical means, and repairing tools for its two attack directions during the Campaign by the General Department of Technology. Army Corps 4 was also provided with OX1 and OX2 workshops in late 1974 and early 1975, allowing the Corps’ Technical Sector to organise mobile repair teams equipped with construction vehicles for the Corps’ offensive directions during the Campaign.

It is clear for us to see that during the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, the Logistics - Technical Sector flexibly adjusted its structure and posture, creatively, opportunely employing methods of support for main corps’ strategic manoeuvres and offensives as well as for localities’ uprising across the South. This could be seen a new development in the Logistics - Technical Sector’s organisation and command capabilities. With reference to that success, General Vo Nguyen Giap and General Van Tien Dung believed: “Logistics - technical forces strived to overcome all difficulties, promoted creativity, and excellently fulfilled all their assigned tasks. The success in logistics, technical, and manoeuvre support marked an outstanding development in the maturity of our strategic support corps”.

3. Mobilising the entire people and Military in logistics - technical support for the General Offensive and Uprising. Under the spirit “All for the front line, all for victory”, the Party Central Committee and the State mobilised all possible resources and forces from the entire people and Military for the liberation of the South. Notably, with its strategic resolve to liberate the South prior to the rainy season of 1975, on 25 March 1975, the Politburo established Central Supply Council headed by Member of the Politburo, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. Grounded on the battlefield’s requirements, the Council formulated the most active, effective lines, plans, and measures to tap human and material resources for the front line. Under the Council’s direction during Ho Chi Minh Campaign, in the North, many construction sites, factories, and offices mobilised 30% - 50% of their strength for service. Military and civilian forces were mobilised to transport personnel, means, weapons, and technical equipment to the battlefield. By mid-April 1975, military and civilian forces transported 24,000 tons of weapons and equipment for the Campaign.

In tandem with the great Northern rear and Southern logistics - technical forces, within 2 years (1973 - 1974), military regions’ logistics - technical offices and units cooperated with Southern localities in actively building forces and creating on-the-spot supplies, including 70,000 tons of ammunition and 107,000 tons of food. Southern logistics - technical forces organised 6 operational transport lines in Bu Gia Map, Loc Ninh, and Dong Xoai towards front-line bases. Mekong Delta military regions’ logistics - technical forces prepared personnel, weapons, equipment, and logistics materials, while coordinating with logistics forces of localities and the people to provide support for the military regions’ armed forces to attack prime targets. Logistics - technical forces of units and localities promoted the spirit of self-reliance and self-strengthening, relying on the people and other units’ logistics - technical support to provide food for troops, establishing integrated military - civilian medical networks, giving first aid and medical care to wounded soldiers, mobilising boats to transport materials and troops for combat.

The success of logistics - technical work in the Great 1975 Spring Victory gave us many valuable lessons that should continue to be researched, applied, and developed in the cause of Army building, national defence consolidation, and Fatherland protection in the new situation as follows.

First, continuing to grasp and strictly execute resolutions and directives by the Party, State, CMC, and MND on logistics - technical work, particularly the Resolution of the 13^th Party Central Committee’s 8^th Plenum on the Strategy for Fatherland Protection in the New Situation, Resolution 1656-NQ/QUTW and Resolution 1658-NQ/QUTW, dated 20 December 2022, by the CMC on logistics - technical work towards 2030 and beyond. The Military Logistics - Technical Sector should improve its research and forecast capabilities to give sound advice to the CMC and the MND on logistics - technical work. Emphasis should be placed on upgrading and modernising weapons, technical equipment, and logistics means in accordance with the budget and road map for modernising the Military, accelerating and accomplishing logistics - technical projects, programs, and plans. Due attention should be paid to building strong logistics - technical potentialities and postures at all levels, with all-people logistics - technical forces as the basic element, military region defence and provincial-level defensive zone logistics - technical forces as the foundation, and the Military’s logistics - technical forces as the core. Besides, it is necessary to quickly perfect policies, mechanisms, and plans for logistics - technical mobilisation and well carry out state reserve work for national defence.

Second, focusing on completing the Military Logistics - Technical Sector’s organisational structure in an “adept, compact, strong” manner. To that end, it is important to accelerate the building of “exemplarily, typically” comprehensively strong, regular logistics - technical forces from grass-roots to strategic levels. Coordination in education and training with military schools should be maintained to ensure the quality and quantity of logistics - technical cadres and employees and improve those staff members’ management, command, and professional expertise. It is essential to deal with a shortage of logistics - technical cadres and employees in several specialities within offices and units.

Third, completing methods of providing logistics - technical materials. Researches should be centred on adjusting, supplementing, and mobilising logistics - technical resources. It is necessary to complete methods of logistics - technical support, actively tap resources, and provide timely, sufficient logistics - technical support for training and combat readiness tasks, with priority given to forces responsible for national sovereignty protection in border, sea, island, key areas and forces moving straight to modernity. All-level logistics - technical forces should strictly maintain regulations on manpower, weapons, technical equipment, and logistics materials, while closely working with other forces in natural disaster and epidemic response and search and rescue.

Fourth, stepping up practical review and theoretical development regarding logistics - technical support under the conditions of market economy and deep, wide international integration as well as regarding support work for forms of war and combat in accordance with forces’ structure, equipment, and operational environments, the new conditions of people’s war for Fatherland protection, and non-traditional security threats. It is necessary to raise the quality of the building and operation of defensive zone logistics - technical forces in line with all-people national defence posture and socio-economic development plans in each direction and area to create a solid, inter-connected logistics - technical posture for Fatherland construction and protection. Besides, defence industry in logistics - technical domains should be developed to serve military tasks and foster economic development simultaneously.

Fifth, actively leveraging resources, applied researches, technological transfer, and 4^th industrial revolution, further employing science, technology, and digital transformation in logistics - technical work. Logistics - technical training content, programs, and methods should be renewed under the motto of “basics, practicality, solidity”, with importance attached to organising tasks-based, synchronised, specialised training courses and improving all-level logistics - technical units’ manoeuvrability, combat readiness, and command over support work to meet the requirements of Army building and Fatherland protection in any situations.

Lt. Gen. TRAN MINH DUC

Director of the General Department of Logistics - Technology