III. Building a politically elite Vietnam People’s Army – A new requirement from practice

Building a politically elite army is a new issue that Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s ideology have not directly addressed. It is also an issue that no resolutions of our Party or the Central Military Commission have directly mentioned. This issue is fundamentally only discussed by some authors when analysing the approach of building a “revolutionary, regular, elite, gradually modernised” People's Army. In particular, it is affirmed that the priority to build an elite Vietnam People's Army must be given to being politically elite. However, there has been no interpretation of what it means to build the politically elite Vietnam People's Army. Classic thinkers, the resolutions of the Party and the Central Military Commission, and published research projects have only discussed building a politically strong army as the foundation for the building of a comprehensively strong army.

Before the 7^th National Party Congress, the term “elite” was not yet a factor in the content of the direction of building the Vietnam People's Army. In the 7th Congress, our Party defined “Building the armed forces with an appropriate regular force in accordance with the revolutionary, regular, gradually modern, elite direction ...”. Then, “elite” became a factor in the building of the Vietnam People's Army and has been mentioned in the documents of the Party Congresses with the current verbatim quote as “revolutionary, regular, elite, gradually modernised”. When interpreting the issue of building a politically elite Vietnam People's Army, authors analyse it from the perspective of building an army with operational capability, thorough training, and “adaptability to any situation”. Several authors have emphasised the issue of building a politically elite army in combination with the goal of “struggling against “peaceful evolution” and tactics of “de-politicising” the army by hostile forces”. Therefore, it has not comprehensively covered the content of building a politically elite Vietnam People's Army.

The politically elite essence of the Vietnam People's Army is characterised by the “maturity, firmness, and solidity” of the army's political stance in accordance with the political guidelines of the Communist Party of Vietnam; the “sharpness, acumen” in advising and handling political situations, political relations, and political struggles in performing the functions and tasks of the Army so that the Army is capable of accomplish all tasks in any situation and become a politically pure, loyal, reliable force and a firm “mainstay” of the Party, the State, and the People. This is a high-level expression as well as a high demand for the political power of the Vietnam People's Army in the current situation. It requires a commitment to Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh's ideology in building and organising the functions and tasks of the Army; the steadfastness of the nature of the working class, the people's nature, and the ethnic nature of the Army; the loyalty of the Army to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Socialist State of Vietnam, and the Vietnamese people in all situations; the strengthening of the “blood and flesh” relationship between the Army and the people, as well as the “comrade-in-arms” relationship within the Army; the competence and effectiveness in fighting against the “peaceful evolution” conducted by hostile forces. To that end, our Army must be constantly educated, trained, meticulously and thoroughly prepared in terms of political stance.

The cause of building the Vietnam People's Army in terms of political stance at present and in the coming time takes place in a context where there are intertwined opportunities and challenges both internationally and domestically. The global and regional situations are predicted to undergo complex and unpredictable developments. Strategic competition among major countries and localised armed conflicts will occur in various forms and at various levels, which exerts a remarkable influence on the morale of the military cadres and soldiers. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, characterised by the widespread utilisation of robots and artificial intelligence in various aspects of life, potentially waver the confidence of military cadres and soldiers in Marxist-Leninist ideology and Ho Chi Minh's thought. The situation in the East Sea still exists conflict risks, which requires the Party, the State, and the Army to handle the situation with vigilance, cleverness, and flexibility to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc.

Political education is regularly conducted at Vinh Hien Border Post, Thua Thien Hue Border Guard Command

Domestically, after nearly 40 years of reformation, in parallel with significant historical achievements, our country still encounters countless difficulties and weaknesses. The four risks that our Party has previously warned about still persist and their presence is predicted to become more complex and intense. Issues such as corruption, wastefulness, bureaucracy, and deterioration in political ideology, ethics, and lifestyles, as well as internal “self-evolution” and “self-transformation”, have a significant impact on the political stance of the military cadres and soldiers. Hostile forces continue to intensify their strategic “peaceful evolution” against our country, particularly by exploiting cyberspace to undermine the fundamental ideologies of the Party. The “de-politicisation” of the Army reinforced by hostile forces makes a portion of military cadres and soldiers prone to “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” without being regularly nurtured and trained. The task of safeguarding the Fatherland during international integration presents new and demanding requirements. The content of safeguarding the Fatherland demands a close connection between safeguarding the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of the Fatherland with the protection of the Party, the State, the People, and the socialist regime. It requires maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for development. The current and future cause of building the Army also pose new requirements with the goal: by 2025, an agile, lean, and strong Army will have been fundamentally built to lay a foundation for the building of a revolutionary, regular, elite, and modernised the People's Army by 2030. The restructuring of the force organisation and the construction of an agile, lean, and strong Army will have multi-faceted impacts on the thoughts, feelings, and ideologies of all military members if we do not effectively implement ideological work with organisational and policy work. Particularly, the construction of several advanced forces may lead to a tendency to emphasise the role of weaponry and undervalue the importance of political and ideological education.

