During the 1975 Central Highlands Campaign, our command devised and executed plans to achieve success in multiple key engagements. Among these, the decisive fight to repel the enemy’s counterattack aimed at retaking Buon Ma Thuot was a major success. This victory created a favourable opportunity for us to advance and annihilate the entire enemy force in the strategic Central Highlands region.

Immediately after the fall of Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy fell into disarray and was forced to act reactively and tighten their defence around Pleiku. At the same time, they deployed their 3^rd Airborne Brigade in a determined effort to block our advance from Buon Ma Thuot along Route 21 towards Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang. In a situation where their strategic reserve forces were scattered across multiple locations to counter our assaults and envelopments, the enemy was compelled to deploy the 23^rd Division (understrength) - one of their elite forces and the closest to Buon Ma Thuot - via airborne operations in a bid to launch a major counterattack and recapture this strategic town.

Our forces attack an enemy fortress during the Central Highlands Campaign (file photo)

On our side, having accurately assessed the situation, the Campaign Commander had already anticipated the possibility of an enemy counterattack once Buon Ma Thuot was liberated. As a result, when the enemy reorganised their forces for a rapid counterattack, the Campaign Command and staff had been able to predict the exact targets of the counterattack. They also promptly and correctly analysed and evaluated the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, thereby formulating an effective combat strategy, deploying forces appropriately, establishing a complex and clever offensive posture and seizing the perfect opportunity to initiate the battle. As the event unfolded, when our forces launched the attack, the enemy, overwhelmed by the coordinated power of our joint operations, fell into disarray. This led them to make critical strategic errors as they ultimately decided to withdraw all their forces from the Central Highlands. This retreat created a great opportunity for us to annihilate the entire counterattacking force.

The victory in the second decisive battle against the enemy’s counterattack crushed their attempt to retake Buon Ma Thuot, causing their forces to rapidly collapse and disintegrate. This success paved the way for us to organise the third decisive battle - annihilating the entire enemy force in the strategically significant Central Highlands. This battle stands as a prime example of the art of fighting enemy counterattack within an offensive campaign led by our military and people during the resistance war against the US for national salvation. It showcased several outstanding features as follows.

First, making accurate assessment of the enemy and precise prediction of the key battle area and targets. During the campaign’s preparation, the Campaign Command and staff, with their creative thinking, in-depth analysis, and skilful application of diversionary tactics, accurately assessed that after the fall of Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy would undoubtedly launch a counterattack to recapture this strategic location. This assessment was a critical ground for planning combat operations, anticipating possible scenarios, and proactively establishing a solid defensive posture to repel the enemy’s counteroffensive. As anticipated, under the pressure of our attacks and in an urgent and precarious situation, the enemy deployed their 23^rd Division - their fastest and strongest available force in the Central Highlands - to counterattack and relieve their besieged positions in an attempt to recapture Buon Ma Thuot. This was because their strategic reserve forces were already stretched thin and forced to respond to our multiple offensives. Along with this assessment, we also considered the likelihood that the enemy would deploy approximately one to two infantry regiments, several armoured squadrons, three to five artillery battalions, and provide 60 to 80 air sorties per day to support their counterattack. In terms of timing, we anticipated that within three to five days after our assault on Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy would begin deploying their forces for a counteroffensive. The likely landing zones for enemy forces were along Route 14 and Route 21 to the east of Buon Ma Thuot, an area with favourable terrain near the bases of their 45^th and 53^rd Regiments and Hoa Binh Airfield. The enemy could use these locations as staging areas, coordinating with their local forces for a swift counterattack to recapture Buon Ma Thuot. Regarding the direction of the counterattack, we anticipated that the enemy might use Route 21 to advance from the rear base of the 45^th Regiment or the axis along Route 14 to launch attacks from the Buon Ho and Dat Ly areas. In terms of manoeuvring method, if their ground routes were cut off and Hoa Binh Airfield was captured by our forces, the enemy would resort to heliborne landings. However, given the situation at the time, they would only be able to deploy one regiment at a time in successive waves.

Based on this analysis and assessment, our units focused on thoroughly preparing the battlefield. Particularly in the northeast of Buon Ma Thuot, thanks to the maximised effectiveness of corps-level coordination, when the enemy’s 23^rd Division deployed via airborne operations, they were dealt a surprise and devastating blow by our forces. Developments in the Campaign demonstrated that, thanks to our accurate assessment of the enemy and precise anticipation of the key battle area and targets, we were able to proactively deploy and position our forces, establish encirclements to cut off and block all ground routes leading to Buon Ma Thuot. This enabled us to tie down the enemy for annihilation, forcing them into a single option - an airborne counterattack - which ultimately led to their catastrophic defeat. That victory shattered the enemy’s hope of recapturing Buon Ma Thuot and triggered a chain reaction of panic among the enemy leadership. As a result, they made a strategic blunder - withdrawing all forces from the Central Highlands to consolidate their defence along the central coastal region. This decision created a critical opportunity for our forces to press forward, liberate the entire South, and achieve national reunification.

