The military art of Vietnam during the resistance war against the United States for national salvation in general, and in the historical Ho Chi Minh Campaign in particular, experienced a vibrant development, reaching unprecedented heights, and making a significant contribution alongside our military’s and people’s efforts to completely liberate the South and reunify the country. Therefore, the distinctive features of that military art need to be studied and applied to the work training and maintaining combat readiness of regular army corps today.

In the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, our Party applied and creatively developed the art of conducting the People’s War on specific terrains and in specific situations. One of these was the art of closely combining guerrilla warfare with conventional warfare, local people’s war with operations by regular army corps which led to significant victories. Accordingly, alongside the local forces, we utilised five regular army corps to launch offensives on five different fronts, forming a combined posture of offence and uprising, creating synergised strength to defeat the enemy. Notably, we successfully addressed significant challenges such as coordinating the preparation of forces with establishing strategic posture, balancing mobility with concentrated troop deployment, firepower, and harnessing overall strength under rapid developments, etc. Practical experience demonstrated that despite departing from different locations with some locations thousands of kilometres away from the intended targets, the 5 army corps still managed to converge at the right moment, forming powerful blows that shattered the enemy’s final strongholds and secured victory.

The victory of the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign left behind numerous valuable lessons and experiences for today’s generations of officers and soldiers, and they need to be continuously studied, applied, and developed in the new conditions of modern warfare.

(1) The organisation of lightning-fast, long-distance troop movements in multiple directions to concentrate forces under extremely difficult and fierce conditions. This was one of the most remarkable aspects of our military art in the liberation war when the opportune moment had ripened. In the context of the strategic decisive battle approaching rapidly, the need for the concentration of force and the establishment of overwhelming superiority for a decisive blow became more crucial than ever, racing against time, the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence organised lightning-fast troop movements with large formations of personnel and equipment. A notable example was the rapid deployment of the 1^st Army Corps covering a distance of 1,700 km from the North to the Southeastern theatre in just 12 days. Meanwhile, the 2^nd Corps conducted fighting on the move along the Central Coastal area towards the East and Southeast of Saigon, and the 3^rd Corps moved from the Central Highlands to assembly positions in the North and Northwest of Saigon, etc.

(2). The accurate assessment of the situation and the establishment of a strong, lethal and comprehensive offensive posture. Based on a correct assessment of the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses, our units swiftly undertook preparatory work, established appropriate combat postures, and enhanced, strengthened and expanded such postures to make them more robust, lethal, comprehensive, and suitable for combined arms actions. Among these, the postures of the 5 main army corps were firmly established along 5 directions, combined with the postures of local guerrilla forces. This enabled them to make coordinated deep advances behind the enemy line to form a widespread but focused offensive posture with focal points, breakthroughs, and deep thrusts, enabling us to capture critical objectives within the city of Saigon, including the nerve centres of the puppet regime and enemy. (3). The concentration of forces and resources for the combination of encirclements, cut-off actions and deep thrusts to eliminate key targets, securing the final victory. With strong combat postures, in each direction of the offensive, the mobile army corps and onsite army corps directly targeted urban objectives, central hubs, and major enemy military bases. Using tactics such as encirclement, cutting off, and deep penetration into key objectives, the 5 army corps systematically eliminated and disintegrated large segments of enemy forces, shattered their strategic defensive formations, and achieved significant victories, concluding the war.

Currently and in the coming years, while peace, cooperation, and development remain significant trends, the global and regional situation continues to undergo rapid, complex, and unpredictable changes. Major powers are intensifying their efforts to attract and assemble allies to engage in strategic competition. Regional conflicts and maritime disputes, especially in the East Sea, remain complex and unpredictable. The task of building the military, enhancing national defence, and safeguarding the Motherland places even higher demands on us. To improve training quality and combat readiness, the Army Corps must continue to apply creative military art and draw upon the experiences gained during the resistance war against the US Imperialism for national salvation. This ensures the preservation of our heritage and the enhancement of the nation’s tradition of training to fight the enemy while adapting to the current situation. The focus should be on several key issues as follows:

First, continue to thoroughly adhere to the Party’s principles and defence and military policies, as well as the resolutions and directives of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence regarding training and combat readiness tasks. This is a matter of principle that ensures all officers and soldiers fully comprehend our leadership’s viewpoints, including those concerning training and combat readiness tasks. Accordingly, the army corps must continue to deeply comprehend and rigorously implement Resolution No. 1659-NQ/QUTW dated December 20, 2022, of the Central Military Commission regarding the enhancement of training quality during the period of 2023 - 2030 and the subsequent years. They must also follow the military and defence orders of the Chief of the General Staff and guidance from relevant agencies regarding the training and combat readiness missions for 2023. The Party Committee, the Command, and units within each army corps must clearly identify training and combat readiness as the central and regular political task and be prepared to respond to non-traditional security challenges in peacetime and be combat-ready to achieve victory during wartime. Additionally, emphasis should be placed on implementing directives and resolutions in combination with organising political education, fostering patriotism, and enhancing understanding of national values, military traditions, and the units’ own traditions. Furthermore, Party committees and commanders at all levels should review and develop specific resolutions for training and combat readiness, specifying objectives and measures based on a new mindset regarding the military and defence tasks of the Party and the requirements of protecting the Motherland in the new situation.