To surmount the negative impacts of the aforementioned situations and address the shortcomings in building a political Army over the past years, it is necessary to intensify the construction of the Vietnam People's Army in terms of political stance with new and more demanding requirements to strive for politically elite essence with comprehensive synchronised measures.

IV. Measures to build a politically elite Vietnam People's Army in the current situation

Building a politically elite Vietnam People's Army is an objective requirement in the current situation, which demands efforts to ensure that all aspects of building a politically strong Army can achieve the highest results. This involves a combination of the guidelines, content, forms, and measures implemented by the Party, the State, and organisations within the political system, particularly the Central Military Commission, the Ministry of National Defence, military cadres, and soldiers of the Vietnam People's Army to ensure that our Army adheres to the Party's ideological foundation, with the goal of national independence and socialism; adheres to working-class stance with profound people-oriented characteristics and ethnicity to be a political force, a clean, loyal, and reliable combat force, and the “mainstay” for the Party, the State, and the People in the cause of national construction and defence. This lays a foundation for our Army to accomplish all assigned tasks.

The content, forms, and measures to build a politically elite Vietnam People's Army are essentially the same as those for building a politically strong military. However, the requirements and goals must be reached. It is a continuous and relentless process, with numerous synchronised measures that chiefly concentrate on the following fundamental measures.

First, maintaining and constantly intensifying the absolute and direct leadership in all aspects of the Communist Party of Vietnam over the Army. It is necessary to grasp and stringently implement while simultaneously researching, supplementing, and perfecting the leadership mechanism in accordance with Resolution No. 51-NQ/TW issued on July 20^th, 2005, by the Politburo (9^th tenure) on “continuing to improve the leadership mechanism of the Party, implementing the one-commander regime in association with the political commissar regimes within the Vietnam People's Army”. The focus must be placed on building a truly pure and strong Military Party in terms of politics, ideology, ethics, organisation, and personnel; ensuring a typical and exemplary Committee in intellect and ethics to set an example for the entire Party; possessing high leadership competence and combat strength to regularly lead all agencies and units throughout the Army to accomplish all tasks. Party committees and organisations at all levels should strictly implement Resolutions of the 4^th Party Central Committee (11^th and 12^th  tenures) and Conclusion No. 21-KL/TW issued on 25 October 2021 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (13^th tenure) on intensifying the construction and rectification of the Party and the political system; striving for the ultimate goal that no cadres and party members in the Military Party Committee have manifestations of degrading their political ideology, ethics, lifestyle, “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” or violate the regulations on what party members are not allowed to do.

Second, enhance political education to maintain the Party’s ideological foundation within the Army and preserve the nature of the working class, the people's essence, and the national characteristics of the Army. To that end, it is crucial to strictly maintain the regime of political education in all units. The focus should be put on renewing the content and methods to improve the quality of political education and ideological orientation in accordance with Directive No. 2423-CT/QUTW issued on 09 November 2023, by the Central Military Commission on “Renewing and improving the quality of political education in the new period” to equip cadres and soldiers with fundamental knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, the Party’s renewal path, the State's policies and laws, the revolutionary mission, the tasks of the Army and units. It is necessary to effectively carry out research, grasp and study the Party’s resolutions and directives, especially those related to military tasks, national defence, and the protection of the Fatherland. Regular propagation and education must be effectively implemented so that all service members can have a deep insight into the nature, conspiracies, and tactics of the hostile forces against the Party, the state, and the Army; comprehend the Party’s viewpoints on partners and subjects of Vietnam’s revolutionary; enhance the revolutionary vigilance, steadfastly adhere to the goals of national independence and socialism. Importance must be attached to continuing to intensify learning and implementing Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, ethics, and manners in line with the implementation of Resolution No. 847-NQ/QUTW issued on 28 December 2021 by the Central Military Commission on “Promoting the qualities of “Uncle Ho's Soldiers” and resolutely preventing individualism in the new situation” and the Campaign to promote traditions, devote talents to deserve “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” title in the new era. Under all circumstances, it is a must to ensure that Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's ideology always play a leading role in the political and spiritual life of the Army; the entire Army consistently maintains unity in politics and ideology and adheres to the Party’s ideological foundation, with no cadres or party members regressing in political ideology.

