Operation Bu Prang - Duc Lap was a small-scale offensive in the strategic region of Central Highlands. Despite logistical difficulties, our troops participating in the Operation achieved high combat performance, thanks to the creative application of the unique military tactic of “point encirclement for reinforcement ambush.” This success contributed to the failure of the enemy’s plan to replace US forces with the Saigon regime’s regular troops on the battlefield.

After the defeat in the Spring - Summer of 1969, to counter our combat operations in the Central Highlands, the enemy strengthened their defensive network and deployed mobile forces along Route 14, near the Vietnam - Cambodia border. This was done to control key strategic positions and vital lines of communication, as well as to prevent and disrupt our preparations for upcoming offensives. In the Bu Prang - Duc Lap area, the enemy concentrated troops¹ and materiel to turn it into a solid forward area, an “outer hard shell” to protect Buon Ma Thuot from afar. At the same time, it served as a base from which US troops and Saigon regime’s forces would launch sweeping operations aimed at cutting off our strategic supply corridor supporting the southern theatre via the Central Highlands.

Tank and armoured units of the Central Highlands Front take part in the Operation (file photo)

On our side, after the Summer Campaign of 1969, the Command of the Central Highlands Front (B3 Front) focused on strengthening and building up the mobile main forces in preparation for operations in the key areas. To defeat the enemy’s “sweep and hold” strategy and disrupt their “rapid pacification” plan, the B3 Front Command decided to launch Operation Bu Prang - Duc Lap. Although the operational area was vast and far from our supply lines while the defending enemy held relatively strong fortified positions and enjoyed strong air and artillery support, we pressed forward the plan with high fighting morale; thanks to our adept application of operational warfare, we managed to deal a devastating blow to the enemy. Consequently, we eliminated a significant portion of the enemy’s mobile strategic forces, destroying a lot of their means of war and infrastructures, and shattering their outer defensive network, speeding up the failure of the “Vietnamisation” strategy. This also thwarted US attempts to revitalise Saigon regime’s military forces on the Central Highlands battlefield. The Operation provides us with many valuable lessons in the art of operational warfare, with the tactic of “point encirclement for reinforcement ambush” standing out as a prominent feature.

First, selecting the correct target for encirclement. To ensure the maximum success of this tactic, target selection to provoke the enemy’s response and the application of combat methods relevant to our capabilities and strengths are of utmost importance. With the core idea of “prioritising encircling and destroying key positions to lure and eliminate reinforcements, with engaging enemy troops outside their fortifications as the main focus,” the Operation Command decided to besiege and attack important targets within the enemy’s defensive network, forcing them to dispatch relief forces to rescue these positions, enabling us to engage and destroy them outside their fortifications. For this reason, in the first phase of the Operation, to ensure success for the initial engagement, we chose the Ka Te stronghold as the key target to provoke a response from the enemy. This decision was proven correct and demonstrated creative thinking and a thorough analysis of the situation by the Operation Command as Ka Te was a crucial “link” in the enemy’s interlocking defensive system, serving as the eastern gateway to the Bu Prang military base. The stronghold guarded the intersection of Route 14 from Gia Nghia to Duc Lap and the road toward the Cambodian border. This was also a combined infantry and artillery base, located in the area of Hill 936, with a US artillery detachment providing fire support for their operations in the region. In case Ka Te was lost, the enemy would lose a key artillery base, severely hindering their ability to conduct sweeping operations or intercept our attacks from afar. Therefore, Ka Te was a stronghold the enemy had to defend at all costs, and if we attacked it, they would undoubtedly dispatch relief forces to rescue it immediately. Besides, as Ka Te was a newly established outpost, its fortifications and defensive structures were not yet fully built or reinforced, and its obstacle system had many vulnerabilities. Therefore, if we launched a surprise assault against this position, the defending enemy would quickly be overwhelmed, which would ensure our initial success. As per this correct assessment, when our Regiment 66 besieged this position and our artillery bombarded key objectives within the Ka Te stronghold, the enemy panicked and dispatched two airborne commando battalions to relieve the position, only to fall into our ambush, suffering heavy losses. Taking advantage of this favourable situation, Regiment 66 tightened the encirclement, bringing infantry close to Hill 936 and using anti-tank weapons to destroy enemy emplacements, while anti-aircraft guns controlled the airspace, cutting off enemy aerial supply route and water sources. As a result, the enemy’s defence forces at Hill 936 became disorganised and quickly collapsed, allowing us to take full control of the stronghold, and we ended the engagement with high combat performance.

Second, organising and utilising forces properly to create and ensure combined strength for success. Faced with the enemy’s superiority in manpower, firepower, and mobility both on land and in the air, to ensure success in each engagement and the removal of critical links in the enemy’s defensive network, we had to carefully organise and utilise our formations in accordance with the objectives of each engagement and phase of the Operation. In addition, it was necessary for us to fully employ the capabilities of each unit to create combined strength to accomplish the assigned tasks.

Before the opening of the Operation, to establish an extensive combat posture, we deployed on-the-spot regular contingents alongside local troops to launch attacks on Kon Tum, Pleiku, Buon Ma Thuot, and Phu Bon. In addition, our forces set up ambush on the supply convoys of the Saigon regime’s 25^th Division en route to Duc Lap, initiated a popular uprising in Gia Nghia town, and destroyed strategic hamlets along Route 14. These actions served as feints to deceive and divert the enemy’s attention, ensuring the element of surprise for our main axis of attack. As a result, the enemy’s combat disposition was disrupted, and their forces were stretched thin and scattered, which created favourable conditions for our forces on the main axis of attack and destroy the assigned targets.

