The Upper Laos Campaign in 1954 successfully annihilated a vital part of the enemy’s forces, significantly dispersing their strategic mobile forces, contributing to the isolation of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold and expanding the liberated area for our friend, Laos. The victory of the Campaign left many valuable lessons on the art of offensive operations under the pressure of time, harsh weather conditions, and distant battlefields from the rear, exemplified by the art of force deployment.
After General Henri Eugène Navarre - the Commander-in-Chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina, decided to establish Dien Bien Phu as an “invulnerable” stronghold with the scheme to lure and “crush” our main forces, in Upper Laos, from early December 1953, the enemy hurriedly constructed the “Nam Ou river defence line” including strongholds from Pak Ou to Muang Ngoi and Muang Khua with about 20 companies. This was considered a “strategic corridor,” a situational solution by the enemy, aiming to protect Upper Laos and Dien Bien Phu from isolation, creating a domino effect and a “safe backyard” for the enemy forces at the stronghold to potentially retreat to Luang Prabang when necessary.
In response to the enemy’s strengthened defence in the “bowl” of Dien Bien, the Party Committee and the Command of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign decided to shift from the strategy of “quick attack, quick resolution” to “solid attack, solid progress”. To deceive the enemy, misdirect their assessments, further deplete their forces, and force them into a position of dispersed strategic mobility and, simultaneously, to facilitate the forces involved in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign in their preparation under the new combat principle, it was decided to launch an offensive campaign into Upper Laos. With the principle of “self-reliance and urgency”, actively grasping the situation of the enemy and timely adjusting and reinforcing determination during combat operations, we delivered a critical blow to the enemy. Although the campaign was short-lived and on a small scale, its victory held strategic significance and left many valuable lessons on the art of campaign combat operations, including the art of force deployment.
Firstly, to mobilise forces for the Campaign that match the realities of the battlefield. In the 1954 Upper Laos Campaign, we only used the 308th Division and the 148th Regiment from the Northwest Military Region in coordination with the Pathet Lao forces. Even to ensure the Campaign took place timely and at the right moment, the Front Command directed the 308th Division that “the number of troops used depends on the division’s supply capability... to ensure that the mission is completed, maintain force integrity, and be ready to return immediately upon order”. This decision reflects flexibility, aligning with the battlefield realities at the time. Through reconnaissance and understanding of the enemy, we observed that the strongholds along the “Nam Ou river defence line” were hastily built, located far from the enemy’s rear, with weak defence, failing to form a solid, continuous front. If we secretly surrounded and attacked unexpectedly, the defensive forces there would quickly collapse and be annihilated. Assessing our situation, the General Command noted that the 308th Division, as one of the early established and main force units of our Army with extensive combat experience in major campaigns, especially the 1953 Upper Laos Campaign, was fully capable of completing the mission in the shortest time with the highest combat efficiency. Moreover, at this time, we were concentrating our main divisions on the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. If a large number of troops were deployed to the Upper Laos Campaign, the offensive power against the Dien Bien Phu stronghold would be diminished, as the forces and resources of the units would be somewhat depleted during combat operations. This would mean additional time needed to consolidate, replenish troops, weapons, and equipment for the units upon their return. If the preparation time for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign was prolonged, the enemy would have the opportunity to consolidate, strengthen, and take the initiative to counterattack, breaking our offensive momentum, complicating the situation further, and possibly missing the opportunity to initiate combat. On the other hand, the 1954 Upper Laos Campaign only took place in the areas of Nam Ou, Muang Khua, Phongsaly, and Muang Soui, covering a narrower scope and having a more limited purpose compared to the 1953 Upper Laos Campaign. It merely served a coordinating role, creating the position and opportunity for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign to transition to the new combat principle. Therefore, mobilising forces of more than one division was appropriate, demonstrating the sharp thinking and flexibility of the Campaign Party Committee and Command during combat operations, ensuring adherence to the realities of the battlefield for high effectiveness.
To strengthen the assault power and ensure a decisive victory, we coordinated with Laos to utilise several local troops and Laotian guerrilla units operating in the campaign area. These forces, being local and well-versed in the terrain and enemy situations, enhanced our capability to attack and support, promptly addressing difficulties in preparation and combat operations brought by our units moving from afar. Thus, by employing flexible forces suited to battlefield dynamics, we maintained elite, highly skilled forces to ensure a decisive victory, shattering the enemy’s defence at the Nam Ou river. Simultaneously, it helped establish positions and create effective force, especially facilitating the “firm attack, firm progress” preparation work, securing a decisive victory in the strategic Dien Bien Phu Campaign offensive.
