The Party’s leadership in the 1975 Spring Victory is manifested in the following angles:

The Party grasped the situation and mapped out the sound guidelines for liberating the South at the correct time. After the Paris Peace Accord was signed in 1973, the U.S withdrew their troops out of Vietnam. However, they still provided support to Sai Gon government in an attempt to maintain their new-style colonialism in the South of Vietnam.

Given the plots of the U.S and Sai Gon government, it is necessary to have a new roadmap for the South in the new period. The 21^st Plenum of the Party Central Committee (3^rd tenure) convened in such context and mapped out the strategy for liberating the South and unifying the country, specifying that: “In each development of the revolution, there will be complications. However, whatever it may be, the only way for the success of the South is violence. We have to prepare for dealing with the worst scenario that the enemy will wage war again”; “The road of the South’s revolution is the one of revolutionary violence. In any situation, we have to grasp the opportunity, keep on our offensive posture and have flexible directions to lead the revolution to success”. We upheld the flag of peace and legitimacy, and conducted political, military and diplomatic struggles to force the enemy to implement the agreement in our favour. The 21^st Resolution (3^rd tenure) was soon spread throughout the Party, especially the Southern party organisations and fronts.

The politburo and the Central Military Commission discussed plan for liberating the South and unifying the country ( A file photo)

When the time was ripe, the Party opportunely grasped the chance to liberate the South and unify the country. In 1974, the Liberation Army accelerated their strategic offensive attacks into the main targets of Sai Gon troops and smashed almost all pacification encroachment of the latter, widening the liberated areas. With the robust growth of the Southern Front, on 7^th January 1975, the Politburo conducted a meeting and gave out important decisions. “Our next task is to grasp the historic opportunity, launch new operations, conduct decisive battles to win the war, end the national revolution in the South, and unify the country. Once the national democratic revolution is fulfilled, the whole country will progress to socialism”; to carry out large scale offensives and uprisings; launch joint-force operations; combine attacks into the enemy’s main troop with breaking their rural pacification; foster political struggle; facilitate special propagation; destroy the enemy’s logistics facilities and war vehicle. The Politburo also drafted operational plan for each battlefield. The North was to give its utmost support for the South’s battlefield while actively countering the assaults of the U.S Air Force and Navy. That was the operational plan for 1975. The plan for the year of 1976 would be decided depending on actual outcomes of the situation in 1975. That was also the political will of the Politburo for liberating the South in the two years of 1975 and 1976.

The Phuoc Long Victory on 6^th January 1975 of the Liberation Army showed that chance for liberating the South came closer and bigger. However, the matter was: Is it possible that the U.S would come back or intervene by their Air Force or Navy to save the government and military of Sai Gon? On 9^th January 1975, the U.S Ambassador to Sai Gon Martin announced to President Nguyen Van Thieu that: “U.S air support is now not permitted”.

The Party chose the right direction and target of strategic offensive which changed completely the situation of war to our favour. Implementing the conclusions made by the Politburo on 9^th January 1975, the Standing Office of the Central Military Commission discussed and concretised the strategic operational plan for 1975 – 1976 period. Accordingly, in early 1975 we would launch offensive operation in the Central Highlands with the main direction being the Southern Central Highlands and the main target being Buon Ma Thuot. After discussion, the Politburo and Central Military Commission decided to found the High Command of Operation Central Highlands and deploy General Van Tien Dung, member of the Politburo, Chief of the General Staff, VPA, to the Central Highlands to command the operation. On 17^th February 1975, the General Staff of the High Command of the operation discussed measures to implement the decision of the Politburo and the Standing Office of the Central Military Commission. With careful preparation, on 10^th March 1975, the Liberation Army launched attacks into Buon Ma Thuot and at 11.00 hour of 11^th March 1975 we successfully liberated this town.

