Quang Tri Victory of 1972 delivered a heavy blow to America’s efforts to realise the “Vietnamisation” strategy, changing the balance of power in our favour. The victory proved our Politburo and the Central Military Commission’s strategic vision and sound direction, developments in our operational art of fighting , and our troops and citizens’ determination to fight and determination to win.
In 1972, realising the strategic determination of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC), our military and people carried out a strategic offensive in order to change the balance of power and create advantages during the Paris Conference. Thanks to the leadership and direction from the Party Central Committee, particularly from the CMC and the Campaign’s Command, the Tri - Thien Offensive Campaign was victorious, completely liberated the province of Quang Tri, and marked an important milestone as we succeeded in breaching a solid defensive line of the enemy, expanding the liberated areas to the North rear, and dealing a death blow to the U.S. “Vietnamisation” strategy. Quang Tri Victory of 1972 vividly illustrated the strength of the national great unity block and our military and people’s determination to fight and determination to win, while providing us with historical values and lessons as follows.
First, proving our Party Central Committee and CMC’s strategic vision and sound direction as well as our troops and citizens’ determination to fight and determination to win. In 1971, the resistance war against the US aggressors by the three Indochinese countries in general, Viet Nam in particular had obtained a great victory, partly defeated America’s “Vietnamisation” strategy and “Nixon Doctrine,” and forced the enemy to retreat back to their defensive lines. Not accepting a passive response to our attacks, the enemy kept enhancing their military operations and pacification programmes and mounting offensives against our strategic transport line from the North to the South. Grasping the enemy’s intent, under the determination to “seize the opportunity, give more decisive blows to the enemy, topple the Saigon puppet regime, and force the U.S. to withdraw all troops”, our Politburo and CMC decided to launch a Strategic Offensive Campaign in 1972, with Tri – Thien as its main attacking direction, aiming at liberating Quang Tri and then Thua Thien.
The Tri – Thien Campaign took place in parallel with other campaigns in the Northern Central Highlands and the Southeast. In order to create a diversion, our General Staff directed Division 304 to deploy several units and issue fake commands in the Central Highlands. Doing so made the enemy believe that the Central Highlands would be our main attacking direction; therefore, they were totally surprised by the direction and duration of our strategic offensive in 1972. After a short period of the Tri – Thien Campaign, only with two offensives by the ground forces, we completely liberated the province of Quang Tri. After losing Quang Tri, the enemy reinforced their strength, established a defensive line along My Chanh river, and used their air and artillery bombardment against our Campaign’s rear, with a view to preventing our attacks on Hue and providing a springboard for reoccupying Quang Tri. Against that backdrop, instead of attacking to liberate Thua Thien, the Campaign’s Command decided to organise campaign-level defence in order to safeguard Quang Tri Citadel and the liberated areas and frustrate the enemy’s ambition of reoccupying Quang Tri.
Quang Tri Victory of 1972 expressed our Politburo and CMC’s strategic vision and thinking during operations and our troops and people's aspirations for independence and freedom, determination to fight, and determination to win. That spirit was clearly manifested during 81 days and nights of fighting to protect Quang Tri Citadel when our military and people had to surmount harsh weather conditions and suffer thousands of tons of bombs and munitions. The Victory was one of the most important reasons to force the US to sign the Paris Accords and withdraw all troops from Viet Nam, while strongly encouraging our military and people to continuously win significant victories on battlefields.
Second, dealing a fatal blow to the enemy’s efforts to realise the “Vietnamisation” strategy. After 3 years of implementing the “Vietnamisation” strategy with a lot of expectations, the enemy was unable to achieve their pre-set goals as they encountered our troops and citizens’ strong resistance. That situation confused the enemy, put them into passivity, undermined their fighting morale, and compelled them to spread their forces, and heavily impacted on their pacification efforts. In 1972, US imperialists and the Sai Gon puppet regime continued enhancing military operations to avoid a serious reversal on the battlefield, while using “coercive diplomacy” to isolate Viet Nam and force our country to make concessions during negotiations in Paris.
