All-level political offices act as an important part of the mechanism for the Party’s leadership over the Military. Operations by such offices will help maintain and strengthen the Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the Military, ensure that the Military will preserve the working-class nature and its absolute loyalty to the revolutionary cause, the Party, the State, and the people, and build a comprehensively and politically strong Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) capable of successfully fulfilling all assigned tasks. Therefore, it is necessary to promote the role of all-level political offices in the building of a politically strong VPA via various measures.

The VPA’s practical operations in the past 75 years have showed that all-level political offices have always served as an important component of the mechanism for the Party’s leadership over the Military. Operating that mechanism, promoting the Party’s leadership over the VPA, and raising the quality and effectiveness of the party and political work all directly depend on the quality and effectiveness of political offices at all levels within the Military. The operations of all-level political offices will greatly contribute to building a politically strong VPA as the basis for improving its synergy and power to defeat all invaders and successfully fulfil all assigned missions. All-level political offices have given advice to their party committees and key cadres, while directing and helping offices and units to carry out the work of political education and ideological management and combine political education with tradition and law education. Doing so has helped disseminate Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, the Party’s guidelines, and the State’s law and policy and enable the working class’ ideology to play a dominant role in the Military’s politico-spiritual life. Besides, all-level political offices have synchronously carried out the ideological, organisational, policy, and personnel works and built a politically, ideologically, organisationally, and morally strong Military Party Organisation capable of leading the entire VPA to successfully fulfil all assigned tasks.

However, the task performance of several political offices has been poor and they have yet to satisfy the requirements set by the building of a politically strong VPA. Their proactiveness, flexibility and capacity to give advice to party committees and commands have been still limited. The contents and forms of their operations have yet to be renewed. Self-study and self-improvement amongst some political cadres and their capability in the party and political work have yet to meet their task requirements.

In the upcoming years, peace, cooperation and development will still be the mainstream. However, the situation around the world and in the region will have rapid, complicated, unpredictable developments. The 4^th industrial revolution will give us a lot of opportunities but impose many threats. Moreover, non-traditional security challenges will continue to be complex. Some new forms of warfare will appear, change the world politics and profoundly impact on all countries. Domestically, the hostile forces will more publicly, intensely sabotage the Vietnamese revolution and especially enhance their “peaceful evolution” strategy and plot to “depoliticise” our Military. By 2025, we shall finish adjusting the VPA’s organsiational structure in a compact, strong manner. By 2030, a number of services, corps, and forces shall be made modern. From 2030, the entire Military shall be mordenised. To achieve that goal, it is necessary to adopt various measures synchronously, with a focus on “building a typically strong, pure Military Party Organisation and a politically strong VPA, improving cadres and party members’ political zeal, professional competence, and revolutionary morality, preserving and promoting the virtues of Uncle Ho’s soldiers, and making military staff members absolutely loyal to the Homeland, the Party, the State, and the people, and capable of successfully fulfilling all assigned missions.” In addition, it is vital to promote the role of all-level political offices via several solutions as follows.

First, make a huge positive change in the awareness and responsibility of party committees, commissars, and commanders at all levels towards the role of all-level political offices. In order to meet the requirements set by the Military build-up and enhance the Party’s leadership over the Military, all-level party committees, commissars, and commanders should be fully aware that all-level political offices play a role of utmost importance to the building of a politically strong VPA. Besides, party committees, commissars, and commanders at all level should consider the building of comprehensively strong political offices as their responsibility and promote those offices’ role in counselling and carrying out the party and political work as a key solution to making the Military politically strong. Due attention should be paid to developing guidelines, plans and programmes together with specific goals and measures to build comprehensively strong political offices at all levels and encouraging their role in proposing solutions to build a politically strong VPA. Party committees and commanders at all levels should place emphasis on leading, directing, inspecting, and facilitating all-level political offices’ performance of their assigned functions and missions.

Second, attach importance to making the system of political offices at all levels typically, exemplarily strong and capable of well performing their function and task. Due regard should be paid to consolidating political offices’ organisational structure and establishing the criteria for job titles of political cadres and assistants under the Regulation 61-QĐ/TW, dated December 29^th, 2016 by the 12^th Party Central Committee’s Secretariat on all-level political offices within the VPA and the Central Military Commission’s relevant resolutions and directives. The consolidation of all-level political offices’ organisational structure must be in line with the building of a compact, strong VPA and the particularities of each office and unit. It is important to continue identifying the criteria for each job title of political cadres and employees as well as their authority and tasks. Additionally, it is essential to avoid applying a general model to building all offices and units, while it is necessary to deal with a lack of regulations on the authority and task of several job titles within political offices. Due regard should be paid to building a contingent of key cadres and political assistants with proper structure, high quality, professional competence, good work skills and experience, and great capabilities in counselling the party and political work to meet their task requirements. As for key cadres, in addition to those criteria, they must have great capacity to command, manage, and operate their offices, and promote the synergy for performing their offices’ function and the staff work. Besides, it is important to renew mechanisms and policies to attract and recruit new staff members to all-level political offices.

Third, continue renewing working method and style and well implementing the working regulations of political offices at all levels. In fact, a part from strong points, there have been several weaknesses in some political offices’ working method and style. Meanwhile, their working plans have yet to good enough or relevant to reality. Therefore, it is essential to comprehensively renew political offices’ working method and style so that they would counsel and direct the party and political work effectively in accordance with higher echelons’ directives and resolutions and the development of reality. Emphasis should be placed on renewing the method of studying and introducing the Party’s guidelines and higher echelons’ resolutions and directives and keeping a close eye on the situation to deal with issues and difficulties. More importantly, great value should be attached to grasping affiliates’ ideological and organisational issues and the developments of the situation to counsel and develop plans and guiding documents for the party and political work. It is necessary to use the task performance as a yardstick for personnel evaluation and appointment.

Fourth, heighten the role of political offices at all levels in preventing and fighting against the hostile forces’ “peaceful evolution” strategy and plot to “depoliticise” our Military as well as the degradation in political ideology, ethics and lifestyle and the signs of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” from within. The building of a politically strong VPA must be in tandem with preventing and combating the hostile forces’ “peaceful evolution” strategy and plot to “depoliticise” our VPA, the degradation in political ideology, ethics and lifestyle as well as the signs of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” from within. The reason is that “the defence of the Socialist Homeland is to firmly protect the national independence, sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity, security, culture, social order and safety, the Party, the State, the people, the socialist regime, and the country’s renewal cause and national interests.” Thus, there should be measures for effectively fighting against wrong, hostile viewpoints to avoid the deviations from socialism and the Military’s combat goal and ideal. All-level political offices should promote their role in the theoretical and ideological struggle, while focusing on fighting to thwart the hostile forces’ “peaceful evolution” strategy and plot to “depoliticise” our VPA. To that end, significance should be attached to grasping and seriously executing the 12^th Politburo’s Resolution 35-NQ/TW, dated October 22^nd, 2018 on enhancing the fight against wrong, hostile viewpoints to defend the Party’s ideological foundation and the Directive 47-CT/CT, dated January 8^th, 2016 by the Director of the General Department of Politics of the VPA.

The synchronous implementation of those above-mentioned measures will help promote the role of all-level political offices, protect the Party’s ideological foundation within the Military, improve cadres and soldiers’ political zeal, steadfastness in Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, and the goal of national independence and socialism, and their absolute faith in the Party’s leadership as well as make them capable of undertaking and successfully fulfilling all missions assigned by the Party, the State, and the people.

Sr. Col. TRAN NGOC HOI, PhD

Political Academy, Ministry of National Defence