In the event of a (potential) war to defend the Motherland, armoured forces remain a crucial assault element, indispensable in combined arms operations with infantry, artillery, and other forces, contributing significantly to the success on the battlefield. Therefore, studying the art of employing armoured forces in a systematic and in-depth manner in strategic counteroffensive is a pressing issue at present.

Strategic counteroffensive is a form of military operation that can be conducted in the early stages and throughout the course of a (potential) war to defend the Homeland. In such operations, mobile contingents of the regular army play the central role and these operations are carried out in one or multiple theatres (or strategic directions) in combination with the combat activities at local defence zones and other fronts according to the combat intent and determination of the Central High Command or the theatre command. The practical experience of our resistance war against the US Imperialists and in recent global military conflicts has shown that armoured forces continue to be widely used and remain a crucial assault element, especially in offensive, defensive, and counteroffensive operations. Although armoured platforms are large in size and boast significant heat, radiation and acoustic signature, making them easily detectable and vulnerable to enemy firepower, if organised and used flexibly, creatively, and in a timely manner, and adaptively to the combat condition, they can be powerful and effective instruments in various types of operations. In reality, many battles and campaigns have seen armoured forces, escorted by infantry units, play the role of the assault element, contributing significantly to the ultimate victory. In strategic counteroffensive, the targets of armoured forces are often enemy infantry and mechanised infantry divisions, amphibious contingents, airborne forces, etc. with advanced weaponry, strong electronic warfare capabilities, and received firepower support from their allies’ artillery, missile, and unmanned aerial vehicle forces. When facing our counteroffensive, the enemy relies on their technological advantages to counter our moves and dispatches reinforcement to halt, destroy, push back and disrupt our counteroffensive to regain the initiative.

Currently, our armoured forces are experiencing significant development in terms of organisation, structure, equipment, and combat capabilities. They undergo fundamental training and participate in exercises at various levels, scales, and types of combat, including counteroffensive operations. However, we still lack practical experience in using armoured forces in strategic counteroffensive operations, particularly in modern warfare where the enemy employs advanced weaponry. Therefore, leveraging the strength of armoured forces in combat operations in general and in strategic operations in particular during a potential war to defend the Homeland is an important and essential issue. This article aims to discuss several aspects of the use of armoured forces in strategic counteroffensive operations during a potential war to defend the Homeland.

First, concentrate armoured forces on the primary directions, areas, and primary targets of the counteroffensive operation. This is a fundamental principle in the use of armoured forces and is a crucial factor determining success or failure in strategic counteroffensive operations. Due to the limited number of our armoured vehicles, which have been in use for many years without upgrades, while the enemy possesses modern weapons, advanced equipment, rapid mobility, and widespread electronic warfare capabilities, conducting “asymmetric” warfare aimed at quick strikes and rapid resolutions of combat situations, it is necessary to focus our armoured forces on the primary, important directions, areas, and decisive strategic operations. Effectively addressing this issue will enable us to harness comprehensive strength and advantages in each direction and area to slow down the enemy’s advance, and set up conditions for strategic and operational mobile forces to destroy the enemy. Therefore, the High Command or the theatre command and the strategic planning staff must base their decisions on the terrain of the operational area, the quantity and quality of armoured forces, our familiar tactics, and the capabilities of our units to fulfill their missions. This is essential for allocating armoured forces appropriately to each direction, area, operation and strategic combat action.

In terms of scale, armoured forces participating in strategic counteroffensive should primarily operate at tactical level, such as battalions and companies. However, the use of small, separated armoured units should be limited, and if they participate independently in strategic counteroffensives, commanders can employ armoured contingents up to the brigade and reinforced brigade levels. Under specific circumstances, conditions, and operations, armoured forces can also be used in coordination with combined arms units and armed forces in the defence zone to counterattack and destroy enemy rapid reaction forces, defeat enemy land invasions and amphibious landing operations, and recapture islands, seaports, etc.

Additionally, to seize strategic initiative and promptly address contingencies, the armoured forces under the High Command or the theatre command, as well as those under military regions, army corps, and the navy’s armoured branch, must organise mobile counterattack forces and strategic counteroffensive forces in each direction, area, and target with focus on appropriate force concentration and suitable combat capabilities and logistical support. Simultaneously, it is essential to organise reserve forces to be ready for replacement. In organising reserve armoured forces, it is critical to ensure that they are sufficiently strong, flexible, and formed from the outset. Once the reserve forces are put into use, new reserve forces must also be promptly established. In certain operations, reserve armoured forces can be used to reinforce strategic mobile forces, form deep penetration echelons or operational combat groups to counterattack and eliminate the enemy on the battlefield or in the main strategic direction.

