In coordination with other theatres during the Winter – Spring Strategic Offensive of 1953 – 1954, we launched a surprise campaign in Central – Lower Laos, inflicting major losses to the enemy, forcing them to disperse their mobile reserve forces in multiple directions. This is a small-scale campaign conducted in a strategic area, far from our logistics bases; however, with the employment of the art of “striking at one point to destroy reinforcements”, we were able to achieve very high combat efficiency, contributing to the ultimate victory of our Resistance War against French Colonialism.

In their plan to invade Indochina, the French colonialists always considered Central - Lower Laos as a strategically important region, a strong defensive line to block our main forces from the North crossing the 18^th parallel to the South. Due to the fact that our resistance forces and the Lao resistance forces had never launched a major offensive in this area, the enemy’s defence here was relatively weak, mainly manned by Laotian puppet forces at key positions along Routes 9, 12, 13, etc. However, upon detecting our main forces advancing into Central Laos, General Henri Navarre - the Commander-in-Chief of all French Forces in Indochina - hastily deployed 6 elite infantry battalions of Mobile Group 2 (GM2), and 1 artillery battalion to reinforce this strategic area. In carrying out this plan, the enemy organised their defensive positions into 3 strongholds (Na Peu, Khamkeut, Lak Sao; Banaphar; Nam Theun), with reinforced fortifications, and regularly conducted reconnaissance patrols to detect and deter our offensives from afar.

In line with the strategic combat plan of Winter - Spring 1953 - 1954, our Politburo and General Staff decided to coordinate with the Pathet Lao to launch an offensive campaign into the Central - Lower Lao region. In this campaign, that we only had limited preparation time and did not hold a significant numerical advantage over the enemy, and our forces had to fight in a vast area of operation with distant supply lines. However, with high combat spirit and the application of unique military tactics, including the prudent preservation of forces for sustained, high endurance engagement, we managed to deal successive decisive blows to the enemy. The success of the campaign forced French Command to dispatch large portion of its strategic mobile forces to Central Laos, weakening their main forces in the Red River Delta; it also caused substantial enemy casualties and losses, facilitating the expansion and consolidation of liberated areas of the  Lao resistance forces and the opening of the strategic North-South corridor. This was truly a strategic offensive with high combat performance, yielding valuable lessons in the art of conducting small-scale campaigns; notably, the art of “striking at one point to destroy reinforcements” stood out prominently.

First, correctly selecting the target area for “point striking”. Given that our forces did not hold a numerical advantage over the enemy, to ensure the success of engagements and the “manipulation” of enemy movement according to our tactics, the Campaign Command decided to target feasible but critical positions within the enemy’s defensive system, such as Kham He bridge, Hiu Sin, Thakhek, etc., to “provoke” the enemy and force them to respond, thus enabling us to destroy them outside their fortifications. In the initial phase of the Campaign, to ensure success of the first engagement, we chose a newly constructed enemy stronghold in the area of Kham He bridge as the “point striking” target. This was an absolutely correct decision, demonstrating innovative thinking, thorough study, and careful assessment of the situation by the Campaign Command, as this stronghold was a critical “node” on Route 12, connecting two strong enemy positions, namely Thakhek and Mu Gia. Once it was destroyed, the continuous defensive line linking the East and West of Route 12 would be completely broken, seriously threatening enemy strongholds such as Banaphar, Kha Ma, etc., along  Route 12. Moreover, to defend this crucial stronghold, the enemy reinforced itself with a 105mm artillery battalion from Thakhek - their main fire support unit - aiming to deter our offensives and protect the strongholds along this vital supply route. With such a crucial stronghold, when we launched our attack, facing the risk of its destruction, the enemy undoubtedly had to deploy elite main forces to reinforce it, falling into our trap. On the other hand, situation assessment showed that this stronghold was newly constructed after the enemy had detected our regular units moving to the Central Laos theatre, indicating that its fortifications were not completed, its obstacle system was rudimentary, and there were many weak points in its defence disposition. If we secretly encircled and launched a surprise attack, it would quickly collapse. Therefore, the decision to attack the Kham He bridge area was to avoid the enemy strong positions and strike at their vulnerable but critical points, creating a breakthrough and advancing the success of the Campaign. The outcome of the Campaign proved that this decision was entirely correct; Regiment 101 quickly eliminated the enemy stronghold overnight and managed to redeploy its troops in a timely manner to set up ambushes at both ends of Kham He bridge to eliminate the enemy company moving in from Banaphar to lift the siege with high combat efficiency.

