In the Tay Son Tinh Offensive Campaign in 1966, although we used small-scale forces in the areas close to the enemy's large bases, with the art of applying flexible and creative fighting methods, we achieved high combat efficiency. The victory of the Campaign opened up the possibility that our main forces could inflict heavy losses and destroy individual US battalions, firmly consolidating the determination to dare to fight and defeat the US imperialists in the new revolutionary period.

In 1966, implementing the intention of launching the first dry-season strategic counterattack on the entire battlefield, in the area of ​​Zone 5, the enemy mobilised a large number of forces and means, with strong support from air force and artillery firepower, attacking in 3 directions: North Binh Dinh (mainly), South Quang Ngai and North Phu Yen. On the direction of attack in Southern Quang Ngai, the enemy launched an operation called "Double Hawk", using 05 battalions of US Marines, 08 main battalions of puppet troops and the support of 01 aircraft carrier, 02 destroyers, 04 landing ships, tanks, armoured vehicles, combining sea and air landings and land attacks to sweep Duc Pho, Dong Ba To, etc. to "search and destroy" our main units.

Regarding us, thoroughly implementing Resolution No. 12 (December 1965) of the Party Central Committee, the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region 5 Command set out the task for the armed forces to “Strengthen their attacks and counterattacks against the enemy, resolutely destroy the US and puppet troops, defeat their strategic counterattack plans, maintain, expand and build bases in the mountainous and plain areas, and develop revolutionary forces” . While the enemy’s mobile main force was being held back in Southern Quang Ngai, realising that Tay Son Tinh was a vulnerable and weak direction, the MR5 Command decided to launch an offensive campaign in this important area to destroy and wear down the vital part of the US troops, disintegrate the important puppet main force, contribute to smashing the first dry season counterattack plan, defeat the enemy’s “search and destroy” plot; at the same time, support the mass movement to fight, maintain and expand the liberated areas; thereby improving the political, ideological, organisational, and command level of coordinated combat on an increasingly large scale. With the determination to dare to fight, know how to fight, and defeat the American invaders, along with unique military art, we caused the enemy great losses, dealing a “deserved blow” to the American army’s will to invade and its plot to “search and destroy”. Through the practice of the Campaign, we have recorded remarkable progress in practicing campaign operations against the American army; in which, the art of flexibly and creatively applying ways of fighting in each specific condition is a prominent feature.

People visit the Ba Gia - Son Tinh Victory Monument (Photo: baotanglichsu.vn)

First, creatively applying the art of “provoking”, cleverly deceiving, luring the enemy into the battle formation we prepared. The Tay Son Tinh offensive campaign took place in an area only about 20km from Chu Lai base, about 10km from Quang Ngai town. To “pull” the US troops out of the base, we applied the art of “hitting points, destroying reinforcements”, choosing the right “trigger” target, cleverly luring the enemy into our prepared battle formation, and mainly destroying the enemy outside the fortifications. Based on studying the situation on all sides, we used the engineers of Regiment 21 in combination with guerrillas to cut off the traffic on Route 1 (South of Vo Mountain). In the condition that the enemy had concentrated their forces to sweep in the South (Duc Pho, Dong Ba To), this area was an exposed, weak direction and a vital route. If we cut it off, it would have a strong impact on the transportation of forces, logistics, engineering, etc. between the enemy’s major bases. At the same time, this was a border area, behind which was our liberated zone, so if we occupied this area, not only would Quang Ngai province be “cut in half” but the enemy’s two important bases, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai town, would be seriously threatened. When we “hit the nail on the head”, to restore this important transportation route, the enemy immediately used puppet troops to relieve the situation. The Campaign Commander’s determination was to defeat the puppet troops, forcing the enemy to use American troops to rescue them, and to carry out the intention of “pulling” the American troops out of the base to destroy them. Therefore, we concentrated our forces to severely damage a puppet troop company moving from Chau O, burned several vehicles, and stopped a convoy of nearly 100 vehicles moving from Quang Ngai town to Chu Lai. Faced with the “helplessness” of the puppet troops, the enemy was forced to use American troops in combination with a large puppet troop force to rescue and relieve them, falling into our secretly arranged battle formation in Khanh My, Dong Giap, and Phuoc Binh. Thanks to that, in just two days, through continuous, overlapping battles, we dealt the enemy fatal blows, completely annihilating two companies and severely damaging three US Marine battalions, the enemy's "search and destroy" plan was painfully defeated.

Second, flexibly apply tactical forms; promptly transform the battle situation, achieving high combat efficiency. This is a campaign where we directly fight with the US army, which has the strength of air force firepower, artillery, mobility, quick rescue and relief capabilities. Therefore, to maintain the initiative, focus on destroying the enemy in the identified key areas, we flexibly apply tactical forms, in order to promote the strengths and fighting methods of each force, promptly transform the battle situation, and inflict heavy losses on the US battalions.

