The Tri-Thien Offensive Operation in 1972 shattered the enemy’s strong and fortified defensive line, completely liberating Quang Tri Province, and creating a new situation in our War Against the US Imperialism. The victory of the Operation demonstrated a new development in the art of combined arms warfare, and among them, the art of using artillery was one of the distinctive features of the Operation.

In early 1972, despite having suffered a devastating defeat in the 9th Route - Southern Laos Operation (in 1971), and facing the risk of completely failing their “Vietnamisation” strategy, the enemy, with their stubborn nature, still nurtured ambitions to prevent the worsening of the situation on the Indochina battlefield. In the Southern theatre, they consolidated their strong defensive positions, especially in strategic areas, increased their puppet forces, and intensified their pacification plans in order to gain complete control over this volatile theatre. In Laos and Cambodia, they intensified their encroachment activities, created chaos, and expanded their occupied territories. To achieve these goals, the enemy bolstered their forces, and resources, and focused on building the Tri-Thien area (the front line in the defensive system of the US and its puppet) into a solid and interconnected defensive line, in an attempt to defeat any upcoming offensives of our forces.

On our side, seizing the strategic opportunity, the Politburo decided to launch a strategic offensive across the entire Southern theatre in 1972, with the main thrust in the Tri-Thien area and important coordinated offensives in the Southeast and Central Highlands. After nearly three months of continuous fighting, with high determination and the application of unique military art, utilising the combined strength of different branches of the military, we dealt a heavy blow to the enemy, inflicted significant losses on their forces, and completely liberated Quang Tri Province. This played an important role in the overall victory of the 1972 Strategic Offensive. The success of the Operation marked a milestone in the development of our large-scale combined arms warfare, particularly in terms of organisational and command capacity, and the application of operational-level military art. Among them, the art of using artillery stood out prominently.

First, proactively carry out effective preparations in terms of forces and battlefield disposition. Recognising the clear significance and importance of preparation for the outcome of combat operations, with the role of being the main firepower of the Operation, the artillery forces closely followed the combat intentions of the operation, the actual situation, and the assigned tasks. They organised thorough dissemination of the tasks and build the determination of the troops. At the same time, they made preparations in terms of forces, resources, ammunition, and battlefield disposition, and made plans for combat coordination between units. To enhance the firepower of the artillery forces and ensure the element of surprise in combat, the Operation Command focused on force organisation and development, and the deployment of battlefield equipment. In particular, we proactively established motorised artillery regiments under the command of regular infantry divisions and organised the coordination of units from the guided anti-tank missile battalion (B72 – AT3) of the Artillery Command attached to the Campaign. Attention was paid to the organisation, adjustment, and replenishment of equipment for six strategic reserve artillery regiments (converted into long-range artillery); priority was given to equipping artillery companies and battalions under the command of infantry battalions and regiments participating in the Operation. At the same time, artillery units were directed to conduct supplementary training, study the combat plans, carry out combined arms exercises with infantry and live-fire exercises with various types of artillery, and train the troops to be familiar with the actual combat condition. Therefore, during the fighting process, the artillery forces proactively overcame difficulties, demonstrated the tradition of “Bronze feet, iron shoulder, fight well, shoot true”, and displayed creativity, intelligence, and courage, successfully fulfilling their assigned tasks in the Operation.

To establish a well-concealed and surprising artillery battle array, the units quickly constructed a system of mobile roads, conducted terrain research, organised artillery surveying, and intelligence gathering on the enemy, and established communication, logistics, and fortification networks for the artillery batteries and vehicles, and so on. Thanks to the proactive and comprehensive preparation work, the artillery forces were able to concentrate firepower, establish a well-concealed and surprising artillery battle array, closely coordinate with other forces, especially the infantry and other units in the main direction, and create a concentrated strength to deliver thunderous firepower to the enemy, ultimately achieving victory in the Operation.

Artillery of Division 304 participates in Quang Tri Operations in 1972

Second, organise, allocate, and deploy artillery batteries effectively; creatively apply the principle of concentrated firepower in combat. The Tri - Thien Operation in 1972 lasted relatively long and was conducted over a wide area, with numerous fierce battles involving various components and participating forces, undertaking multiple tasks and different objectives. The combat targets were the enemy forces entrenched in strong fortifications, with advantages in reconnaissance assets, air support and artillery firepower, etc. Therefore, to meet combat requirements, particularly the need for extensive artillery firepower, while our ability to mobilise artillery was still limited, the Operation Command directed the rational organisation, allocation, and deployment of artillery forces. Simultaneously, flexible and innovative applications of the concentrated firepower principle were implemented, with emphasis placed on providing support to key forces in the main offensive direction, pivotal battles, and decisive pivotal battles to accomplish the assigned missions.