Second, regularly innovate and enhance the quality of training and combat readiness. Training and combat readiness involve the process of improving military knowledge and applying the experiences and fighting traditions of our forefathers in the context of new combat conditions. Therefore, there is a need to continue pushing for breakthroughs in improving training quality, and maintaining training content, methods, and scale in accordance with the principle of "fundamental, practical, and robust". Training activities should be closely aligned with the realities of combat, the characters of potential opposing forces and the units’ areas of operation and task requirements. They should also be in line with our existing organisational structure, capabilities, equipment, military arts, and both new and traditional fighting methods. 

Based on the general training program, units need to proactively integrate training content, combining political education with military training, technique training with tactics training, theoretical training with practical exercises, and traditional methods with modern techniques. This aims to develop well-rounded troops with high combat skills, physical fitness, and discipline. Training content must also be significantly innovated and tailored to each specific target group.

In this context, officer training is pivotal, ensuring that officers at all levels are proficient in theoretical matters, adept in management, and effective in leadership at their respective levels while being able to provide sound advice that is accurate and relevant to the higher-ups. The current challenge is how to adapt the experience gained from the national liberation war to the new combat conditions, especially when there are fundamental adjustments in the methods of conducting warfare. Therefore, there is a need to focus on training in grasping and flexibly applying our military art of “achieving big results with small forces” in various forms of combat, including defensive, counterattack, and offensive operations. For each unit, they must meet the criteria of excellence in both technical and tactical aspects, being skilled in small-scale combat, independent action, cooperative engagement under higher-level formations, and combined operations with various services and arms, across different scales and forms of combat. This involves intensified night training, field exercises, mission-oriented training, and mobilised training closely tailored to specific objectives and the realities of combat. Additionally, units must become proficient in the use of the various weapons and equipment within their organisational structure, gradually gaining expertise in handling modern weaponry, military hardware, and advanced technologies. Also, our troops must excel in fighting in various terrains, including forests and mountains, uplands, plains, urban areas, and coastal zones, all within the context of the people’s war. Furthermore, they must be effective in coordinating with local forces, regional defence units, and friendly units, applying various methods of warfare across the entire country or specific strategic directions on land, sea, and islands.

In terms of methodology, it is essential to follow the correct training procedures. This includes a close integration of training at the tactical level, combined arms training at the operational level, and joint operations at the strategic level. There should also be an emphasis on incorporating new elements of joint warfare and arms coordination into various forms of strategic-level operations in critical areas. This step-by-step approach aims to immerse the troops in training that closely simulates the real-life challenging and harsh combat environment. In addition, significant focus should be placed on training in logistical and technical aspects under conditions of vast geographical expanse, time-sensitive missions, and high risk of enemy cutting off our formations. Furthermore, there is a need to establish robust logistical and technical networks with the necessary depth to ensure timely support for units engaged in prolonged combat operations.

Third, improve the quality of exercises. Exercises represent the highest form of training, aiming to synthesise knowledge and assess the training results of units and agencies. The exercise content and scenarios should be determined annually to ensure their relevance. And the scale of exercises can range from tactical to operational or even strategic-level. In addition, the exercise content and methods must immerse participants in realistic combat scenarios, enhancing the command and organisation capabilities of commanders and the actions of contingents.

For commanders at all levels, they must thoroughly study the planned areas for exercise scenarios, familiarise themselves with the terrain, and select appropriate methods of task execution. Also, they may need to engage in reconnaissance while finalising their decisions. In the context of new combat conditions, the process of organising, directing, and conducting exercises may involve rapidly changing and dynamic situations. Therefore, commanders at all levels not only need to have the capability to organise and execute their tasks efficiently with a scientific mindset but also the ability to harness the collective intelligence of their teams in resolving critical tasks. They should emphasise the advising role of their staff, particularly in research, synthesis, timely detection, and accurate proposal of decisions, aiding commanders in organising and conducting operations swiftly and effectively. Additionally, the application of information technology should be strongly encouraged to provide timely support to leaders and commanders at all levels, aiding them in making decisions to engage the enemy at the right moment and directing and managing actions against the enemy most effectively.

Senior Colonel NGUYEN TRUNG HIEU, Deputy Commander - Chief of Staff of the 1^st Army Corps