Second, establishing a flexible and clever offensive posture. In their attempt to recapture Buon Ma Thuot, the enemy planned to deploy their 23^rd Division via airborne operations which may grant them advantages in mobility, temporal, spatial and deployment method initiatives, and the potential for tactical surprise, which could have posed significant challenges to our forces. To neutralise the enemy’s advantages and exploit their critical weakness - the inability to receive strong, direct support from heavy firepower immediately upon landing - we deliberately set up a flexible and clever counterattack formation. By skilfully luring and forcing the enemy to land in a predetermined area, we were ready to crush the 23^rd Division before they could fully establish their foothold. To isolate and destroy the enemy’s mobile forces, the Campaign Command ordered Division 320 to cut Route 14 and prepare to eliminate one to two enemy regiments moving from Pleiku to relieve Buon Ma Thuot, then capture Cam Ga and Thuan Man, and expand operations to encircle and destroy enemy forces in Phu Bon (Cheo Reo); Regiment 25 was assigned to cut off Route 21 west of Khanh Duong and be on standby to intercept enemy reinforcements or retreating units; Regiment 95A and elements of Division 3 were responsible for blocking Route 19 at both the eastern and western approaches to An Khe, and making preparation to engage enemy forces attempting to break through or retreat. This deployment completely encircled and isolated Buon Ma Thuot by cutting off all major roadways. Immediately after securing Duc Lap, we dispatched mechanised forces to quickly deploy Division 10 to northeast Buon Ma Thuot, while our artillery and anti-aircraft units were repositioned to the east of the town (after its liberation) to provide fire support for Division 10 against enemy counterattack. Furthermore, Division 10’s reserve forces were assigned to seize the enemy’s key strongholds, including the 45^th Regiment base, the 53^rd Regiment base, and Hoa Binh Airfield - potential staging areas the enemy could use to launch a counteroffensive against Buon Ma Thuot - ensuring that we would maintain the strategic initiative throughout the battle.

By establishing a flexible and clever combat posture, we set a “trap” in the Phuoc An and Nong Trai area, waiting for the “prey” 23^rd Division to fall into it as anticipated. This caused great confusion among the enemy ranks, forced them to act passively and deploy troops in unfavourable terrain, and prevented them from landing the entire division at once. As a result, they were isolated upon arrival, lacking tank and artillery support, which created ideal conditions for our Division 10 to engage them under our plan. The subsequent fighting proved that as soon as the enemy landed, before they could manoeuvre for a counterattack, they were struck by our overwhelming strikes, caught off guard, and swiftly annihilated.

Third, ensuring close coordination, seizing the right moment, exercising flexible battlefield command. In this second key battle, our main adversary was the enemy’s airborne troops, characterised by high mobility, thus leading to rapidly evolving combat situations that were difficult to predict, with opportunities arising and disappearing within a very short time. Comprehending that issue, the Campaign Command and staff directed all forces to maintain close coordination to quickly seize opportunities and launch continuous attacks, preventing the enemy from responding effectively and forcing them to fight reactively and eventually suffer a crushing defeat. Following the principle of “quickly organising force manoeuvres, with the first arrivals immediately preparing for combat and engaging the enemy, while later-arriving units must promptly coordinate and provide support”, when the enemy deployed their troops along Route 21 from Height 581 to Nong Trai, Division 10 identified the enemy’s 2^nd Battalion, positioned at Height 581, as their main counterattack force. As the enemy had not been able to establish a firm foothold, the Division immediately deployed Regiment 24 (understrength) to launch an assault, even though Regiment 28 had not completed its manoeuvre to join the division’s formation yet. This decision proved entirely correct, as allowing the enemy time to stabilise their formation, reinforce their fortifications, set up obstacles and establish coordinated defence would have posed significant challenges to us and eliminated the element of surprise and our offensive initiative. By seizing the right moment, we struck the enemy at Height 581 just as they landed, before they could manoeuvre or counterattack, overwhelming them with an assault they could not withstand, leading to their swift annihilation and collapse.

In addition to ensuring close coordination between different units, the Campaign Command, its staff, and unit commanders demonstrated flexible and decisive combat leadership, keeping the enemy in a constant state of surprise. A prime example of this was that, immediately after capturing Nong Trai, our forces swiftly launched an assault against the enemy’s 44^th Regiment while simultaneously advancing towards Khanh Duong at a moment when the enemy’s counteroffensive had already failed and they had yet to organise a retreat. The leading forces maintained relentless pressure, closely pursuing, isolating and encircling enemy reinforcements, thereby setting the stage for follow-up units to deploy their attack formations effectively. Although our forces were not large and had to attack with hasty preparation, we were able to muster combined strength to achieve a swift victory. Initially deploying a relief force for a planned counterattack, the enemy gradually lost their initiative, became increasingly disorganised in command and coordination, struggled to mount effective defence against our assaults, but ultimately suffered a bitter defeat.

Our success in the second key battle of the 1975 Central Highlands Campaign effectively defeated the enemy’s airborne counteroffensive by their 23^rd Division, crushing their effort to recapture Buon Ma Thuot. This victory created the momentum, strategic advantage, and favourable conditions for our forces to annihilate enemy forces across the entire Central Highlands theatre. The distinctive features of the art of fighting enemy counteroffensive should continue to be studied, applied, and creatively developed in the cause of Fatherland protection. 

Sr. Col. NGUYEN DUY HIEN, PhD

National Defence Academy