Accordingly, the organisation of artillery forces was established comprehensively at all three levels: the operational artillery consisting of long-range artillery regiments and some large-calibre multiple rocket launcher regiments, forming artillery groups on the main attack directions and thrusts, concentrating on the main direction and main objectives, and in pivotal battles. The divisional artillery organised into artillery clusters, utilising large-calibre towed artillery (D-20, M-46) deployed in difficult and non-mobile terrains; depending on the mission, units were equipped with 160mm, 120mm mortars or BM-14, B-72 anti-tank missiles. The accompanying artillery of infantry regiments and battalions consisted of various types of mortars (120mm, 82mm, DKZ, etc.) providing direct fire support to infantry and tanks. With the establishment of a formidable battle array, effectively implementing the principle of “dispersed batteries, concentrated firepower”, that was in line with our tactics, conducting operational encirclement and cutting off action, the artillery forces of the Operation were able to suppress and gain dominance over the enemy’s outer artillery positions and within their defensive depth, maintaining the secrecy, surprise, ease of mobility, and favourable conditions for concentrating firepower.

Additionally, the Operational Command also conducted three major artillery strikes to swiftly shatter the enemy’s interconnected and robust defensive system, enhancing the breakthrough capability and combat pace of our infantry and tanks, creating a combined strength for victory. The first strike: we initiated the Operation with a simultaneous artillery barrage (Storm 1) right at the moment that the enemy was rotating troops, utilising 150 towed guns, over 200 towed artilleries and rocket systems and nearly 15,000 artillery rounds, accurately targeting 19 out of 24 enemy bases, catching them completely off guard and causing heavy damage, and creating favourable conditions for our infantry and tanks to encircle, approach, and break through the enemy’s outer defensive line. The second strike (eliminating enemy tanks and armoured vehicles in the vicinity of Dong Ha): we concentrated the firepower of five operational artillery battalions and divisional artillery units, with nearly 4,000 rounds of various large-calibre; simultaneously, we employed a combination of different anti-tank weapons, forming a powerful firepower system, defeating the enemy’s “hard mobile steel shell” tactics in their clustered tank formations on the outer perimeter, destroying each and every one of their tank clusters, enabling our infantry and tanks to swiftly advance and shatter the enemy’s main defensive positions in Dong Ha town. The third strike (artillery ambush at La Vang): we utilised the concentrated firepower of four artillery clusters and a battalion of BM-14 rocket artillery, with nearly 600 rounds, firing rapidly for 15 minutes, turning the enemy’s retreat into a full-scale rout, inflicting heavy losses on their forces and equipment. This was also the first and only time in our military history that artillery ambush strikes were employed in an offensive campaign.

Third, closely combine various types of artillery, and promptly and flexibly mobilise forces and firepower to address combat demands. The enemy’s defence in Tri-Thien relied on a strong system of fortifications, with maximum coordination between the air force and artillery inside and outside their bases, combined with the strength of their tanks and armoured vehicles to counter us. Thanks to our firm understanding of the enemy and the terrain, we effectively utilised and exploited the range and capabilities of our artillery, closely combining motorised guns with large-calibre mortars, thereby significantly multiplying our firepower, promptly concentrating it on key directions, tasks, areas, and decisive battles. Simultaneously, we capitalised on the advantages of accompanying artillery to conduct infiltration and close-range combat and combined the use of various anti-tank weapons at different distances to enhance target destruction performance. Especially during Phase 02 of the Operation, we employed B72 anti-tank missiles, creating the elements of secrecy and surprise for the enemy, resulting in the destruction of a large number tanks and armored vehicles and quickly breaking through the enemy’s "steel belt" in the western and northern parts of Dong Ha.

It can be affirmed that in the history of our artillery operations, one of the most important factors to achieve victory is effectively addressing the issue of manoeuvrability of forces and firepower, timely adjusting the battle array, providing effective fire support to infantry, tanks, and handling situations to fulfil assigned tasks. With a clear understanding of this issue, the Operational Command focused on effectively addressing issues related to mobility (mobility routes, vehicles, artillery, repairment, recovery, and the organisation of command coordination, and maintenance and supply), allowing artillery units to manoeuver to their firing positions, ensuring safety, secrecy, and precise timing (when all artillery forces in all directions were ready to execute “Storm 1,” the enemy were still unaware of our offensive intention). During the course of the Operation, artillery units were able to deploy their force and hardware safely and promptly to provide support to all directions and spearheads. In Phase 01, after providing fire support to infantry and tanks to outer strongholds, artillery units sequentially moved their formations to forward areas (Mai Loc, Lang Mut, Bai Son shrine, etc.), they simultaneously conducted manoeuver and preparation for the offensive in Dong Ha and Ai Tu. In Phase 02, motorised artillery units primarily focused on deploying their batteries, while towed artillery units closely accompanied infantry and tanks, providing firepower to destroy the enemy. To prepare for Phase 03, operational artillery units redeployed for the second time, crossing the Thach Han River into Truong Phuoc, passing through Cua Viet into My Thuy, An Don, Nham Bien, etc., providing fire support for advancing forces along the southern My Chanh River, Đong Lam to conclude the Operation.

The above highlights the distinctive artistic features and valuable lessons regarding the art of using artillery and large-scale combined arms actions in the Tri -Thien Operation of 1972, which should continue to be studied, applied, and creatively developed in the cause of national defence today.

Senior Colonel, PhD. NGUYEN VAN HUNG, Army Academy