The special propaganda, which is a part of the revolutionary mobilisation of the Party, is a crucial section of the party and political work in the Army. In the changing situation, this work needs to be intensely evaluated, clearly perceived and effectively implemented, meeting the demands and tasks of building the Army, strengthening the national defence, and safeguarding the Fatherland in the new situation.

It is practically proved that the special propaganda has been an effective attack direction, making a huge contribution to the great victory of struggling for national liberation, building and safeguarding the Fatherland, according to President Ho Chi Minh’s teachings, i.e. “It is good to fight and win but it is better to win without fighting. Winning without fighting is due to agitprop among enemy troops”.

On continuously inheriting these precious traditions and experience, together with the strategic thinking of safeguarding the Fatherland from afar, in recent years, on grasping and implementing directives of the Party, especially the Central Military Commission, the special propaganda has been intensely led, directed, guided and implemented by the party committees and commands of all offices and units in the whole army to be practical with the reality, requirements and tasks of all units and localities. The awareness and responsibility of cadres and soldiers, especially the presiding cadres for this important work have been gradually improved; the ability of researching, forecasting, judging and evaluating the situation, and advising of offices and cadres doing the special propaganda has also achieved many active changes. The propaganda contents, forms and methods have been creatively renewed, skillfully and effectively applied in solving any complex problems in accordance with the guidelines of the Party, the policies and law of the State, which has played a role as a sharp political attack and an effective struggling method. This, as a result, has contributed to defeating all sabotage plots and schemes of hostile forces, maintaining the political security, social order and safety, firmly protecting the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country.

Border Guard post at Chi Ma International Border Gate conducts legal dissemination (Photo: baolangson.vn)

Presently, the situation in the world and region has seen complex and unpredictable developments with the appearance of new forms of warfare, which has raised higher commands for the task of safeguarding the Fatherland. Hostile forces have been trying to take advantage of democracy, human rights, ethnic groups, religions and existing problems of the country to enhance their sabotage with many dangerous plots. Meanwhile, the special propaganda in the Army has still got certain limitations, etc., raising several issues which need to be continuously researched and solved with suitable solutions in order to improve the quality of this work.

Firstly, the general awareness, and the leadership and direction. The party committees and commands of some offices and units have not fully understood their positions and roles, tasks, contents and methods to do the special propaganda; in some moments, they have neither clearly defined the subjects nor separated this work from others. This is due to different causes including the careless research, grasp and learning, even the insufficient consideration of this work from all-level leaders and commanders. These are serious causes, which, if not being timely solved, will lead to the fact that the quality and effectiveness of the special propaganda, the research and forecast of situations, consultation and proposal in particular, will not meet the demands. To solve the above problems, in our opinion, it is first and foremost, in each level, to continuously make a serious grasp, lead and direct all units to enhance the propaganda and education to improve the awareness and responsibility of cadres and soldiers, the core forces in particular, for the positions, roles, meanings and importance of the special propaganda in the new situation; clearly identify partners and objects of Vietnam revolution; thoroughly understand the tasks, directive viewpoints, mottos, rules, contents and methods to conduct the special propaganda. Based on the directives and guidelines of the Central Military Commission and functional organs, each party committee and party organisation should concretise these into their periodical and specialised resolutions combined with assigning the party committee members to be in charge. Contents and activities of the special propaganda need to be concretised into the commanders’ working programmes and plans, and strictly conducted. Each office and unit need to make research and forecast, and proactively build plans and schedules to conduct the special propaganda closely with each task, object and area, particularly in the border areas, seas, islands, main and strategic areas.

In the process of conducting the special propaganda, it is necessary to strictly follow the leading mottos and rules on both cooperating and struggling, enhancing the international cooperation, avoiding conflicts and confrontation, taking political struggle as the main method and proactive protection as the key; being active but careful, resolute but flexible, patient, smart, calm but not subjective and simple in judging and evaluating the situations; readily conducting the special propaganda to well meet the requirements and tasks in all situations.

