The soldiers and people of Viet Nam and Laos fought side by side with one another to deal a heavy blow to the enemy in the Upper Laos Campaign of 1953. Victory of the Campaign brought about a strategic opportunity for the revolution in these two countries, especially the Lao revolution, to drive French military in Northern Indochina theatre of war into passivity, forcing them to disperse forces to react.
Our victory in the Northwest Campaign in 1952 seriously threatened enemy troops in the strategic area of Upper Laos. To address the situation, the enemy quickly established a defence posture in the Upper Laos with a view to regain initiative in the Northern Indochina theatre of war. Accordingly, apart from making every effort to strengthen the Na San fortress complex and turn Sam Neua into a strong fortress complex aimed to counter our operations.
On firmly grasping situations in the theatre of war as well as the enemy’s plots and tricks, in Spring 1953, the Party Central Committee, President Ho Chi Minh, and the Resistance Government of Laos decided to launch the Upper Laos Campaign to annihilate part of the enemy strength, firmly holding the strategic initiative, and enable Lao friends to expand their liberation area, consolidate the revolutionary base, and stand up to fight side by side with Vietnamese people against our common enemy. Owing to careful preparations in every aspect, high combat resolution, and unique military art, the Upper Laos Campaign won a landslide victory. A 70 years’ look back reveals that many great values of the Campaign have been affirmed more clearly and comprehensively.
First, sound strategic vision of the Party Central Committee, General Military Commission, and General Command as well as the excellent art of operational command and control of the Campaign Command is key to victory of the Campaign. On the basis of important victories in 1952, to maintain and bring into play the strategic initiative, we sought to preserve a continual offensive posture aimed to deter and deny the enemy to regain the Northwest, striving for destroying its fortress complexes and countering its major offensives in the plain and our liberated areas. To do so, the Party Central Committee of Viet Nam’s Labour Party convened the 4th Congress, which determined that “our strategic direction is to temporarily avoid the enemy’s strong points and strike at its weaknesses to disperse forces and expand the liberated areas”. Although the enemy had strengthened defence, it still exposed many weaknesses such as difficult terrain. Thus, they would be divided and isolated when we attacked. The difficult terrain also made it hard for the enemy to provide reinforcements and logistic support. The Lao puppet troops were in low spirits and lacked combat skills, thereby being extremely vulnerable to our attacks. The liberation of Upper Laos would enable the Resistance Government of Laos to build robust resistance rear while making the enemy disperse its mobile forces to deal with situation in the Northwest and stabilise the Northern plain, further deepening their contradiction between concentration and mobility of forces. On the basis of such assessments, in February 1953, the General Military Commission approved the plan to launch the Spring – Summer Campaign of 1953 to attack the enemy in the Upper Laos. Victory of the Campaign is clear evidence for sound leadership and correct strategic vision of the Party Central Committee, General Military Commission, and Campaign Command when they identified direction of attack and aims of the Campaign.
In addition, the art of operational command and control of the Campaign Command is also a striking feature, which led to the Upper Laos victory. In late March 1953, the operational plan was basically completed, in which Sam Neua was chosen as the main direction of attack while the River Nam Hou valley and Xiangkhouang were the direction of coordinated attack. The operational method was maneuver warfare. Accordingly, the combat formations secretly approached and quickly surrounded enemy positions; attacked important heights in the peripheral area in connection with launching deep attack to divide and annihilate the enemy. Nevertheless, when we were near to Sam Neua and ready to carry out attack, the enemy troops had withdrawn from their positions. The Campaign Command, therefore, decided to pursue the enemy. At the same time, it ordered the 304th Division to intensify operational activities on the Highway 7 to intercept the withdrawal towards the Plain of Jars. Given its resolve to destroy the enemy to the bitter end, the Campaign Command coordinated directions of attack in a smooth, close manner and leveraged overall power of all forces to successfully accomplish the objectives.
Second, invaluable lessons on making close, careful preparations in every aspect for the Campaign. The Upper Laos is an area of strategic importance, which is characterised by jungles and mountains. The place is far from the rear and roads of transportation, thus making it difficult for securing logistic support. This is the first time a large part of our regular force has ever fought a campaign in Laos. Consequently, the preparation process must be carried out closely and carefully in all fields, of which tactical, technical training and logistical support are of special importance.
