Some issues about enhancing the effectiveness of commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4
The construction of military party cells in communes, wards, and towns is a major policy aimed at strengthening the Party’s leadership of local defence and military work at the grassroots level. In Military Region 4, this type of party cell has been organised and operated in all communes, initially affirming its leading role in carrying out national defence and military tasks. However, there are still some practical issues that need further research and proposals for solutions and improvements.
To thoroughly grasp and carry out Instruction No. 35-HD/BTCTW, dated 15 October 2009 and Instruction No. 24-HD/BTCTW, dated 20 September 2023, of the Central Organising Commission on the organisation and operation of military party cells at the commune, ward, and town level (hereinafter referred to as the commune-level military party cells), by 31 December 2023, there were 1,651 commune-level military party cells established and operating in Military Region 4 (reaching 100%). The practical situation shows that the commune-level military party cells have effectively fulfilled their roles in providing advice and leadership, coordinating the implementation of local national defence and military work in a synchronous and close manner, with many positive changes, especially in unique areas and remote and border areas. The most prominent results are the leadership of commune-level military commands to successfully carry out combat training and readiness; implement the Law on Military Service; bring into play the core role in handling contingencies regarding the protection of borders, sea, and islands; participate in flood and storm prevention and response, search and rescue, disaster relief, epidemic prevention, and forest fire prevention and control; effectively coordinate with other forces to maintain political security, order, and social safety, and so on. Through the leadership of commune-level military party cells, the responsibility, methods, and working style of military cadres have been innovated and closely aligned with localities. They have better fulfilled assigned tasks and contributed to raising the awareness and responsibilities of all levels, sectors, and people for carrying out national defence and military tasks at the grassroots level.
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A militiawoman of Hong Linh town (Ha Tinh province) practises shooting |
However, alongside the achievements, the organisation and operation of the commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4 have revealed some shortcomings that need further research and solutions.
Firstly, in terms of awareness, some party committees, military agencies, cadres, and party members do not fully understand the positions, roles, functions, and tasks of commune-level military party cells. Some even believe that the establishment of commune-level military party cells is unnecessary, or they should only be done in key defence and security areas. This is a fundamental issue that has hindered the comprehensive, serious, and effective implementation and operation of some commune-level military party cells. Therefore, timely measures are needed to address this issue. Both theory and practice show that deep, correct awareness facilitates principled, thorough implementation. To deal with this issue requires party committees and authorities at all levels, especially at the district and commune levels, to strengthen leadership and direction and effectively carry out propaganda and education through various forms and measures such as mass media; conduct study sessions, party activities, and meetings; give training courses to further enhance the understanding and responsibilities of party committees and party organisations, first and foremost the executive committees, secretaries, and party members in the commune-level military party cells regarding the necessity, roles, functions, tasks, power, and working relationships of the commune-level military party cells. This will help to promote their understanding, work out policies, leverage their responsibility, actively overcome difficulties, resolve obstacles, and organise and improve the effectiveness of commune-level military party cells.
Secondly, in terms of personnel, the members of party executive committees in the current commune-level military party cells are mainly holding dual positions. Some military party cells still lack secretaries and deputy secretaries, and fail to be timely strengthened. Moreover, some party cells have few members and their activities are scattered, affecting their own leadership capacity and combat power. This is a difficult issue that cannot be completely resolved overnight. To gradually address this shortcoming, in addition to the current composition of cadres and party members of the commune-level military party cells, it is necessary to include border guard officers (in border communes) dispatched to commune-level party executive committees in the commune-level military party executive committees. For commune-level administrative units in the merging process with the transfer of party secretaries and military command chiefs, and the communes with reinforced party members participating in the activities of hamlet- and village-level party cells, if the dispatch is compulsory to establish commune-level military party cells, the higher-level party executive committees need to provide specific instruction to strengthen the secretaries and deputy secretaries of commune-level military party cells and allocate party members without affecting the organisation and operation of other party cells. Additionally, to address the issue of party member development, it is necessary to consider establishing branches of Youth Union within the militia force in the communes to gather and create an environment for the members to train and strive towards perfection, thereby selecting and nurturing outstanding members to be recommended for admission to the Party in military party cells. Furthermore, party executive committees at all levels need to pay attention to party member development among young people preparing for military service to create a source of militia and self-defence force cadres and party members, especially in remote and less populated areas with few party members.
