During the resistance war against US imperialists for national salvation, for the first time, through the Route 14 - Phuoc Long Offensive, we successfully liberated an entire key province located right next to Saigon. This victory resulted from the convergence of multiple factors in successfully executing a “strategic reconnaissance strike”, with the art of force utilisation being chief among them. 

Entering the dry season of 1974 - 1975, faced with our fierce and widespread offensives across the entire southern theatre, the enemy was forced to retreat and regroup at key positions and along major transportation routes to defend population centres. This made their positions in mountainous and rural areas vulnerable. Meanwhile, US support for the Saigon puppet regime, particularly in military aid, had significantly declined, further weakening the enemy’s standing and capability. To establish a solid “iron shield” to protect Saigon from afar, the enemy concentrated large forces and resources in the strategic area of Route 14 - Phuoc Long, organising their defence into three main zones: along Route 14, from Bu Dang to Dong Xoai (including the Bu Dang and Dong Xoai sub-districts and the Bu Na stronghold); the Bu Dop subdistrict and several outposts along Route 311 (linking Route 14 to Phuoc Long town); and the Phuoc Binh - Ba Ra - Phuoc Long triangle.

Attacking National Police Department of Saigon puppet regime in Phuoc Long province

In implementing Resolution 21 of the Central Party Committee, we swiftly regained control of most of the previously liberated areas that had been captured by the enemy and expanded several new zones. In terms of the balance of force on the battlefield, we were stronger than the enemy - though not overwhelmingly so - capable of launching major offensives in several strategic directions. While the Politburo was holding a conference to determine the strategic resolution for the complete liberation of the South, and in compliance with the directive of the Central Military Commission, the Southern Central Bureau and the Theatre Command launched the Route 14 - Phuoc Long Offensive. The objectives were to eliminate a portion of enemy forces, liberate population areas along Route 14, expand the bridgehead for strategic transport lines, and provide an additional springboard for subsequent advances towards Saigon. With unique military strategy and the combined strength of coordinated armed forces, we managed to win successive key battles within a short period, inflicting critical defeats on the enemy. This major success of ours marked the beginning of the end of the Saigon puppet army, clearly demonstrating that enemy forces had been severely weakened and lacked the capability to counterattack and reclaim vital strategic areas. At the same time, it revealed the limited ability and willingness of the US imperialists to re-intervene militarily in South Vietnam, even when we successfully launched large-scale offensives. This further reinforced the Politburo’s firm strategic resolve to completely liberate the South. The success of this offensive was the result of various operational elements, with the art of force utilisation standing out as a key factor.

First, concentrating forces for the key opening battle to ensure the offensive's success. The principle of force concentration is fundamental and crucial in warfare, particularly in offensive operations. It aims to achieve force superiority over the enemy at a specific moment, in a certain direction, or within a designated operational zone. This allows the rapid destruction and capture of key enemy targets, the partial or complete disruption of the enemy’s defensive systems, and the establishment of favourable conditions for the offensive’s further development. Accordingly, in the Route 14 - Phuoc Long Offensive, to guarantee success in the key opening battle - the assault on the primary target, the Bu Dang sub-district - the Operation Command decided to deploy a large force, including Division 3 (understrength), reinforced by Infantry Regiment 165 (minus one battalion), Commando Battalion 14, Engineer Battalion 280 (minus one unit), and several heavy fire support units. Additionally, Logistics Units 770 and 814, in coordination with local armed forces, transported a large volume of supplies to the Bu Dang area and along Route 14 from Bu Dang to Dong Xoai. This ensured adequate provisions enabling the troops to “be well-fed and win war". Meanwhile, on the secondary axis of attack at Bu Na, only two battalions from Division 7, two battalions from Commando Regiment 429, one battalion from the Regiment 201, and limited firepower - including a single 85mm artillery piece and one 120mm mortar - were deployed. This force allocation later proved entirely precise, reflecting the Operation Command’s creative thinking and its ability to analyse and assess the overall battlefield situation accurately. The reason is that Bu Dang was considered a critical link in the enemy’s defensive system along Route 14, a stronghold that formed an essential part of their outer defensive perimeter. Breaking through this position at all costs was imperative. Only by concentrating a significant force to swiftly capture the Bu Dang sub-district could we establish a solid foothold, exert pressure, and advance quickly towards Bu Na, Dong Xoai, and Phuoc Long. Success at Bu Dang would create a breakthrough in the course of the offensive, triggering a chain reaction that would accelerate the overall success. The developments throughout the offensive demonstrated that by flexibly applying the art of force utilisation to achieve force superiority over the enemy, we managed to swiftly “wipe out” the Bu Dang sub-district, throwing the enemy into disarray. The rapid collapse of Bu Dang sent shock waves through the enemy ranks, causing the enemy at Bu Na to panic and retreat. As a result, we liberated a vast area along Route 14. The success of this key opening battle “broke open” the gateway to Dong Xoai and Phuoc Long, creating the momentum and advantageous battlefield conditions necessary for the subsequent decisive battles that would lead to the offensive’s ultimate success.