Secondly, to effectively use reconnaissance forces to grasp the situation. Assigned with the task of attacking the enemy in Upper Laos, our units faced several challenges, such as the limited time for preparation, the urgent and highly secretive organisation of combat, distant combat zones, treacherous terrain, limited reconnaissance forces, etc. Therefore, the requirement was to enhance the ability to grasp the situation to quickly and accurately determine combat plans, closely aligned with reality, swiftly breaking the enemy’s defence. To overcome these challenges, we flexibly combined multiple measures, effectively leveraging forces to scout the enemy and the terrain, particularly deploying the reconnaissance force of Division 308 - the unit tasked with the main offensive direction in the 1953 Upper Laos Campaign, experienced and familiar with the combat zone. To ensure Division 308’s smooth offensive, we dispatched a reconnaissance company from the headquarters to grasp the enemy situation in Muang Khua. Meanwhile, promoting a proactive spirit, units simultaneously scouted the enemy and terrain while attacking them. Additionally, the campaign fully utilised reconnaissance information from higher levels, actively coordinating with local Pathet Lao forces to grasp the situation. As a result, in a short time, we firmly grasped the enemy’s intentions in organising, deploying, and using forces, the nature of fortifications, battlefields, obstacles, etc., at the Nam Ou river defence line, continuously monitored, especially detected the enemy’s early withdrawal plans from Muang Khua and nearby strongholds to Nam Bo. With timely and accurate information, the Campaign Command had a solid foundation to quickly determine precise combat resolutions, transforming the battle situation timely, persistently pursuing, destroying, and disbanding enemy forces, fulfilling the assigned tasks. Thus, despite the rush in preparation, moving through treacherous terrain, under harsh weather conditions, and far from our rear, thanks to proactive and flexible use of reconnaissance forces, Division 308 and the units consistently maintained the initiative to attack, promptly and effectively dealing with situations during combat operations, continuously forcing the enemy into a passive state, rapidly being destroyed. This highlights the strengths of local reconnaissance forces and the positive, proactive nature of the units in the preparation and execution of the offensive.
Thirdly, to flexibly and timely adjust forces in transforming the attack posture during the enemy’s retreat. The enemy’s initial intention was to defend and maintain the Nam Ou river defence line, creating a mutually supportive position with the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. However, upon discovering Division 308’s maneuver into Upper Laos and approaching the strongholds, the enemy panicked and ordered a withdrawal of forces from Muang Khua and surrounding strongholds to Nam Bo. Noticing a fundamental change in the enemy’s state, despite the situation developing earlier than anticipated, the Campaign Command quickly seized the opportunity, shifting the combat plan from attacking the defending enemy to pursuing the retreating enemy, timely adjusting forces and flexibly transforming the battlefield, contributing to the Campaign’s total victory.
A notable aspect of using the pursuing force was its proactive and initiative-taking approach to overcoming difficulties, continuously attacking without waiting for higher orders or for the full force to assemble. The units that first encountered the enemy took the initiative to engage, with subsequent units coordinating upon hearing gunfire, supporting the initial units, and quickly exploiting the enemy’s panic during their retreat to secure victory. Moreover, during the pursuit, units fully leveraged the advantageous terrain to flexibly organise force deployment, transforming the battlefield. A prime example was the use of swift, lightweight forces to move ahead and block the enemy, creating favourable conditions and opportunities for the following units to catch up with the retreating enemy formation, coordinating attacks smoothly and effectively, disintegrating enemy forces part by part.
The campaign demonstrated that, upon receiving the order to switch to pursuing the retreating enemy, Division 308 quickly formed two attacking flanks towards Muang Soui (Regiment 102) and Muang Nguai (Regiment 36). The division’s reconnaissance units, equipped for swift, easy maneuverability, moved ahead in collaboration with local Pathet Lao forces to occupy strategic terrains, creating firm “blocking points” and swiftly halting the enemy’s retreat. Relying on advantageous blocking positions, subsequent main forces, including Company 261, Battalion 18, Battalion 79, etc., quickly formed attack directions, closely coordinating in combat to eliminate the disorganised enemy formation efficiently. With flexible and reasonable adjustments in force deployment, Division 308 was capable of pursuing the enemy, continuously attacking, each engagement creating conditions and opportunities for the next battle over a distance of more than 200 km, achieving high combat efficiency. This represents a distinctive aspect of the art of force deployment to timely transform the battlefield, contributing to rapidly breaking the enemy’s Nam Ou river defence line, approaching Luang Prabang, forcing the enemy to hastily reinforce troops and logistics, significantly dispersing their strategic mobile forces.
The victory of the 1954 Upper Laos Campaign played a significant role in establishing a favourable position for the Dien Bien Phu front to implement the “firm attack, firm progress” combat principle, achieving a victory “resounding across continents, shaking the world”. The distinctive art of force deployment drawn from the Campaign should continue to be studied and creatively applied in the current mission of national defence.
Dr. TRAN LENH AN, Army College No.2