Second, organising and utilising combat force in a rational and flexible manner, creating combined strength to secure victory. Faced with the overwhelming advantages in terms of number, firepower, and mobility of the French forces, to ensure victory in each engagement and sever each important “node” in the enemy’s defensive line, the Campaign Command always maintained a firm grasp of the situation, organising and utilising units in a rational manner to conduct continuous and high endurance combat. Through reconnaissance, we observed that the enemy deployed their  27^th Algerian Mobile Battalion and one artillery company only to defend the Kham He bridge area. However, the depth and width of its defence were extensive and its formation was dispersed, unable to establish continuous defence lines, with limited ability to provide mutual support during combat. Furthermore, this was a newly established enemy stronghold, with unfinished fortifications and an insufficient obstacle system. Based on this assessment, the Campaign Command decided to only employ 2 battalions from Regiment 101 to attack 1 reinforced enemy battalion, effectively implementing the guiding principle of “preserving forces for prolonged combat.” This was a correct decision, entirely appropriate for the balance of force between us and the enemy and the terrain in the operational area. It ensured our success while also created pressure to “lure” enemy reinforcements from other areas. Additionally, in line with the intention to primarily engage the enemy outside their fortifications, immediately after “flattening” the enemy stronghold at the Kham He bridge area, we utilised conscripted labourers from Nghe An to collect weapons, haul artillery and ammunition into the forest for concealment; and the main force of Regiment 101 was ordered to promptly set up ambush positions to intercept enemy reinforcements from Banaphar and Nhom Ma Rat. Furthermore, we closely coordinated with Pathet Lao units to disrupt traffic on Route 13 at the area linking Central and Upper Laos. In addition, the militia and guerrilla forces of Khammuane province conducted activities to encircle, threaten, and disintegrate enemy puppet forces and gradually expanded liberated areas. Thus, through the art of organising and utilising forces with a focus on the main task of destroying the enemy outside their fortifications, we gained a significant advantage over the enemy. Within a short period of time, we swiftly annihilated their reinforcements at both ends of Kham He bridge, partly completing the Campaign’s objectives. Moreover, to concentrate forces for the “point striking” mission targeting Thakhek, we successfully enlisted and utilised 200 prisoners of war to transport ammunition, food, and medical supplies with the unit, contributing to enhancing its strength for combat. Consequently, despite our limited number compared to the enemy, long marching distance, and challenging terrain, our flexible force organisation and utilisation allowed us to leverage the strength of each unit to accelerate the pace of movement, timely prepare for combat operations, create surprise elements, and swiftly eliminate the Thakhek stronghold within a short time frame.

Third, flexibly applying creative tactical forms and combat methods. In the Central – Lower Laos Offensive Campaign, our main units had to fight in challenging mountainous terrain, far from our logistics bases, against the French expeditionary forces boasting numerical advantage, formidable firepower, and high mobility. Therefore, to mitigate their strengths and exploit their weaknesses, the Campaign Command maintained a firm grasp of the situation, flexibly applied various tactical forms, closely integrated combat methods, ensuring their suitability for each enemy unit and terrain, leveraging the strengths and combat styles of each of our unit, and adaptively transforming the combat posture in a timely manner.

For “point striking” engagement, we employed the tactic of attacking the enemy in strong fortifications, continuously making breakthroughs, and swiftly eliminating enemy strongholds. When the enemy dispatched their reinforcement to relieve besieged positions, we utilised the advantageous terrain to execute ambushes and raids, eliminating enemy forces outside their fortifications – “destroying reinforcements”. In practice, during the second phase of the Campaigm, when shifting the offensive direction down to Route 9, the determined objective of the Campaign Command was to cut off this strategic supply route, forcing the enemy to deploy additional forces from the North for reinforcement, or luring them out of strongholds such as Xepon, especially Xeno, to create opportunities for destroying them during their marching process and expanding liberated areas. Implementing this strategy, our forces and the Lao resistance forces launched successive attacks against the enemy in strong fortifications along Route 9 and Route 8B, such as the attack to eliminate the enemy’s 3^rd Mobile Parachute Battalion at Hin Siu and the ambush inflicting heavy casualties on 2 enemy battalions from Xeno when moving in to rescue the besieged unit. To draw the enemy out further and continue creating opportunities to engage them outside their fortifications, Regiment 66 attacked 3 positions simultaneously: Falam, Hasala, Xe Thamouak. Subsequently, we organised ambushes along Route 9, from Dong Hen to Phou Lan, swiftly eliminating 2 puppet companies, destroying over 40 vehicles, and capturing nearly 100 enemy troops.

To further ensure the destruction of the enemy, we employed various combat methods with utmost flexibility and creativity in each engagement and combat scenario, demonstrating the significant maturity and progress of our officers and soldiers in technical and tactical proficiency. An exemplary instance is the artful combination of breakthrough with deep penetration tactics in the attack on the stronghold of Kham He by Regiment 101.

Faced with a large enemy stronghold, garrisoned by a large number of enemy troops inside strong fortifications, the command of Regiment 101 organised two daring thrusts directly into the enemy’s command post and the 105mm artillery positions. Simultaneously, other contingents launched coordinated attacks to divide the enemy’s defending formation into multiple sections, combining inward assaults with outward manoeuvres, launching a vigorous offensive that prevented them from regrouping. As a result, we swiftly seized control of the battlefield, eliminating the majority of the 27^th Algerian Mobile Battalion and the enemy’s 105mm artillery unit, with 60 individuals captured alive.

With this strategic victory in the Central–Lower Lao region, our forces and the Lao resistance forces successfully “split Indochina in half”, forcing French Command to dispatch a large force from Red River Delta to establish 2 fortified stronghold groups, namely Xeno¹ and Salavan². The Navarre Plan stood on the brink of complete failure. Lessons learned from the Campaign, particularly the art of “striking at one point to destroy reinforcements”, need further study and creative application in the ongoing endeavour to defend the Fatherland.

Colonel, Dr MAI DUC KIEN, Infantry Officer College No.1

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1 – Over 26 battalions

2 – 2 mobile groups (GM7 and GM51)