As the first military operation of our forces in the resistance war against the French Colonialism, the Counter-Offensive Operation in Viet Bac Autumn-Winter 1947 defeated the enemy’s plan for “swift strike, swift victory”, ensuring the firm protection of the headquarters and bases of the resistance in Viet Bac. It also preserved and enhanced the combat capabilities of our regular troops. The success of the operation left many valuable lessons, especially in the art of transforming combat posture at operational level in a wide area of operation, right in the early stage of the war.

In October 1947, the French Colonialists, determined to implement their “swift strike, swift victory" plan, decided to launch a large-scale military operation with the ambitious objective of advancing into Viet Bac to eliminate and capture our resistance leadership, search and destroy our main forces, dismantle Viet Bac bases, search and destroy our main force, block the Vietnam - China border to stop aids from socialist bloc for our forces, and strive for a decisive victory to swiftly defeat our people’s resistance movement.

In the face of the enemy’s schemes and tactics, the Central Party Committee and President Ho Chi Minh led our People and Military to decisively destroy the ambitions of the French Colonialists. With the collective strength of the nation, a resolute spirit, ingenuity, creativity, and the art of “taking the weak to counter the strong, using the small to defeat the large, and employing the few to deal with the many” we remained calm and clear-headed to deal with challenges and disadvantages and step by step turn the tide of battle, and swiftly regain the strategic initiative, defeating the offensive of the French professional military force. The success of the Counter-Offensive Operation in Viet Bac Autumn-Winter 1947 affirmed remarkable advancements in our technical and tactical skills and the ability to coordinate multiple forces in action to destroy the enemy. It left behind valuable lessons in the operational art, in which the art of transforming combat posture was one of the most significant features.

First, establish a robust and complex initial combat posture, simultaneously carry out combat deployment and harassing action to disrupt the enemy formation. To gradually defeat the enemy’s three-pronged assault, it was essential for us to establish a robust, complex, flexible, and dynamic initial combat posture. This was the basis for us to swiftly regain the initiative, allowing us to skillfully “luring” the enemy into the areas we had chosen for their destruction, eliminating their advantages in firepower and number, disorienting them, causing them to lose the initiative, and moving from one mistake to another, and ultimately leading to their defeat. To realise this strategy, the task of building our forces and preparing the battlefield was urgently carried out, especially after we obtained intel on the enemy’s plan to advance into Viet Bac. Consequently, we deployed 18 regular battalions, concentrating on three directions: River Lo - Route 02, Route 03, and Route No. 04. We followed the principle of “independent companies, concentrated battalions”, leveraged favourable terrains, and established a complex counter-offensive posture, and executed key battles in a timely manner to halt and bog down each offensive prong, disrupting their plan to concentrate their attacks. Alongside the emphasis on establishing combat posture for mobile forces advancing against the enemy on all directions, we also proactively dispersed a significant part of our regular forces across the Viet Bac region, organising them into 30 independent companies and dispatching them to critical areas to bolster guerrilla warfare, carrying out the principle of “with an effective combat posture, the few can defeat the many, the small can fight the large”. As a result, in a short period, thousands of fighting villages were established, and hundreds of guerrilla units were meticulously organised. This created a widespread people’s warfare posture and exponentially multiplied the strength of our on-site forces. We relentlessly launched attacks against enemy formations, gradually making them gradually to lose their operational and strategic initiative. The enemy was trapped in the “net of people’s warfare”, their strength, equipment, and morale were depleted, and the fighting spirit of their soldiers deteriorated, leading to a steady decline in their combat effectiveness.

In addition to focusing on building the combat posture for mobile forces and on-site units, we actively pursued the dual strategy of “simultaneously forming friendly’s posture and disrupting the enemy’s disposition”. We timely directed contingents in all sectors to intensify their efforts in sabotaging the enemy’s lines of communication along their ground attack directions. We organised deception activities along waterways, planted spike traps at key locations to prevent enemy parachute landings. At the same time, we proactively dispersed and relocated supply depots, workshops, bases, and evacuated and guided the civilian population to implement scorched earth strategy. This made it impossible for the enemy to forage supply to sustains their units. The enemy’s ability to supply their troops, which was already meagre, was made even more difficult due to their distant rear areas and treacherous terrain. As a result, the enemy could not fully exploit their advantages in terms of rapid mobility. Coordinated actions between their units were limited. Their paratroopers were isolated and surrounded and could not made any advance or withdraw. Their mobile force on Route 04 was divided and had to advance at an extremely slow speed due to the fact that they had to keep stopping to repair damaged roads during the march. All in all, it was obvious that their plan to converge to destroy our forces was a complete failure.  

