Sixty years ago, for the first time on the southern battlefield, the Regional Military Command concentrated significant forces to launch the Binh Gia Offensive Campaign, achieving a resounding victory and creating new strategic advantages for the revolutionary forces during the early years of the resistance against the American imperialism. This campaign left behind many valuable lessons in the art of operational warfare, espeacially the shaping and transformation of order of battle.

In 1964, in response to the growing revolutionary movement in the South, the enemy was forced to stretch its resources to counter, and tensions between the United States and its puppet government escalated, leading to continuous military coups. Faced with the imminent collapse of the “Special Warfare” strategy, the US and the puppet government stubbornly pressed on with the “McNamara Plan” in an attempt to pacify the South within three years. They sought to use their military superiority and all forms of deceitful tactics to crush the revolutionary movement and prevent the development of concentrated military operations of our main forces. In pursuit of this objective, they established four military zones in the crucial Ba Ria area (Duc Thanh, Long Dien, Dat Do, and Xuyen Moc), reinforcing their forces and resources, fortifying posts and outposts, and actively consolidating the population into “strategic hamlets.” Among them, Binh Gia was considered a “model strategic hamlet” and was given special protection, with plans to replicate this model throughout the South.

The Binh Gia Victory Monument (An illustrative photo)

In terms of our forces, following the resolutions of the 9^th Plenum of the Central Party Committee, the Southern Central Committee determined that it was essential to build a strong main force and launch large-scale concentrated operations aimed at annihilating segments of the enemy’s main military forces, thereby defeating the key foundation of American imperialism’s “Special Warfare” strategy. This would create a new strategic situation for the revolution. To accomplish this, the Regional Party Committee and Military Command decided to launch the Binh Gia Offensive Campaign in the Southeastern region, with the objectives of destroying enemy manpower, disrupting their “key pacification” plan, supporting the uprising of the mass to dismantle “strategic hamlets”, intensifying guerrilla warfare, and expanding liberated zones. Although it was the first major operation for the Southern main forces and had to be conducted in a distant battlefield far from the rear, our troops demonstrated high morale and utilised unique military tactics. For the first time, we decisively eliminated an enemy armoured division equipped with heavy firepower, causing unexpected and significant losses for them. This important victory marked a turning point in the balance of forces and the overall battlefield situation, shifting it to our favour. It played a key role in defeating the “Special Warfare” strategy of the enemy and paved the way for further actions to thwart American - puppet regime’s strategic plots. Furthermore, it confirmed the remarkable development of the Southern Liberation Army, particularly in terms of operational warfare tactics, including the art of shaping and transforming order of battle.

Firstly, skilfully employing deception tactics, “misleading and luring the enemy,” to establish a solid and treacherous initial defensive position. In the Binh Gia Offensive Campaign, to surprise the enemy and create favourable conditions for our troops to begin and conclude the campaign at the most advantageous locations and timings, we executed precise and effective strikes that disrupted enemy operations. We cleverly applied flexible strategic tricks to “mislead and lure the enemy” according to our style of warfare, achieving high operational effectiveness. Prior to the start of the campaign, to maintain secrecy and surprise the enemy regarding the primary direction and decisive battle, we used a wide range of deceptive tactics to mislead and force the enemy to disperse their main mobile forces across a large area. This led them to overlook vulnerabilities in the Duc Thanh - Binh Gia region. To execute this plan, the Regional Military Command instructed local forces to carry out operations across the entire battlefield, including raids on the “strategic hamlets” surrounding the military outposts of Hoai Duc, Long Dien, and Dat Do; ambushing enemy convoys on Route 15; launching artillery strikes on Bien Hoa airfield to limit enemy air support, and so on. These widespread and distant deceptive activities diverted the enemy’s attention, causing them to misjudge our intended offensive direction. As a result, they were forced to spread their forces and firepower across a wide area, leaving them completely passive. By the time we launched our attack, the Duc Thanh and Binh Gia areas had become vulnerable and weak. Seizing the opportunity provided by the deception, the 761st and 762nd Regiments secretly crossed the Dong Nai River, moving through National Routes 20 and 1 to occupy and deploy their attack formations in accordance with the plan, maintaining secrecy and safety (The operations centre for the campaign was set up on Nua mountain; the 761st Regiment was stationed in the south of Xuan Son; the 762nd Regiment in the southeast of Nghe mountain; and artillery forces were positioned in the northern part of Van Kiep and northwest of Duc Thanh). This strategic deployment allowed us to establish a solid, treacherous, and secret initial position, giving us the ability to launch attacks across the entire battlefield. At the same time, it concentrated our main forces in the primary combat zone, providing the flexibility to transform the battlefield and respond to enemy reinforcements, both by land and air, throughout the course of the campaign. Thus, with brilliant deception tactics, we created a solid and treacherous initial battlefield, stretched the enemy across multiple fronts, and positioned ourselves in the most advantageous situation, while placing the enemy in the most disadvantageous one. This allowed us to launch an unexpected attack on an axis they did not anticipate, giving us the initiative from the very beginning and forcing them to miscalculate, rendering them confused and unable to regain control, ultimately leading to their defeat.