On realising such guidelines, in early March 1953, the General Military Commission held a meeting with the participation of the regiment-level cadres and above to discuss and agree on principles and combat methods of units. After that, units organised meetings with the participation of company-level cadres and above to popularise guidelines, reach consensus about awareness, and strengthen the resolve of cadres and commanders; conduct additional tactical, technical training; step up ideological, political education; improve the spirits of solidarity; strengthen Viet Nam – Laos combat alliance; and promote mass mobilisation during operations on Lao soil. Beside additional training, technical, logistical support was carried out promptly because the amount of logistics was huge and the preparation was made within a short period of time. Having grasped their missions, the General Military Commission and General Command decided to establish the Theatre Support Council, which was organised from the central to interregional and provincial level. Frontline support divisions of ministries were also quickly set up to intensify provision for the theatre of war. The Resistance Government of Laos appealed for localities in the treatre to bring into full play on-site logistic support capacity to coordinate actions with our forces. Consequently, we mobilised and transported nearly 7,000 tonnes of food, 166 tonnes of ammunition, and so on. Although we had to shift from offensive towards fighting the enemy who were withdrawing, support work was able to be carried out to meet requirements of units, contributing to victory of the Campaign.
Third, the Campaign defeated French colonialists’ effort to consolidate the Upper Laos and marked a new development in our strategic offensive posture. In view of serious challenges in the Upper Laos, French colonialists decided to put the area under command of the French Headquarters in Northern Viet Nam. They also divided the Upper Laos into two defensive zones namely Me Kong and Tran Ninh, of which they concentrated on building Sam Neua into a “Na San-style” strong complex of fortresses in Laos with a view to regain the strategic initiative in the Northern Indochina theatre of war. Accordingly, they hurriedly sent three battalions to Sam Neua and one battalion to Xiangkhouang. Together with the on-site forces, they established 11 fortresses and repaired Na Thong Airfield and Na Vieng landing area. Additionally, they were ready to use the mobile forces in the Northern Viet Nam theatre of war to conduct airborne support or rescue when needed.
Although the defence system was firmly established, right after discovering our regular divisions’ movement towards the Upper Laos, General Raoul Albin Louis Salan, commander of French forces in Indochina, immediately ordered withdrawal of all forces from Sam Neua to avoid being destroyed. It was within this context that the Campaign Command timely instructed units to reorganise themselves into battalions and companies, enabling them to quickly pursue and annihilate a large part of enemy troops. Defeat in the Upper Laos not only drove French mobile forces in the Northern Indochina into passive response but also denied their effort to regain strategic initiative. As for us, the Victory of the Upper Laos marked a new development in our strategic offensive posture, which created a premise for staging following offensive operations to consolidate our strategic initiative and strive for final victory.
Fourth, the Victory of the Upper Laos of 1953 is a milestone in the special combat solidarity between Viet Nam and Laos, which brought about a new development in Lao revolution. After the Border Campaign of 1950, solidarity and combat alliance among people of the three Indochinese countries increasingly prospered. The Viet Nam – Cambodia – Laos Combined Front was established in March 1951 at the People Alliance Meeting of three Indochinese countries. Therefore, the unity and solidarity bloc between people of three countries were increasingly strengthened and developed; the war of resistance against the common foe won more victories. Nevertheless, the war of resistance in Laos and Cambodia faced many difficulties and failed to meet mission requirements. There remained limitations in operational coordination among forces of three countries. In Spring 1953, after careful exchanges, Viet Nam and Laos decided to launch the Upper Laos Campaign. The objectives of the Campaign were suitable to practical conditions and satisfied demands of revolutionary missions in each country and the Indochina as a whole. The party leaders and heads of the Resistance Government of Laos agreed wholeheartedly with our guideline and actively worked with us in combat coordination. Victory of the Campaign ushered in a new context for the war of resistance for national salvation of Lao people; brought the Lao revolution a huge base connecting with Viet Nam’s liberated areas; created a strategic coordination posture between the two revolutionaries; and enable the wars of resistance for national liberation to thrive. The Upper Laos Victory is the result of the proletarian internationalism and the operational coordination between the two militaries and people of the two countries. It becomes a milestone in Viet Nam – Laos solidarity history. The Upper Laos Victory and other military victories in 1953 inflicted heavy defeats on the enemy, created a turning point for Lao revolution, and brought about developments in position and strength, enabling militaries and people of the two countries to defeat French colonialists’ invasion completely. The lessons learnt from the Upper Laos Victory of 1953 remain invaluable in theoretical, practical terms in today’s national building and defence.
Major General, Dr. NGUYEN HOANG NHIEN, Director of the Institute of Military History, Ministry of National Defence