The great victory of our people and troops in the Border Operation (October, 1950) pushed our resistance war to a new stage in which we took the initiative and the French colonialists were placed at a disadvantage in terms of strategy. After studying the situation thoroughly, on 20 April 1951, the Party Central Committee decided to launch Quang Trung Operation across the provinces of Ha Nam, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh with the aim of destroying the enemy force in the region and breaking down their plan to consolidate strategic defensive posture in the Northern battlefield. That was the first time we launched an operation of considerable scale in plain area far from our main base resulting in a number of challenges for us such as: combat experience, the manoeuvrability in secret in open ground, the strict control of the enemy, logistics support, evacuation of the casualties, overcoming the firepower of the enemy’s artillery and airforce, etc. However, with our strong determination, creative way of combat, and especially the art of coordinating three types of forces namely main force, local force and guerrilla force, the operation was made a success both militarily and politically with various distinctive features as follow:

1. Close coordination in propagandizing and mobilizing people’s contribution for the operation. This matter was of paramount importance, deciding the victory of the operation, particularly when we attacked into plain area which was considered the enemy’s strongest rear. To accomplish the mission, the General Command ordered the Inter-region 3 and other units to conduct thoroughly political and ideological education for troops and strengthen mass mobilization. To fulfill the order, units opened intensive political meetings to make cadres and troops grasp viewpoints and lines of people’s war and self-reliance of the Party. Thenceforth, they could build strong determination and readiness to overcome hardships and sacrifice to fulfill their task.

2. An extensive coordination among the three forces in the wide plain area. The Command of the operation commanded and operated closely the coordination among the main force, local force and guerrilla force during the combat process. Accordingly, the command of the operation empowered the divisions to be in charge and command local forces and coordinate with each other to launch attacks synchronously into various targets; conduct a number of military activities both inside and outside the area of the operation to prevent the enemy’s reinforcement from entering the combat area. Main force also coordinated with local force and guerrilla force in making recce to grasp the all round situation, particularly maneuvering route, places for force disposition, supporting locations, etc., of the enemy. Basing on these information, way of combat was decided on. Accordingly, main force would swoop on and advance in the enemy installations; local force and part of the main force would engage the enemy in every place to prevent them from rescuing and reinforcing; guerilla force would engage the enemy with small and close fights to destroy part of enemy’s force and their lackeys and watch, direct and support the manoeuvre of our vehicles, etc. The distinction of coordinating the three forces was also shown when we had difficulties in resupplying and evacuating casualties. The command of operation was successful in upholding the role of each force, calling for support of the local people, organizations and authority to evacuate all the casualties safely to the rear which was a great spiritual encouragement for the subsequent operations.

3. Hold and transform the coordination reasonably for protecting people’s crop. When the enemy reinforced to cause disadvantage for us, the operation command quickly and actively develop the operation into a new direction towards our advantage, i.e. fostering guerrilla war, protecting crops, strengthening and promoting political victory, destroying more enemy force. To implement the above determination, the operation command restructured their forces. Each division would leave behind a regiment to coordinate with local troop and guerrilla force to conduct small fights, further destroy and suppress the enemy, give support for localities to counter the enemy’s sweeping, destroy lackeys, safeguard and enlarge our bases. Accordingly, since the mid of June 1951, the left-behind regiments coordinated closely with local troop and guerrilla force to carry out small fights carefully. The involving forces, being highly organized, encircled the enemy’s installations all night and day preventing them from robbing and damaging people’s harvest. As a result, people in localities were able to harvest their crops timely and transport hundreds of tons of rice to the liberated zone.

65 years have gone by but the distinctive feature of coordinating three forces in Quang Trung Operation is still of value. Particularly, in the new circumstances, valuable lessons in the operations should be further studied, applied and developed.

Snr Colonel Pham Duc Truong

The Institute of  Vietnamese Military History