On 11^th March 1975, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission listened to the report of the General Staff about the situation in the Central Highlands and Buon Ma Thuot victory.  Analysing the situation, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission appreciated that we could gain major victories earlier than anticipated. On 16^th March 1975, the remaining enemy in Play Ku and Kong Tum withdrew to central coastal regions along No. 7 Road. We followed them in 8 consecutive days from 17^th March to 24^th March 1975 and defeated them. On 25^th March 1975, Central Highlands was totally liberated. Since the beginning of the Central Highlands Operation, our forces in the Southern and Central battlefields strengthened our assaults against the enemy. Prior to the operation, on 8^th February 1975, the Politburo decided to found the Party Committee of the Tri – Thien Front. The Tri – Thien Military Region and the 5^th Military Region all joined with the Central Highlands Front. The plan for liberating Hue, Da Nang and other central provinces was made. On 21^st March 1975 we launched Hue Operation and on 25^th March 1975 Hue was liberated. Our assault into Da Nang began on 28^th March 1975 and the city was soon liberated only one day after on 29^th March 1975. Following these two victories, we forwarded our liberation to other central coastal provinces.

Moreover, our Party led and directed the mobilisation of human resources and material to multiply our strength. On 25^th March 1975, the Politburo decided to establish the Council for Reinforcing the South headed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. On 1^st April 1975, the Politburo sent a telegram to the Southern Central Committee, ordering to speed up the plan for General Offensive and Uprising in Sai Gon – Gia Dinh and founded the High Command and Party Committee of Sai Gon Front. The telegram read: “We have destroyed more than 35% of the enemy force, two of their corps, about 40% of their technical corps and more than 40% of their logistics facilities, liberated 12 provinces with a total population of nearly 8 million people. We have gained an overwhelming strength and the enemy is risking a total collapse. Since this moment, our last decisive match begins. Our revolution is growing with a very fast pace”. Therefore, the Politburo decided that: “We have to grasp this opportunity and determine to carry out the general offensive and uprising to win the war in the shortest time. The best time is in this April, no later. We have to act speedily, boldly and surprisingly”. As such, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission decided to liberate Sai Gon and the South before the rainy season of 1975.

With the strategic decision of the Politburo, on 6^th April 1975, General Vo Nguyen Giap gave his order to the Southern Front that: “Speedy and speedier. Bold and bolder. Making use of every hour and minute to advance and liberate the South. Determine to fight and win completely”. On 9^th April 1975, the Politburo sent a telegram to the Southern Central Committee and other commanders about the plan to attack into Sai Gon with the best prepraration on all directions to ensure a total victory. With the victories on the battlefields, the Politburo conducted a meeting on 14^th April 1975 and listened to the Central Military Commission report about the situation in Sai Gon and the proposed plans. The Politburo agreed with the ideal to change the Sai Gon Liberating Operation to “Ho Chi Minh Campaign”. The Party’s leadership made our posture and potentials increasingly strengthened. On 21^st April 1975, Nguyen Van Thieu, President of Sai Gon government, had to resign. On 22^nd April 1975, the Politburo sent a telegram stressing that “The time for a general offensive into Sai Gon is ripe. We should make use of every single day to launch our assault. Our action should be done in careful manner to ensure total victory. If we are late, we will lose our military and political advantages… Grasping this big opportunity, we will surely gain victory”. Ho Chi Minh Campaign began on 26^th April 1975 and successfully ended at 11h30 on 30^th April 1975. Sai Gon was liberated and our 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising ended gloriously.

The decisions made by our Party in the General Offensive and Uprising have shown the intellectual height and responsibility of the Party for the country. They are also the developments of Vietnam’s military science and arts in Ho Chi Minh era which both inherited the nation’s tradition and developed with unique and creative features. The high consensus among the Politburo, the Central Military Commission and the General Command with actions on the battlefields, fronts, and operations has brought about a major strength. The creativity in leading and commanding on the battlefields showed the talents of the generals which ensured the implementation of the Party’s decision. Focus, unification, responsibility, discipline, speediness, and boldness are notable features of the Party’s leadership for the final victory of the Campaign.

Assoc Proff, Doctor NGUYEN TRONG PHUC