As the world is transitioning towards a multipolar order, the expansion of BRICS - a group of emerging economies - is a matter of concern. Many ASEAN member states have expressed their intention to join BRICS as full members. This could have substantial implications for the interests and role of ASEAN, thus drawing considerable attention from the international community.
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| BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations meeting of 2024 held in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia |
BRICS expansion
Since being founded by Brazil, Russia, India, and China in the early 21st century, BRICS has increasingly strengthened its role as a key driver of global economic growth. The group has garnered attention and aroused desire for membership from the international community, including ASEAN countries.
In January 2025, Indonesia became the first ASEAN member state to officially join BRICS as a full member. Thailand and Malaysia have publicly expressed their desire to join the club, while Laos and Myanmar are reportedly considering membership. Singapore and the Philippines have yet to officially state their positions on joining BRICS. Before Indonesia’s accession, BRICS welcomed five new members in 2024, namely Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Ethiopia. Over the past nearly 15 years, BRICS has grown from four to eleven official members. In contrast, the Group of Seven (G7) took over 20 years to add a new member, Russia, to become the G8. However, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the original G7 suspended Russia’s membership in the group, effectively dissolving the larger G8.
In the current global context, developing nations remain under-represented due to the dominant influence of the United States and Western powers. Notably, many developing and emerging nations have expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of power in the international system designed by major powers after World War II. This discontent has created an opportunity for BRICS to emerge as a platform where these nations can assert their influence. As a result, approximately 40 countries have evinced an interest in joining BRICS and this number is expected to grow.
From an economic perspective, BRICS continues to close the gap with G7. By 2025, BRICS's nominal GDP is projected to reach $31.7 trillion, compared to $51.5 trillion for G7, representing 27% and 45% of global GDP, respectively. However, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), BRICS has already surpassed G7, accounting for 35% and 30% of global GDP respectively. With the global shift in power from the West to the East and from the North to the South, it is only a matter of time before BRICS overtakes G7 in overall economic scale.
From a geopolitical standpoint, some prominent Western politicians view BRICS as a counterbalance to the US and the Western influence. As US - Russia and US - China strategic competition intensifies, Washington increasingly perceives BRICS as being influenced by Moscow and Beijing for political purposes. However, for BRICS member states and potential candidates, the group represents a coalition that reflects the demand for a reform in the current global order which has become outdated in comparison to the new balance of power.
Opportunities for ASEAN
Accounting for approximately 4% of global GDP, ASEAN ranks as the fifth-largest economy in the world. Coupled with the engagement of Asia-Pacific's major powers in its cooperation mechanisms, ASEAN is considered one of the most successful regional organisations globally. However, in terms of population size and market scale, ASEAN remains far behind BRICS. China and India alone, the two leading emerging economies in BRICS boast a market of nearly 3 billion people with an expanding purchasing power driven by a burgeoning middle class. Thus, the desire of ASEAN member countries to join BRICS primarily stems from the objective of leveraging resources from BRICS to support their economic development. Indonesia, for example, sought Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) membership before joining BRICS. Therefore, it makes no sense to claim that Indonesia or other ASEAN members have chosen sides by joining BRICS.
In the energy sector, excluding Indonesia, the remaining ten BRICS member countries account for approximately 36% of global crude oil exports and 34% of refined oil exports. Meanwhile, BRICS's economic tools, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), both established in 2015, offer ASEAN countries alternative financial options that reduce reliance on Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To date, the NDB has approved $32.8 billion in funding, while the CRA holds a reserve of about $100 billion. For ASEAN economies, these are substantial resources, especially as they are not tied to standards of “politics”, “democracy”, or “human rights”, often used by the US and Western nations as conditions for loans from the WB and IMF.
Moreover, the political weight of BRICS will provide additional leverage for ASEAN member countries. Despite being partners rather than full members, ASEAN states have been invited to key BRICS summits, such as the Expanded BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024. This contributes to enhancing ASEAN’s international standing while reinforcing its role as a regional organisation. Many ASEAN strategists have discussed the concept of a “Global ASEAN” with influence beyond the region. Active participation in global political forums, including BRICS, aligns with ASEAN’s ambitions to expand its diplomatic reach.
In a multipolar world characterised by intense major power competition, most ASEAN member countries recognise the necessity of pursuing a hedging strategy and diversifying their strategic options. No small or medium-sized state wants to “put all its eggs in one basket”. Therefore, joining BRICS plays an important part in realising that strategy.
Challenges for ASEAN
Despite being regarded as one of the most successful regional organisations globally, ASEAN faces numerous internal and external challenges. Many experts and scholars believe that the intention of six ASEAN member countries to join BRICS could significantly impact the ASEAN Community-building process and the Association’s centrality in the Asia-Pacific region.
International opinion suggests that as more ASEAN states consider BRICS membership, BRICS’s presence in the Asia-Pacific will inevitably increase. Even before BRICS made significant inroads into the region, ASEAN’s role had already been somewhat challenged by several “mini-multilateral” groups, such as the Quad (officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a group of the US, Australia, India, and Japan), the AUKUS security pact (between the US, the UK, and Australia), and other trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation mechanisms led by the US and China. With an increasing number of overlapping mechanisms and competing forums in the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN’s once-indispensable role may become less prominent.
Another risk facing ASEAN member states joining BRICS is the US's possible economic retaliation, particularly under a second Trump administration. Washington perceives BRICS as being increasingly dominated by China and Russia - its two biggest strategic adversaries. In December 2024, before taking office, President-elect Donald Trump threatened to impose a 100% tariff on BRICS countries seeking to reduce their reliance on the US dollar. Some analysts warn that, given Russia’s efforts to consolidate power within BRICS and transform the group into a counterbalance to US and Western hegemony, the benefits offered by BRICS may not outweigh the costs for certain ASEAN member states.
Additionally, some scholars argue that joining BRICS may exacerbate ASEAN’s economic dependence on China. Currently, China accounts for about 72% of BRICS’s GDP, 80% of its growth and its trade surplus. Even before any ASEAN member joined BRICS, the economic relationship between China and ASEAN had already been asymmetrical. Once leading ASEAN economies like Indonesia, Thailand, or Malaysia become BRICS members, the economic and trade imbalance between ASEAN and China could further widen.
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has stated that the post-Cold War world order has ended, with the world entering a new multipolar era marked by unprecedented geopolitical tensions and strategic competition among major powers. Amid these developments, traditional institutions may gradually lose their relevance, while new coalitions like BRICS become increasingly attractive. In this context, most small and medium-sized countries are pursuing a dual strategy: enhancing their strategic autonomy while maintaining good relations with all major powers. It is not coincidental that Indonesia, a regional power historically committed to the “non-alignment” principle, has begun to make significant adjustments towards “multi-alignment”. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS is a vivid example of this policy shift.
For other ASEAN states, joining BRICS as full members or strategic partners appears inevitable. However, it is still too early to quantify or compare the benefits and drawbacks of BRICS membership for ASEAN as a whole and for individual member countries. Therefore, in a world moving towards a multipolar order, most experts agree that participating in BRICS, maintaining an open attitude towards US and Western initiatives, as well as continuing to strengthen intra-ASEAN unity and cooperation is the correct path for member nations to best serve their individual interests and the Association's collective interests.
VU DUY THANH, PhD
Ministry of Foreign Affairs