Grounded on strategic victories in 1970 and 1971, we were able to closely combine military struggle with political and diplomatic struggle and continue taking the initiative on the battlefield to gain more remarkable victories in 1972. Therefore, in 1972, our Politburo and CMC decided to launch a strategic offensive, with Tri – Thien acting as its main direction. That was a sound decision of our Party Central Committee as the battlefield of Tri – Thien held a position of special importance to both sides. Tri – Thien was a key transport hub connecting Viet Nam with Central Laos and Lower Laos; it was also the first line of the enemy’s strategic defensive system designed to prevent our North rear’s support for the South battlefield. Winning a victory in Tri – Thien, the enemy would put pressure on us at the Paris Conference. As the battlefield of Tri – Thien was near the North rear, we could well make logistics and technical support preparations for the Campaign. In case we could break the enemy’s defensive line, take control of Quang Tri town, approach the northern bank of My Chanh river, and threaten Thua Thien, the enemy would be placed under more pressure on the negotiating table.
In spite of the fact that the enemy deployed a large number of troops and means and built a solid defensive system with great firepower to control the Northern and Southern banks of Ben Hai river, within a short period of time, our troops and people simultaneously mounted attacks to break the defensive line of Route 9 – North Quang Tri (liberating Gio Linh and Cam Lo on April 4th, 1972) and the inter-connected defensive line in Dong Ha, Ai Tu, and La Vang, thereby completely liberating Quang Tri province.
Our victory delivered a powerful blow to the enemy’s “Vietnamisation” strategy and plot of “power-based negotiation” at the Paris Conference and multidimensionally impacted on the US and the Sai Gon puppet regime as they ever admitted that “the offensive of 1972 led to the most tragic emergence of the drawbacks of the Vietnamisation process”.
Third, marking a new development in our operational art of fighting. The Party Central Committee’s selection of Tri – Thien as the main attacking direction just 7 days before the commencement of the Campaign posed a big challenge to the Campaign’s Command and forces in terms of preparation and combat. To accomplish that strategic mission, the Campaign’s Command brought into play knowledge, unity, and synergy created by relevant forces to flexibly, creatively make preparations and closely, scientifically conduct operations. The Campaign’s Command used main infantry and specialised units to cooperate with local armed forces in attacking Quang Tri in the North as the first direction, in the South as the secondary direction, in the East as the flank, and in the West, thus creating immense joint strength for constant attacks against the enemy’s defensive measures. It should be noted that the Campaign’s Command effectively used tanks and armoured vehicles as the core force in continuously raiding and breaking the enemy’s solid defensive lines and combined military offensive with the masses’ uprisings in the Campaign’s areas.
Moreover, great importance was attached to ensuring logistics and technical support for the Campaign. Since July 1971, Front B5’s Logistics Department was consolidated with an extensive, close logistics network, while Corps 559 launched transport-related emulation movements, fulfilled plans on setting up distributors for military stations in South Ben Hai river, and guaranteed stockpiles for the attacking direction of Tri – Thien. When the strategic attacking direction was changed, the work of logistics and technical support was quickly completed to meet the requirements of combat prior to the start of the Campaign. Correctly selecting the main target, properly using forces, establishing a posture in our favour, employing an appropriate combat method, and making elaborate preparations before the Campaign, have proved the sound, clever direction and operation of the Party Central Committee, especially the CMC and the Campaign’s Command. That also indicated the robust development of our troops and operational art of fighting and acted as a feature of the Tri – Thien Campaign organised to liberate the province of Quang Tri in 1972.
Quang Tri Victory of 1972 and the fight against the enemy’s reoccupation of Quang Tri provided us with valuable historical lessons, namely: (1) correctly assessing the situation, proactively developing combat determination relevant to the battlefield, closely combining military offensive with political and diplomatic struggle; (2) accurately selecting the Campaign’s direction and target, properly employing forces and combat method, strictly abiding by strategic directions; (3) and maintaining our troops and people's solidarity, determination to fight, determination to win, and determination to overcome all hardships. Those lessons are both theoretically and practically valuable and should be studied, applied, and creatively developed in the cause of Fatherland protection.
Maj. Gen. NGUYEN HOANG NHIEN, PhD.
Director of the Viet Nam Institute of Military History