Second, closely cooperating with local armed forces to create combined strength, defeating any enemy’s plan. The Route 14 - Phuoc Long offensive took place across a vast area, with limited participating forces and logistics capabilities from our side. Therefore, our regular units closely cooperated with local armed forces to create combined strength and establish a favourable combat posture for us to defeat any tactics of the enemy’s. To ensure thorough preparation, the Southern Central Bureau and the Theatre Command assigned the Phuoc Long Provincial Party Committee the task of intensifying a three-pronged offensive. This involved restraining, wearing down, and eliminating local enemy forces, forcing their mobile regular units to spread themselves too thin. Additionally, local forces were prepared to cooperate with regular troops, mobilise the masses for an uprising, and seize control of the province when the opportunity presented itself.

Phuoc Long Victory Monument in Binh Phuoc province

At the beginning of the offensive, to maintain the element of surprise for our regular troops’ assault on the Bu Dang sub-district, we deployed the Binh Phuoc Commando Company to launch a surprised assault on Bu Dop to cut off the enemy’s vital transport route connecting Bu Dang to Phuoc Binh and Phuoc Long. At the same time, it diverted the enemy’s attention, creating a favourable opportunity for our regular forces to manoeuvre and deploy their formations against Bu Dang in complete secrecy and safety. This allowed us to deliver a series of rapid and decisive blows, quickly destroying this key enemy stronghold. Building the momentum on the opening battle’s success at Bu Dang, and in coordination with the regular units, the Bu Dang Party Committee ordered local armed forces to seize the opportunity, and swiftly mobilised the civilian population to rise up against the enemy and their lackeys. The Party cells in Hoa Dong 1, Hoa Dong 2, and Bu Mon effectively carried out political mobilisation, persuading three platoons of local militia and eight civil defence teams to abandon the enemy ranks and return to the revolutionary cause. To ensure success in the decisive assault on Phuoc Long Town, local forces continued to cooperate with regular units. On the secondary axis, Local Battalion 208 launched an attack on the Phuoc Loc stronghold to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or providing mutual support between their positions. This created favourable conditions for our regular units, with the strength of combined arms, to successfully liberate Phuoc Long Town and bring the offensive to a triumphant conclusion.

Third, closely monitoring combat developments, promptly redeploying forces and utilising reserve forces at the right moment for maximum combat performance. In order for success in key engagements to be ensured and each engagement to set the stage for the next - the Operation Command closely monitored battlefield developments, promptly adjusted forces, and flexibly transformed the combat posture. In the decisive engagements against the Phuoc Binh sub-district and Phuoc Long Town, the enemy’s urban defence proved formidable, and there was little time for extensive preparation. Recognising this problem, the Operation Command utilised its forces in a way that was different from previous engagements, organising combined-arms groups to attack along designated routes, constantly cornering the enemy at the centre of the town for elimination. Each combined-arms group was built around a core infantry regiment, reinforced with armoured and artillery units, and was responsible for attacking specific targets - typically two to three town blocks or military installations. Each axis of attack was further divided into two assault columns, with each infantry battalion, supported by artillery and tanks, leading a separate charge. Throughout the operation, a combination of forces was employed to maintain relentless pressure. The combined power of infantry, artillery, and armour ensured continuous breakthroughs, preventing the enemy from regrouping or reinforcing their allies. Also, we employed both offensive and defensive forces to defeat enemy counterattacks. Additionally, a tank platoon was deployed deep into the Treasury Bureau compound, both to disrupt enemy defence and to withstand counteroffensives. This innovative force deployment not only secured success in the operation’s decisive engagement but also provided valuable lessons for subsequent large-scale offensives. These experiences laid the groundwork for subsequent urban assaults, culminating in the final push towards Saigon during the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

Alongside the flexible adjustment of force deployment, our timely introduction of reserve forces at the right moment played a crucial role. In the decisive assault on Phuoc Long Town, after cornering the enemy to the northern third of the town, it was imperative to deal a decisive blow before they could regroup, recover, or receive reinforcements. To achieve this, the offensive’s reserve force - Infantry Regiment 2 (Infantry Division 9) - was ordered to immediately join the fight. This well-timed deployment dramatically shifted the balance of power, catching the enemy off guard and creating an overwhelming advantage, leading to a swift and decisive conclusion to the battle. 

The victory of the Route 14 - Phuoc Long Offensive provided momentum, strategic positioning, and favourable conditions for our final offensive to “crush the puppet regime” and achieve the complete liberation of the South, culminating in national reunification. The valuable lessons learned from this Offensive - particularly the art of force utilisation - should continue to be studied, applied, and creatively developed in the defence of the nation. 

Sr. Col. NGUYEN VAN QUYEN, PhD

Army Academy