In the 9th Route - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Campaign, we annihilated a large enemy force, shattered and completely defeated the largest military operation of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in 1971, firmly protecting our strategic transportation lines and logistical bases. The victory of the Campaign dealt a heavy blow to the “Vietnamisation” strategy of the US Imperialists, leaving behind valuable lessons, especially the art of transforming the battlefield.

In early 1971, with the aim of stepping up the implementation of the “Vietnamisation” strategy, the US Military Command and the ARVN aggressively launched offensives throughout Indochina, using puppet forces as the backbone and with maximum support from American firepower. They focused on attacking our strategic transportation corridors and logistical areas in Central-Southern Laos and Northeastern Cambodia. To realise this plan, along with the escalation of “pacification” activities in the South, the enemy conducted numerous large-scale military operations. Among them, Operation Lam Son 719 was the largest, mobilising substantial forces and resources to advance into the 9th Route - Southern Laos region, with the intention of severing or completely destroying our transportation lines and strategic logistical bases. They aimed to isolate the Southern Theatre, preventing our main forces from launching major offensives, while also testing the capabilities of the ARVN in the implementation of the "Vietnamisation" strategy. Fully aware of the situation and closely monitoring the enemy’s activities, the Central Party Committee and the Central Military Commission decided to launch the 9th Route - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Campaign, aiming to annihilate a large enemy force, decisively defeat their military operation, and firmly defend our strategic transportation lines and logistical bases. After nearly two months of continuous fighting, utilising our unique military art, we dealt a devastating blow to the enemy, opening up the possibility of completely defeating their elite main forces, which were part of the strategic reserve of the ARVN. This was a significant success of a large-scale joint combined arms counteroffensive campaign, highlighting the distinctive features of the art of transforming the battlefield of our military.

First, establish an unpredictable, robust, and clever initial battle array as a foundation for transforming the battlefield during the course of the operation. The 9th Route - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Campaign took place in a vast operational area with a sparse population, and our targets were the most elite and battle-hardened units of the ARVN, which boasted a large number of troops equipped with modern weapons and equipment, and advanced mechanised vehicles. They also had the ability to conduct widespread electronic warfare and widespread psychological operations and were heavily supported by aerial and artillery units, and a portion of the US military. Therefore, in order to ensure the success of our counteroffensive, we needed to form an initial battle array that was robust, clever and unexpected to the enemy with advantageous striking and defensive positions. It also needed to facilitate the mobility of our forces and vehicles, allow for flexible transformation of the battlefield, and maintain the initiative for counterattacks, creating a clear advantage over the enemy in the area of operation and at decisive moments to defeat their military operation.

To realise these objectives, our General Staff proactively developed the operational plan, directed the organisation of forces, and made necessary preparations for the battlefield. Accordingly, we established the 70th Corps - the first strategic mobile corps of our military, consisting of three infantry divisions: the 304th, 308th, and 320th, along with various support units. Thanks to the strong mobile forces, we managed adjusted the deployment positions of units in a timely manner, creating an unexpected and formidable initial battle array that allowed our units to engage the enemy from multiple directions. To establish a favourable battle array for the counteroffensive, the Campaign Command deployed the 24th Regiment (304th Division) with artillery and anti-aircraft gun support and in coordination with the onsite units at Cha Ki Bridge, Hill 351, Co Roc, etc., to establish blocking and rendezvous positions, aiming to prevent the enemy’s main advance along Route 9 from Lao Bao to Ban Dong. In the main counteroffensive direction (North Route 9), we deployed the 308th Division and the 64th Regiment (320th Division); on the secondary counteroffensive direction (southward), we deployed the 324th Division (understrength) and the 2nd Division (understrength) supported by several tank, artillery, and anti-aircraft contingents. For the coordinated counteroffensive direction (westward), we positioned the 48th Regiment (320th Division) at Muong Phan, Pha Lan. These deployments created a truly complex and robust initial battle array, providing favourable conditions for the utilisation of our main mobile forces early on, causing surprise and launching powerful attacks at critical positions, resulting in the destruction of a large enemy force.

To establish a strong battle array for onsite forces and secure vital and vulnerable positions, we made several adjustments in Front B5 units and some contingents from the Tri-Thien Military Region (B4). The 559th Transport Division was reorganised and ordered to establish an extensive air defence network, concentrating on strategic points and high ground (in the northern and southern areas of Route 9), ready to engage the enemy’s airborne landing. Along with force organisation, deployments, and arrangements, the Campaign Command promptly directed the disposition of battlefield equipment to create favourable conditions for us and disrupt the enemy’s offensive posture. Simultaneously, we opened new routes to enhance the transportation of materials by motorised units and prepared defensive structures and fortifications in key areas such as Cu Boc, Cu Roc, and high points like 660 and 723. We also established operational-level blocking positions at the Cha Ki Bridge and Hill 351 to halt the enemy’s advance towards Ban Dong and prevent their progress towards Tchepone.

Thanks to the establishment of an unexpected, robust, and clever battle array, right from the beginning, we were able to encircle, surround, cut off, and contain enemy groups, as well as launch widespread counterattacks. In addition, we managed to promptly and flexibly transform the battle array and inflicted significant damage on the enemy’s forces and equipment, forcing them to deploy their formations in disadvantageous positions and limiting their ability to coordinate their advances. This defeated their plan to fully utilise their heli-bourne and armoured-bourne tactics to conduct “rapid attack, rapid advance”.

