The 1971 Route 9 - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Operation stands as the largest-scale counteroffensive in our Resistance War Against US Imperialism. The success of this operation delivered a decisive blow to the “Vietnamisation” strategy of the US, marking a significant advancement in our combined arms warfare tactics. In this, artillery played a pivotal role and rightfully stood as the primary land-based firepower.

Moving into the year 1971, alongside intensifying pacification efforts in South Vietnam, the United States feverishly prepared for and launched large-scale offensives on the theatres of Laos and Cambodia. In this context, they identified the Route 9 - Southern Laos region as the primary direction of attack, implementing “strangulation strategy” aimed at disrupting our transportation routes and directly undermining our strategic rear. They also sought to eliminate our main force, weakening our armed forces in the South, and set the stage for achieving the goals of the “Vietnamisation” strategy. To carry out this plan, they mustered a significant force, including elite main forces from the strategic reserve of the Saigon military, initiating an operation under the codename “Lam Son 719” to advance into the Route 9 - Southern Laos area.

Grasping the strategic intentions of the enemy, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission decided to launch the Route 9 - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Operation to destroy enemy forces, defeating their offensive, and shattering the invading will of the enemy. After nearly two months of continuous combat, with high determination, flexible and innovative application of the art of counteroffensive warfare, and leveraging the unified strength of combined arms, we “fought brilliantly, won spectacularly, and achieved outstanding results.” This led to the failure of the enemy’s plan to expand beyond their outer defensive perimeter, resulting in the elimination of a significant enemy force, the destruction of numerous war vehicles, and the complete collapse of the “Saigon military main force plus maximum U.S. firepower support” formula - the backbone of the “Vietnamisation” strategy. The success of the operation marked a milestone in the development of our art of large-scale combined arms warfare tactics, with the art of using artillery prominently featured.

First, establishing a robust and cohesive artillery battle array aligned with the fighting determination of the Operation. As the enemy launched a massive offensive in the Route 9 - Southern Laos area, deploying the elitist and most battle-hardened units of the Puppet military, supported by maximum firepower, including more than 20 artillery battalions with over 300 artillery pieces, and several US military units, it was imperative to counter their strength by creating a cohesive artillery battle array. In response to the enemy, the Operation Command promptly adjusted and reorganised the positioning of the artillery regiments in the area. Following this plan, we utilised artillery units of the 559^th Corps and the artillery contingent of Quang Tri Province, in conjunction with secretly mobilising artillery detachments from the 2^nd Infantry Division (5^th Military Region) from Que Son (Quang Nam) to the Route 9 area, establishing an extensive onsite artillery battle array to be “ready to deliver preemptive strikes to cover infantry setting up position during advance.” At the same time, such a battle array was capable of providing timely fire support during the counteroffensive phase, preventing the enemy’s offensive momentum in various directions, with a focus on preparing countermeasures against airborne enemy forces landing in the North and South of Route 9, and supporting our infantry and tanks in manoeuvring to encircle, divide and destroy the enemy. Alongside the establishment of stationary artillery positions, we proactively formed mobile artillery groups to carry out concentrated firepower strikes in the main direction and decisive engagements of the Operation. To complete the artillery battle array, the 368^th Artillery Regiment moved to the Southern Laos area, the 84^th Artillery Regiment was secretly deployed deep into the enemy’s rear, and the 45^th Artillery Regiment from Vinh (Nghe An) was covertly dispatched to the battlefield. With a clear grasp of the enemy situation and the combat tasks and capabilities of our artillery force, the Operation Command organised four mobile artillery groups, each responsible for a specific combat direction and closely coordinating with combined arms units to ensure victory from the very beginning. Thanks to the close coordination between mobile and stationary artillery detachments, we were able to create a cohesive, robust, and flexible battle array suitable for the terrain of the area of operation and the determination of the Operation Commander. Consequently, during the combat phase, our artillery units effectively utilised the technical and tactical features of each type of artillery, implementing “dispersed systems, concentrated firepower,” maintaining flexible manoeuvrability and delivering unexpected thunderous blows to the enemy. They effectively suppressed the entire enemy artillery force from Lao Bao to Ban Dong, ensuring the Campaign always held and retained the initiative for the offensive and timely and effectively provided support to all forces, especially infantry and tank units to accomplish their missions.