Second, ensure the secret and surprise elements of the deployment of armoured forces in a timely manner to create continuous and complex counteroffensive battle arrays. This is a crucial solution that determines the effective use of armoured forces which makes the enemy hard to predict our counteroffensive plans, intentions, objectives, and the posture of our armoured forces, thus limiting the losses of our personnel and armoured vehicles, especially under conditions where the enemy has advanced reconnaissance capabilities, high-precision weapons, and significant firepower. In highly developed people’s warfare scenarios, within the defensive postures of military regions and provincial defence zone that have been well-prepared during peacetime, armoured forces participating in strategic counteroffensive operations enjoy favourable conditions to utilise existing defensive structures to deploy troops, vehicles, camouflage, decoys, etc., ensuring the secret and surprise elements. Therefore, the High Command or the theatre command and the strategic planning staff must deploy armoured forces in unexpected positions to be able to catch the enemy off guard, striking at their weak and vulnerable points. In addition, it is essential to make use of local resources, manpower, and material and the terrain of the operational area to deploy forces, vehicles, forming a continuous and complex counterattack posture, ready for both offensive and defensive actions. In mountainous terrain, it may be appropriate to deploy more tanks than armoured personnel carriers; in plain areas, a balanced combination of tanks and armoured personnel carriers can be employed. If counteroffensive actions are conducted in urban areas, a mixed formation of tanks and armoured personnel carriers should be organised, with a higher proportion of armoured personnel carriers to provide timely support and coordination and mitigate the weaknesses of each type of vehicle and enhance combat strength. For combat activities in riverine areas, ports, and maritime regions, the priority should be given to using armoured personnel carriers.

When conducting strategic counteroffensive, in addition to the existing armoured forces, the theatre can be reinforced with additional armoured forces from the High Command or from military regions, army corps, and the Navy (in areas with maritime and island operations). Therefore, when deploying armoured forces, commanders and strategic planning staff must rely on the defensive postures of military regions and provincial and city defence zones to make appropriate disposition. Besides ensuring elements of secrecy, surprise, and timing, it is crucial to coordinate closely with the armed forces of defence zones and mobile operational and operational - strategic forces to form a continuous and complex counterattack battle array, enabling counterattacks to defeat the enemy’s advancing and spearhead forces.

Third, flexibly and timely transform the combat posture. In a potential war to defend the Homeland, the involvement of armoured forces in counteroffensive operations is likely to be limited. However, the presence of armoured forces enhances our breakthrough capability and contributes to the flexible and timely transformation of out combat posture. With its outstanding feature of powerful and rapid assault capability, armoured forces can reinforce the intensity and pace of counterattacks of strategic mobile forces to defeat the enemy’s land reinforcement, airborne landings, breakthroughs and envelopments in various directions. This helps the theatre commander promptly handle situations during counterattacks, especially in joint and combined arms operations. Besides, armoured forces can coordinate with other forces to accomplish missions, but they can also independently carry out counteroffensive operations. Therefore, commanders and operational and strategic planning staff must base their decisions on the enemy’s and our own situation, the combat determination of the local defence zones, and the number of armoured forces available for reinforcement for appropriate use. However, flexibility must be ensured to transform the combat posture during counterattacks. Furthermore, it is critical to strictly adhere to the principles of using armoured forces and the requirements of strategic operations in a war to defend the Homeland. In addition to prioritising the concentration of armoured forces for the primary and important counteroffensive directions and decisive strategic operations, attention must also be given to other directions and areas to facilitate the transformation of the counteroffensive posture.

Due to the wide-ranging scope and varied terrains of counteroffensive operations, with the enemy’s capability for rapid response, when employing armoured forces, commanders and strategic planning staff need to study the organisation and disposition methods to ensure that our forces are minimised in size but maximised in effectiveness, capable of transitioning from counteroffensive to ambush, raid, defence, and envelopment against the enemy formation or participating in counterinsurgency and responding to various contingencies. During the counteroffensive, when favourable opportunities arise, commanders can use armoured forces for independent actions, but they must reinforce and ensure logistical support for such contingents to adequately fulfil the mission.

In the event of a (potential) war to defend the Homeland, the targets of armoured forces’ operations are very different from the enemy in previous liberation wars. The enemy now employs precision weapons with significant destructive capabilities and modern tactics. Therefore, the use of armoured forces in strategic counteroffensive must be based on a thorough understanding of the principles of strategic operations in our war strategy to defend the Homeland. It must also be adapted to the enemy’s and our own situation and the combat environment to ensure flexibility, innovation, and effectiveness.

Major General DO DINH THANH, Commander of the Armoured Corps