Secondly, the timely adjustment of forces to counter and defeat the enemy’s operational strategies was a critical factor. In order to limit the enemy’s strength in terms of manpower, firepower, and mobility, and to overcome their tactics of “armoured convoy” and “helicopter assault”, we maintained constant surveillance and a firm grasp of the overall situation. We swiftly adjusted our forces, maintained the initiative and achieved success in decisive battles. Through the deft application of “provocation” tactics, we intensified pressure on Binh Gia, forcing the enemy to immediately launch Operation “Binh Tuy 33” to clear Route 2 towards Binh Gia and Duc Thanh. However, the 3rd Armoured Squadron of the enemy’s 1st Armoured Brigade did not enter the ambush positions we had set up in the southern part of Nghe moutain and along the west of Route 372, thus we missed the opportunity and allowed the enemy to maneuver towards Duc Thanh. Foreseeing the enemy’s return, the 762nd Regiment quickly readjusted its forces, bolstered its resolve, and reorganised its ambush formations to the east of Nghe Moutain, creating a solid and precarious defensive position. As a result, when the enemy returned, overconfident and fatigued, they walked directly into our ambush. The regiment swiftly launched a counter-attack, blocking their advance, trapping them, and engaging them in continuous combat, causing total surprise and severe losses. This marked the first major victory of the campaign. For the first time in the Southern battlefield, we decisively eliminated an entire enemy armoured squadron, generating considerable impact. In a short period, as the enemy’s posture shifted, we adapted the battlefield situation rapidly - from a defensive to an offensive stance - ready to strike when the opportunity arose.

In the second phase of the campaign, after eliminating the enemy’s 33rd Special Forces Battalion, we anticipated further reinforcements as the enemy sought to recapture the strategic “Binh Gia strategic hamlets”. We made timely adjustments, moving the 761st Regiment to positions in Quang Giao (South of Xuan Son) and enhancing tactical plans for all units ready to fight against the enemy. Consequently, although our forces and resources were limited after the annihilation of the 33rd Battalion, we remained proactive, positioning ourselves advantageously. We cleverly “lured” the 4th Marine Battalion deep into our prepared ambush zone, where they were wiped out, with 8 prisoners captured, including a U.S. Captain Advisor. This success demonstrated the growing strength of our main forces. Despite the enemy deploying their elite units and receiving strong air and artillery support to relieve Binh Gia, our swift and flexible adaptation of the battlefield, with key battles, enabled us to defeat elite enemy battalions and send shockwaves through the Southern theatre.

Finally, the campaign capitalised on the flexible and innovative application of tactical forms, combat methods, and effective handling of operational situations. Adhering to the principle of “hit the point, destroy the reinforcements”, with the main focus being the elimination of the enemy outside their fortifications, the Campaign Command continuously monitored the evolving battle conditions, directing units to apply creative and flexible tactical forms and methods to defeat the enemy’s “helicopter assault” and “armoured convoy” strategies at the campaign level, achieving high combat efficiency. To “lure” the enemy out of their strongholds, we provoked them to expose their forces and equipment, creating favourable opportunities to annihilate each armoured unit. We employed clever deception, selecting appropriate targets to “provoke” and applied effective offensive tactics against the enemy in their fortifications. We continuously increased pressure on the Binh Gia strategic hamlets, forcing the enemy to deploy their most elite units for relief operations, thus falling into our pre-prepared traps, incurring heavy losses.

To rescue the Binh Gia strategic hamlets, the enemy mobilised substantial forces, resources, and provided maximum support through air and artillery firepower, simultaneously deploying both ground manoeuvres and the flexible airborne assault capabilities. As a result, the enemy’s operational posture was highly dynamic, with combat situations unfolding rapidly and in a complex manner, necessitating timely and flexible responses from the Campaign Command. To maintain the initiative, consistently disrupt the enemy’s positions, and “lure” their elite units into adopting our methods of combat, the Campaign Command employed a creative and flexible range of tactical forms. These included: launching ambushes to annihilate the 3rd Armoured Squadron; attacking the enemy’s airborne forces landing in the southeast of Binh Gia, leading to the destruction of the 33rd Special Forces Battalion; and ambushing and destroying the 4th Marine Battalion, among others. Moreover, in each battle, various combat tactics such as encirclement, deep penetration, division, and the use of firepower control were widely implemented, forcing the enemy to land in areas we had prepared for them. To enhance the effectiveness of our annihilation efforts, units consistently adhered to the principle of “attacking from the enemy’s rear”, preventing them from establishing lines to use lethal firepower against us. These tactics played a significant role in leveraging the strengths of our forces, creating a combined force capable of overcoming the enemy’s operational strategies.

The success of the Binh Gia Campaign was a key factor in the eventual failure of the United States’ “Special Warfare” strategy, marking a significant development in the capabilities of the Liberation Army of Southern Vietnam. Although the war has long ended, the lessons drawn from the art of shaping and transforming the order of battle, as well as gaining the initiative in combat, remain highly relevant. These lessons continue to hold value and should be studied, applied, and further developed for furture war for Fatherland protection.

Dr. TRAN LENH AN, Army College No.2