Thirdly, in terms of legal framework, there has been no general guidance on the organisation and operation of commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4 since the Central Organising Commission’s issuance of Instruction No. 24-HD/BTCTW. This has led to confusion in the operational methods of the commune-level military party cells including those established for nearly 20 years ago. They still have to apply document templates for both military and civilian activities, causing difficulties in the leadership of task execution, especially during inspection. Based on this reality, it is necessary for the Central Organising Commission and the General Political Department of Viet Nam People’s Army to coordinate in researching and issuing unified regulations for building the document system of the commune-level military party cells. The Standing Commission of the Military Region Party Committee should collaborate with the provincial party committees to give general guidance documents which clearly stipulate functions, tasks, operating regulations, content of activities, and document templates of the commune-level military party cells. Thus, the commune-level military party cells need to proactively establish operating regulations, define functions, tasks, working relationships, etc., focusing on building strong party cells in terms of politics, ideology, ethics, organisation, and personnel. This will create unified understanding and action, enhancing the operating effectiveness of the commune-level military party cells.
Fourthly, in terms of leadership capacity, practical assessment has shown that leadership capacity, which is the ability to comprehend and implement guidelines of higher echelons, build resolutions, implement the Party’s leadership measures, and inspect, supervise, and maintain the implementation of principles on party activities of some commune-level military party cells, is not comprehensive, clear, and partly insufficient to meet requirements and tasks. This issue stems from various reasons and requires comprehensive solutions to overcome. However, it is necessary to focus on promptly completing the project on “Enhancing the leadership capacity of commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4 at present,” led by the Military Region Political Department, thereby carrying out specific measures to enhance the comprehensive leadership capacity of the commune-level military party cells. At the same time, the Military Region needs to regularly inspect and survey to understand the difficulties, obstacles, and shortcomings at the grassroots level to provide advice and suggest solutions to enhance leadership capacity of this type of party cell. It is essential to strengthen coordination with the provincial party committees and assign the provincial military commands to advise local party committees to hold training and retraining for the corps of secretaries, deputy secretaries, and members of party executive committees on organisation and operational methods. Additionally, the party executive committees at all levels need to regularly conduct effective inspection and evaluation, thus drawing experience, multiplying advanced models, and disseminating effective practices, while addressing and correcting limitations to enhance the leadership capacity and combat power of the commune-level military party cells.
Fifthly, in terms of mechanisms and policies, currently, the commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4 do not receive operational funding. Party members of the mobile militia force are far from commune centres, thus facing difficulties in participating in monthly activities. Most of the commune-level military commands do not have separate working offices, which significantly affects the operational results of the military party cells. Therefore, the Central Organising Commission needs to promptly issue instructions to ensure policies for the operation of the commune-level military party cells. The party executive committees, people’s councils, and people’s committees at the district level need to allocate budgets proportionally to the activities of the commune-level military party cells as with other party cells at the same level. There should be appropriate support mechanisms and policies for party members in remote areas to participate in activities at the commune-level military party cells. The district military commands need to actively coordinate and advise the local party committees and authorities to allocate land and invest in building working offices for the commune-level military commands according to guidance of the Ministry of National Defence. At the same time, they should actively support and create favourable conditions for the commune-level military party cells to enhance the quality of their activities and provide learning and preferential policies for the cadres and party members of the commune-level military party cells.
The above discussions do not fully reflect all the issues about the construction and operation of the commune-level military party cells in Military Region 4. However, these are practical foundations for the party committees at all levels to consider and have measures to deal with shortcomings, contributing to enhancing the leadership capacity and combat power of the commune-level military party cells to meet requirements and tasks in the new situation.
Senior Colonel PHAM VAN DONG, Deputy Director of the Military Region Political Department