Second, firmly grasp the situation, promptly adjust and supplement the battle plan, and actively launch offensives to destroy the enemy. A counteroffensive campaign often involves engaging the enemy while they are advancing, so both we and the enemy are always seeking every means to gain the initiative. The situation is highly dynamic, with rapid and complex developments, sometimes even beyond expectations. Therefore, the Campaign Command must constantly monitor the battlefield situation, have a firm grasp on all aspects to adjust and supplement the combat plans and objective in a timely manner in order to seize the initiative in the counteroffensive, defeating all tactics and measures employed by the enemy.

Developments in the Campaign showed that prior to the offensive, the enemy stepped up their subversive activities in Southern Zone 4. However, thanks to timely detection, we promptly adjusted our battle plan, and swiftly mobilised and deployed forces and resources, shifting the focus of our preparation to the Route 9 - Southern Laos area, ready to counterattack and defeat their operation. As the enemy launched their offensive, they realised that our forces in the southern part of Route 9 were relatively thin, mainly consisting of units from the 559th Division, with limited capability to hold onto strongholds and defensive positions and our Campaign Command had already dispatched the 324th Division from Route 12 to reinforce the southern direction. Thanks to the timely transformation of the battle array, our forces in the southern direction quickly launched an offensive, completely destroying one battalion and inflicting heavy losses on another battalion of the enemy’s 1st Infantry Division, and maintaining a strong counterattacking momentum in this direction. Faced with consecutive heavy defeats, the enemy decided to adjust their plans, reorganise their forces, and bring in their second echelon into combat but still failed to turn the tide of the battle, and ultimately had to cancel their offensive and gradually shift to a defensive posture in Ban Dong, focusing on clearing and opening Route 9 (from Lao Bao to Ban Dong). Grasping the changes in the enemy’s battle plan, we quickly adjusted our combat objective, and organised forces to encircle, cut off, and isolate the enemy in each area to form a favourable counterattacking posture. We concentrated our forces, utilising the combined strength of different arms of our forces, and initiated a decisive battle to cause major destruction to the enemy’s large forces clustering in Ban Dong, forcing them to abandon this important stronghold. With a firm grasp of the Campaign’s developments, we were able to promptly supplement our objectives and reorganise our forces to block their retreat routes and later shift our focus on pursuing and destroying the fleeing enemy.  

Third, flexibly and creatively employ various combat tactics and fighting methods. In the Route 9 - Southern Laos Campaign, to defeat the enemy’s large forces and undermine their strengths while exploiting their weaknesses through various tactics and combat measures, the Campaign Command focused on firmly grasping the situation, applied flexible combat tactics and closely combined fighting methods, ensuring their suitability for each enemy target and terrain. We leveraged the strengths and fighting manners of each unit to launch “in-depth, covert, and widespread" strikes, and promptly and effectively handle various situations with high combat efficiency.

In the eastern counteroffensive direction, while the enemy was deploying their offensive formation, B5 forces set up ambushes on land and along the river banks in the Bong Kho - Dau Mau section. They conducted artillery strikes on the enemy’s logistical bases and command posts in Sa Mu, Dong Ha, Cua Viet, etc resulting in the heavy destruction of enemy manpower and combat vehicles, slowing down their advancing speed. This created favourable conditions for our forces in other directions to be well-prepared and ready to counterattack and defeat the enemy. In the main counteroffensive direction, the 88th Regiment (308th Division) closely shadowed the enemy and launched unexpected strikes that inflicted heavy damage on the enemy’s 21st Ranger Battalion at Hill 316. The 64th Regiment conducted offensive manoeuvres and inflicted damage on the enemy’s 6th Parachute Battalion and completely destroyed two puppet companies at Hill 456. The 102nd Regiment encircled and eliminated the enemy’s 39th Ranger Battalion at Hill 500. Particularly, the 64th Regiment (320th Division) supported by tanks, artillery, rocket artillery, and engineering contingents, encircled and encroached the enemy at Hill 543, then launched simultaneous attacks, combining breakthroughs with deep thrusts, and cut-off actions to anihilate the enemy’s 3rd Ranger Battalion and capturing the enemy’s brigade commander and his staff. In the Ban Dong area, thanks to good preparations, we halted the enemy’s advancing formation, utilising various units to encircle the enemy and cut off traffic on Route 9 (from Lao Bao to Ban Dong), resolutely preventing them from advancing to Tchepone and firmly defend our strategic transportation line. When the enemy withdrew from Ban Dong, we quickly shifted from encirclement to pursuit operations. Therefore, by proactively selecting suitable combat tactics and closely combining them with appropriate fighting methods, we consistently maintained the initiative throughout the counteroffensive, timely transformed the battle array, and forced the enemy to shift to a passive stance and deploy their formations in unfavourable terrains, caused confusion and the loss of initiative in their offensive, ultimately leading to their defeat.

The valuable lessons and experiences in the art of battlefield transformation that we learned from the Route 9 - Southern Laos counteroffensive campaign have become an integral part of Vietnam’s military art. It stands as one of the exemplary campaigns that need to be further studied and creatively applied in the cause of defending the Motherland today.

Senior Colonel, Dr. TRINH DUC DUY, Army College No1