Secondly, bringing into play the overall power. The recent reality has shown that the coordination among offices, units and functional forces in and out of the Army in carrying out the special propaganda has not always been taken into consideration, they, therefore, have neither timely advised the local party committees and governments to effectively solve complex problems or “flash points” nor brought into play the overall power of the whole political system and people in conducting the special propaganda. It is difficult to have an effective and close coordination in all working fields, but it is even more regarding the special propaganda. Hence, we all have agreed that the party committees and commands of all units need to strengthen their leadership and direction, combine the special propaganda with the mass mobilisation; mobilise and encourage the people to actively take part in protecting the political security, social safety and order; monitor and hold the situations of localities and people; advise the local party committees and governments to establish working teams and groups; build the core political forces in industrial zones, export-processing zones, religious and important areas; intensely use the contingent of cadres in the grassroots levels, veterans, self-defence and militia, religious dignitaries, village patriarchs and chiefs, and prestigious people in the ethnic minorities in order to carry out the special propaganda.

In the strategic and major areas or the mountainous, remote, ethnic and religious regions, all units need to proactively consult and closely coordinate with the local party committees, governments and socio-political unions to enhance the propaganda and struggle against any sabotage plots and schemes of hostile forces; propagandise and mobilise the people to raise their vigilance, not to listen to bad words or freely migrate to other places, not to participate in illegal religious activities or follow any strange religions or heresies, not to be attracted or stimulated to join any demonstrations and riots; enlighten and convert other people who have been taken advantage, controlled, seduced or bribed; identify, classify and isolate the instigators and leaders, and defeat the plots of stimulating the thought of dividing the national unity; timely solve any complex problems.

In the current period, it is necessary to be proactive, flexible and creative in researching and building the contents, plans and methods for doing the special propaganda; combine the traditional methods with scientific and technological applications, the actual activities with struggles on the cyberspace and the mass media. It is also necessary to closely coordinate the special propaganda with bringing into play the roles of the Steering Board 35 and the Task Force 47 at all levels in the Army to refute any toxic information, and guide information among cadres, soldiers and the people, contributing to defeating the plots of “peaceful evolution”, riot and subversion, at the same time, actively take part in building the strong political system at the grassroots levels, proving the strong “people’s hearts and minds” posture, maintaining the political security, social safety and order in all localities, creating the overall power and improving the effectiveness of the special propaganda.

Thirdly, conducting forces and facilities. One of the most difficult issues is because there have been no guidelines on the staff, organisation, activities, regulations and policies for the forces doing the special propaganda in units. These forces have been mainly concurrent ones with certain limitations of profession, competence of foreign and minority languages. There were situations in reality which required teachers of foreign languages from military schools to conduct the special propaganda, undermining the quality of this work. Therefore, it is believed that the functional organs need to enhance their inspection, research and proposal to modify and complete documents regulating the names, staff, organisations and activities of offices and forces doing the special propaganda in the entire Army; take care of training, cultivating, planning and building these forces both in quality and quantity in order to properly meet the task requirements in the new situation; build suitable mechanisms and policies to create strong motivations for these forces to manifest their responsibility and capability in doing their tasks, at the same time, regularly make research of theories, summarise the reality, compile textbooks, and include the contents of the special propaganda into the educational programmes in academies and schools; pay more attention to the specialised training and cultivation on the special propaganda, especially in the tasks of training and exercises of operation and combat in the real battlefields. Together, it is necessary to invest in the production and purchases of new-gen, synchronous and modern equipment, assuring the advantages and effectiveness for all units doing the special propaganda.

Although the article has not been able to deeply and comprehensively mention the special propaganda in the Army, we believe that the above contents could be seen as the basic arising issues which need to be researched, considered, creatively and flexibly applied into each unit and task, making a contribution to improving the effectiveness of this important work in the new situation.

Dr. NGUYEN KHAC TRAI, The Political Academy, Ministry of National Defence