Second, resolutely, flexibly, and timely direct artillery firepower, achieving high combat performance. The distinctive feature of a counteroffensive operation is that battle deployment is carried out while the enemy is still on the offensive, and both our forces and the enemy are still competing to gain the initiative, resulting in highly dynamic and rapidly changing situations, often more complex and unpredictable than anticipated. Therefore, the command of artillery force requires resolute, flexible, and timely decisions to maximise the effectiveness of firepower and the concentration of firepower in the main directions, for the main tasks, areas, and objectives, and in key and decisive engagements. Understanding this requirement, when the enemy initiated their offensive, we decisively directed the firepower of the 368^th Artillery Regiment, the artillery forces of Front B5 and the 559^th Group to concentrate firepower and choose the right moment to effectively suppress, halt and slow down the enemy’s advancing forces, creating favourable conditions for our forces, especially infantry and tank units to deploy their counteroffensive formations. In addition, when the 45^th Artillery Regiment from Vinh (Nghe An) arrived at the assembly area, to ensure effective fire support for engaging units, the Operation Command flexibly converted a battalion of 122mm howitzers (towed artillery) to portable DKB rocket artillery (compact, lightweight, and convenient for movement in mountainous terrain), and ordered this unit to march on foot to promptly engage in battles at Ta Con, Lao Bao, implementing the principle of “whichever company finishes deployment, immediately put that company into combat, whichever gun is operation, immediately open fire with that gun” to maximise the effectiveness of our artillery firepower, ensuring high combat performance. Observing the evolving combat situation, we detected the enemy's attempt to establish a fire support base at Ta Pang. In response, the 368^th Artillery Regiment, in collaboration with firepower of infantry units, was ordered to continuously fired on the enemy formation at Hill Horseback, inflicting significant casualties to them, forcing them to abandon their artillery and vehicles, pushing them into a passive, confused state, unable to employ the full potential of their artillery firepower. Thus, despite the enemy mobilising overwhelming artillery and airpower, launching intense strikes on multiple direction, continuously dropping airborne forces on both flanks of our counteroffensive formation, effective artillery mobilisation, decisive command actions and the power of combined arms allowed us to turn the tide of battle, delivering thunderous artillery strikes on key and critical targets such as enemy artillery positions, command centres, and airbases, etc. These actions caused surprises and disorientation to the enemy, paralysed their command systems, inflicted severe damage to their forces and equipment, shattered their order of battle, and gradually took away their offensive initiative, ultimately leading to their defeat.

Third, closely integrate various artillery types to create combined firepower, meeting combat demands. To seize the initiative in a counteroffensive operation, it is essential to engage in multiple battles and apply various tactical forms and combat methods. As our primary operational firepower, the artillery force needs to closely integrate various artillery types to maximise the effectiveness of firepower, creating combined strength, worthy of the tradition of “bronze feet, iron shoulder, fight excellently, shoot with precision” and plays a crucial role in achieving the determined objectives of the operation. In the Route 9 - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Operation, for the first time, a large number of artilleries, with many different types, was deployed. However, due to the vast area of operation, we could only use approximately one artillery regiment on each direction. Therefore, to leverage the advantages of each type of artillery, from the early days of the operation, we proactively and timely used towed artillery units with long-range capabilities to deliver preemptive firepower, causing surprise and confusion to the enemy. These strikes proved to be effective in suppressing and disrupting the enemy’s formation as they began their offensive, buying more time for smaller-caliber guns and mortars to move into position. Moreover, in engagements against the enemy’s 39^th Ranger Battalion, 3^rd Airbourne Brigade, and 17^th Armoured Squadron, etc. we fully employed the long-range advantage of towed artillery to inflict casualties, destroy enemy fortifications and combat vehicles, suppress enemy artillery positions, and disrupted the enemy’s land and air supply routes. Simultaneously, we promoted the combination of portable rocket artillery (DKB) with infantry support guns, such as 160mm, 120mm, 82mm mortars, and DKZ recoilless rifles, etc. These weapons were deployed on elevated grounds, close to the enemy position and used as direct fire support. This tactic allowed the maximisation of our weapons’ advantages in close engagement, night combat and rapid mobility, effectively providing fire support for infantry and tank units, handling various situations, and meeting the combat requirements. Thanks to the close integration of various artillery types and the effective implementation of the principle of concentrating firepower, our artillery detachments were always present on time, in all conditions and situations, fully utilising the technical and tactical features of each type of artillery. Therefore, our firepower was multiplied, creating overwhelming artillery strikes, contributing to defeating the enemy’s combat tactics and shattering their ambitious operation.

The victory of the Route 9 - Southern Laos Counteroffensive Operation leaves behind valuable lessons in the art of joint combined arms warfare in general, and specifically in the use of artillery. These lessons need to be studied, applied and innovated further in our preparation for a potential war to defend the Motherland in the future.

Senior Colonel, Dr. BUI THANH DAM, Army College No2