To carry out the "trigger" battle of the Campaign, we cut off traffic on the vital road, the important area of South of Vo Mountain, forcing the enemy to use large forces to continuously rescue and relieve. When the enemy carried out "search and destroy", rescue and relief operations, using the form of mobile offensive tactics, the 21st Infantry Regiment proactively fought to create a position, occupied Hill 62 before the enemy, forced the 1st US Marine Battalion into a disadvantageous position; continuously attacked, achieving high combat efficiency. To save the 1st US Marine Battalion, the enemy sent the 2nd Marine Battalion to rescue and relieve, we promptly used the 33rd Battalion to block the enemy, the 90th Battalion moved to attack, implemented "sticking to the enemy's waist and fighting", not giving them time to divide the line; charged in many directions, spearheads, and won. To increase the effectiveness of destroying the enemy, based on the practical situation, we flexibly applied other tactical forms such as: ambushing enemy forces moving by road from Chau O; raided and destroyed the 4th US Marine Battalion in Phuoc Binh, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Regiment of the puppet army in Lam Loc, Son Trung. In particular, the 22nd Infantry Battalion, after finishing the attack on High Point G, as it was dawn and could not move back to its position, switched to defending in Hoa Vinh village at the foot of High Point 62, repelling 5 enemy attacks, holding the position, and destroying more than 100 enemies.

When the enemy used a large force of both airborne and land mobile forces to rescue and relieve the situation, the situation developed rapidly and complicatedly; we promptly transformed the battle situation, gained and maintained the initiative to attack. Discovering that the enemy had mobilised 4 battalions of American troops and 7 battalions of puppet troops, setting up artillery positions at Soi slope to prepare for a relief operation, we quickly adjusted our deployment, sent the 21st Infantry Regiment to Nam Binh - Hoa Vinh, the 1st Infantry Regiment to Vinh Khanh - Phuoc Loc and ordered the units to concentrate their forces to prepare to destroy the American airborne troops in the key area of ​​Khanh My - Dong Giap - Phuoc Binh. In the attack on the enemy in Phuoc Binh by the 1st Infantry Regiment, after capturing Phuoc Binh village, pushing the enemy out of the village, forcing them into the field area, however, at that time it was almost dark, we promptly adjusted our combat determination, switching from attack to raid, destroying almost all of the 4th Battalion of the US Marines. Thanks to the timely transformation of the battle situation, although the enemy mobilised the most skilled and elite units to rescue and relieve the situation, they all fell into a disadvantageous position, were passive, confused in responding, and were successively destroyed by us.

Third, closely combine the operations of the main forces with the local armed forces and the uprising of the masses to create a position to attack the enemy widely. In the Tay Son Tinh Campaign, based on the people's war position, promoting the combined strength of the three armed forces, along with focusing on the "strong fist" to strike decisive blows, we advocated using local troops, guerrillas in the area and the uprising of the masses to coordinate operations, creating a combined strength, attacking the enemy widely, forcing them to disperse their forces to respond. The Campaign's practice showed that when the enemy mobilised a large force to move to relieve the situation, combining road mobility and airborne landing, we used local armed forces together with guerrillas of Son Tinh and Binh Son districts to attack small and scattered units, preventing the puppet army from moving on Highway 2, towards Dai Loc and An Diem, stopping the enemy's intention of "converging attack", creating a favourable opportunity for the main force of the 2nd Infantry Division to concentrate on destroying the American troops landing by air at High Point 62 and Go Cat.

Coordinating closely with the main attack direction, on the secondary attack direction, the 83rd Battalion of Quang Ngai province and the local company of Nghia Hanh district attacked and destroyed 01 companies of the 4th Regiment of the puppet army stationed in Hanh Thinh, the 48th Battalion of the province destroyed a puppet army company in An Phong (Duc Chanh commune) and coordinated with guerrillas to attack the communal council, destroying 49 militiamen, strongly threatening the morale of the henchmen and spies. In Phase 3, the 48th Battalion of the Province and the guerrillas attacked the enemy in Quan Hong, Mang Giang bridge, Nghia Hiep commune, Dong Cat town and Thu Xa, destroyed Dap bridge and Giat Day bridge, forcing the enemy to disperse their forces and firepower in all directions.

Thus, the strong, continuous and widespread activities of local troops and guerrillas in all directions attracted and stretched the enemy forces, forcing them to disperse their forces to deal passively on a large scale, creating favourable opportunities for our main forces to continuously deal powerful blows to the US Marine Corps. At the same time, the effective combat operations of the 2nd Infantry Division pinned down the enemy's main force in the main direction, allowing local troops to take advantage of attacking a number of posts and strongholds, breaking the enemy's grip and, together with the political struggle force, mobilising the masses to rise up and expand the liberated areas.

The victory of the Tay Son Tinh Offensive Campaign demonstrated the determination to dare to fight the American army and defeat the invading American imperialists, along with the army and people of the South to defeat the enemy's first strategic counter-offensive in the dry season. Valuable lessons learned from the Campaign, especially the art of applying fighting methods, need to continue to be studied, applied and creatively developed in the war to safeguard the Fatherland.

Colonel, MA. HOANG VAN TOAN, Army College No1