Second, promptly adjust combat plan, proactively and flexibly transform combat posture to maintain the offensive initiative. In the early stages of the operation, in some directions our forces were caught off guard and had to react to the enemy in a passive manner, this led to initial casualties and material losses. However, having a comprehensive grasp of the overall situation and enjoying favourable terrains and effective initial posture formation, we promptly repositioned our forces in various directions, quickly regained the initiative and launched counterattacks, turning the tide of battle. We pushed back each of the enemy’s offensive prongs, defeating their large-scale operation. Based on a comprehensive situational awareness, the General Command issued orders for our units in the three directions to reorganise their forces, forming three fronts: Route 03, Cao Bang - Route 04, River Lo - Route 02. Simultaneously, the overall objective of the operation was promptly adjusted. Consequently, when the enemy unexpectedly dropped their paratroopers into the areas of Bac Kan, Cho Moi, and Cho Don, we rapidly deployed the 160^th Battalion of General Command and the 72^nd Battalion of the 1^st Military Zone to Cho Moi and dispatched the 72^nd Regiment to operate from Cao Bang to Bac Kan. We also ordered the forces in the southern direction (in the vicinities of Thai Nguyen and Tuyen Quang) to move northward immediately to intercept the enemy. As a result, the enemy’s parachute units were quickly surrounded, isolated, and cut off from resupply and reinforcement, their surprise plan to capture our resistance headquarters was completely thwarted. Our units, from being initially surprised and passively reactive, quickly regained the offensive initiative, employing guerrilla and mobile warfare tactics that aligned with their existing equipment, strengths, and the rugged mountainous terrain, implementing the strategy of “divide and conquer”, surprising the enemy causing confusion among their unit and inflicting heavy human and material losses to them.

On the Cao Bang - Route 04 front, we adjusted the positioning of the 174^th Battalion and focused on engaging the enemy from Cao Bang to That Khe. In addition, independent companies were positioned at key points, ready to engage the enemy in Nguyen Binh and Phuc Hoa. The 11^th Regiment was reallocated to focus on defeating the enemy on Route 04, in the section from Lang Son to Dong Khe, and on Route 01, from Lang Son to Dong Mo. On the Lo River - Route 02 front, we deployed the regular troops of the 10^th Military Zone and the 01 battalion of the General Command to engage the enemy on the Lo River in the section from Viet Tri to Tuyen Quang. The 147^th Battalion and 02 regular battalion of the General Command were tasked with defending the southern part of the provincial road connecting Tuyen Quang to Thai Nguyen. Thanks to the proactive force organisation and adjustments, and the flexible transformation of combat posture aligned with our combat capabilities, our units were not merely on the defensive but instead launched proactive assaults to halt the enemy. They carried out extensive guerrilla warfare in combination with mobile warfare, harnessing the strength of all fighting forces to engage the enemy comprehensively. We thoroughly exploited the enemy’s vulnerabilities when operating on challenging terrain, which stretched thin their formations, limiting their ability to rescue, support and coordinate with each other. These factors enabled us to promptly push back enemy offensive prongs, defeating their plan to envelop and encircle our forces.

Third, flexibly apply tactical forms and combat methods, fully utilise the combined strength of our fighting forces. In the face of the French forces’ overwhelming numerical, firepower and mobility superiority, we did not opt for a passive defensive stance or fixed defensive lines to block the enemy’s advance. Instead, we took the initiative in both offensive and counter-offensive actions to halt, encircle, and isolate enemy units, and combined guerrilla tactics with mobile warfare to destroy them. Thanks to the terrain advantage, we managed to exploited the enemy’s fatal weaknesses and fully utilise the strength of our units. We flexibly employed various tactical forms and combat methods, with a focus on targeting smaller, mobile enemy units for our primary offensives. We timely and effectively responded to each situation, inflicting losses to the enemy wherever they went, depleting their manpower, hampering their resupply efforts, and ultimately leading to their defeat. Thanks to a continuous grasp of enemy situation, the Capital Regiment launched a surprised assault on the enemy company in Cho Don, while other units conducted over 17 small ambushes along the Cho Moi - Bac Kan - Phu Thong road. These actions played a part in wearing down the enemy’s manpower and combat resources, dividing their formations, and cutting off their supply lines. Our guiding principle was to focus on their weak points and attack where they were vulnerable, placing them in a difficult situation that led to significant damage. On the Lo River - Route 02 front, we used artillery with direct fire at close range to ambush the enemy’s boats in areas such as Doan Hung, Binh Ca, and Khoan Bo. We utilised landmines for ambushes at kilometer post 07, killing and wounding nearly 100 enemy soldiers. On Route 04, we made use of the difficult terrain with remote paths, high mountains, dense forests, winding roads, and steep slopes to set up battalion-level ambushes to effectively cut off the enemy’s lines of communication. Notably, the ambush in Bong Lau turned the area into the “deadly road” for the enemy. By flexibly and creatively applying combat tactics combined with various measures, we harnessed the strength of our forces, efficiently managed each situation, gained and maintained the initiative to conduct widespread counter-offensives and offensives. We exploited the enemy’s dilemma of dividing unit to protect their land and riverbourne transportation columns and concentrating forces to envelop our units. The more we fought, the weaker the enemy became, and ultimately was forced to withdraw from Viet Bac.

The lessons and experiences in military art, particularly the art of transforming combat posture, drawn from the Viet Bac Autumn-Winter 1947 Operation, need to continue to be studied, developed, and applied creatively in the modern conditions.

Senior Colonel, Dr. TRAN VAN CAO, Army College No.1