Through reconnaissance and assessment of the enemy’s situation, we discovered that the forces stationed at the Ka Te base consisted of only one artillery detachment and three infantry companies. Although Ka Te was a crucial link on Route 14 connecting Duc Lap and Gia Nghia, its garrison was small and had only recently moved into defence while their fortifications and defensive structure were not yet fully constructed and reinforced. Thus, the Operation Command decided to use only a portion of Regiment 66’s infantry force to conduct encroachment and besiege the base. This was combined with artillery bombardments to destroy Ka Te’s command post, fortifications, ammunition depot, and combat equipment, as well as to cut off enemy supply lines and control the airspace, creating sufficient pressure to provoke enemy’s relief efforts. In this engagement, the main force of Regiment 66 utilised the advantageous terrain to establish strong fighting positions around the Ka Te stronghold, focusing primarily on destroying the enemy outside their fortifications. When two enemy commando battalions arrived via airborne landing to relieve the base, they were quickly fell upon and wiped out by Battalions 7 and 8 of Regiment 66. Meanwhile, we gradually tightened the noose around the enemy contingent inside the base, causing extreme panic. As the enemy attempted to flee in disarray, they were quickly hunted down and eliminated by our units.

In addition to the effective force utilisation in the provocation engagement, we concentrated superior manpower and equipment to create overwhelming strength, far exceeding the enemy, for the decisive key battle. In the third phase of the Operation, we mustered a major force for the main offensive, including Regiment 66, Commando Battalion 37, Commando Company 60, and various artillery units. These contingents conducted relentless assaults and artillery strikes, causing the destruction of the Bu Prang base and inflicting heavy casualty on the enemy’s 53^rd Combat Group, successfully ending the decisive key engagement as well as the entire Operation.

Third, flexibly applying various tactical forms and combat techniques. Throughout Operation Bu Prang - Duc Lap, we consistently kept a firm grasp of the situation, creatively applied various tactical forms, and effectively combined a variety of combat techniques. Our approaches in each engagement were tailored to the specific enemy and terrain conditions, allowing us to maximise the strengths of each unit and dynamically shift the combat posture to ensure success.

In the provocation engagements during Phase 1, we used special forces to assault and destroy the security outpost north of Duc Lap and carried out artillery strikes against targets on Hill 936, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Capitalising on these successes, our infantry conducted attacks against enemy troops in fortified positions, tightening the siege on the Ka Te stronghold without immediately destroying it, thus forcing the enemy to deploy two commando battalions to relieve this position. As enemy troops landed on the area, taking advantage of the combat posture set up in advance and favourable terrain, we repeatedly launched assaults against their unsolidified formation. In addition, we set up ambush on enemy units moving in to relieve their besieged troops. When we increased pressure on Duc Lap, the enemy was forced to hastily deploy the 22^nd Ranger Battalion to northern Dak Song and ordered the 1^st Battalion of the 53^rd Regiment to move along Route 14 to relieve the siege. By forcing the enemy into choosing to act as we already planned, we set the stage for Regiments 66 and 28 to launch repeated ambushes and attacks on both the front and rear of the enemy’s mobile formations, causing heavy losses for the enemy and completely thwarting their plan to relieve Duc Lap.

To ensure high combat performance, we employed flexible and creative combat techniques based on the specific circumstances of each engagement. In the siege of the Ka Te stronghold, we combined encirclement with artillery strike, breakthrough, and deep penetration manoeuvres. As a result, within a short period of relentless encroachments and assaults, we eliminated nearly 200 enemy troops, shot down 14 aircraft, and destroyed a significant amount of their combat equipment. In engagements against enemy relief forces, we used tactics, such as blockade, encirclement, breakthrough and deep penetration to defeat the enemy. During Phase 3 of the Operation, after their 220^th Combat Group suffered severe losses and was unable to realise their plan to relieve Bu Prang, the enemy command deployed the 53^rd Combat Group as a replacement. However, this formation was quickly intercepted and ambushed, also suffering heavy casualty. When the enemy retreated to defend Bu Prang, we launched relentless artillery strikes, further tightened the siege, and then used special forces to conduct deep penetration and raid the 53^rd Combat Group’s command post. In combination with these actions, our infantry units carried out continuous assaults and breakthroughs, eventually “flattening” the Bu Prang base. This decisive engagement marked the successful ending of the campaign.

The victory of Operation Bu Prang - Duc Lap shattered the enemy’s defensive line along the Vietnam - Cambodia border, establishing a favourable position and creating the potential for us to deploy larger-scale forces to liberate the strategic region of Central Highlands. The lessons learned from this Operation, especially the art of “point encirclement for reinforcement ambush”, should continue to be studied and creatively applied in the (potential) war to defend the Homeland.

Senior Colonel, Dr NGUYEN DUC SAO

Infantry Officer College No.1

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1. The enemy deployed 11 battalions (3 US battalions and 8 elite battalions of the Saigon regime) to defend Bu Prang - Duc Lap; moreover, 3 mobile commando battalions of the enemy operated regularly in the area.