Third, concentrating on building a pure and reliable contingent of military cadres, especially high-ranking cadres with strong political zeal and absolute loyalty to the Fatherland, the Party, the State, and the people; and competencies in advising and handling all military-defence situations to safeguard the Fatherland. Party committees and organisations at all levels must strictly adhere to the cadre work procedures and ensure democracy and objectivity in all stages: detecting, planning, training, nurturing, promoting, and using. Emphasis must be placed on planning the cadres at all levels, especially at the strategic level to ensure inheritance between generations. The quality of training and nurturing cadres in educational institutions as well as in-service training in political ideology, ethics, lifestyles, and military professionalism must also be enhanced. Priority must be given to building political zeal, methods, and working styles for the cadres; effectively implement the rotation of cadres between agencies, units, and educational institutions to train, challenge, and cultivate, thereby creating a source of competent leaders; meticulously manage and evaluate cadres to ensure a foundation for planning, training, nurturing, and using. Special attention must be paid to training pure and reliable strategic-level cadres with firm political zeal, sharp strategic thinking, and outstanding capabilities to fulfil their duties and tasks; showing commitment and loyalty to the Party, the Fatherland, and the People. Strive to ensure that no cadre, especially those at the strategic level, regresses in political ideology, ethics, lifestyle, “self-evolution”, or “self-transformation”.

Fourth, strengthening internal solidarity and military-civilian unity while maintaining the image of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” in all circumstances. Accordingly, it is required to regularly and effectively address internal relationships between cadres and soldiers, superiors and inferiors, leaders and followers, individuals and organisations, etc. on the foundation of understanding the goals, combat ideals of the Army, the tasks of units, and the duties of each individual; simultaneously strictly adhere to the regulations, orders, and discipline of the Army and units. The close bond with the people is inherent to the good traditions of the People’s Army and constitutes the root of our Army’s power. Therefore, in all circumstances, party committees and presiding cadres at all levels within and outside the Army must consistently concentrate on building and consolidating military-civilian relations based on the foundation of the Party’s guidelines and the State's policies and laws; concentrate on bringing into full play the conditions to ensure that military-civilian relations become increasingly solid to thoroughly address any factors that adversely affect this relation; strive to minimise disciplinary violations regarding the relationship with the people to maintain the image of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” in the hearts of the people.

Fifth, actively struggling and defeating the “Peaceful Evolution” strategy and the tactics to “politicise” the Army of hostile forces; taking the lead in the struggle to protect the Party’s ideological foundation. For great effectiveness, party committees, and presiding cadres at all levels are required to consistently lead and direct the combination of building politically strong agencies and units with actively struggling against the tactics of “peaceful evolution” and “politicisation” of the Army by hostile forces. The focus must be on actively implementing Resolution No. 35-NQ/TW issued on 22 October 2018 by the Politburo (12^th tenure) on “Intensifying the protection of the Party’s ideological foundation, struggling and refuting hostile and erroneous views in the new situation”. It is imperative to regularly renew the content, forms, and methods of the struggle in parallel with enhancing the awareness and reinforcing the confidence of cadres and soldiers in the Party's leadership and the State's management and administration; strengthen the immunity and resistance of cadres and soldiers against the subversive activities of hostile forces. Strive for the goal that the Army take the lead in thwarting all schemes and tactics of “peaceful evolution” by hostile forces to protect the Party's ideological foundation in all circumstances.

Building the politically elite Vietnam People’s Army requires the efforts of the entire Party, the entire people, and the entire Army with military cadres and soldiers at the core. Therefore, it is required to enhance the political awareness, sense of political responsibility, confidence, and aspirations of all individuals in the cause of constructing a politically elite People's Army to lay a foundation for building a “revolutionary, regular, elite, and modernised” People's Army of Vietnam.

NGUYEN NGOC HOI