The Special Force Corps is the elite special combat force of our Military – one of the core force participating in the General Offensive and Uprising in Spring 1968. With clever and flexible dispositions, compact and elite contingents; unique and creative tactics, our Special Forces secretly infiltrated behind the enemy line, dealing simultaneous and unexpected blows to the enemy, destroying many targets, enabling our people and other forces of the South to launch the Offensive and Uprising. This is a unique feature of our art of special warfare – a lesson that needs to be further studied and applied effectively to the cause of defending the Motherland today.

In 1967, on the basis of correctly analysing and assessing the status, strength and position of our forces, the enemy and the strategic situation, the Central Party Committee determined to step up our resistance war to quickly win a decisive victory. To this end, in July 1967, the Politburo decided to launch a general offensive and uprising in the South. The opportunity to launch this campaign was on the occasion of Tet, on Lunar New Year’s Eve of 1968. Exploiting the enemy’s lack of vigilance on the Holiday, we used combined forces; in which the core was the Special Force to assault key targets in cities and towns, inciting the masses to uprise and seize power in the South.

Unit K12 received the flag to erect on Hue citadel

To realise the strategic plan of the Central Party Committee and on the basis of following President Ho Chi Minh’s teaching “the Special Force means special work, special honour, therefore special effort is required”, cadres and soldiers of the Special Force Corps urgently made preparation in all aspects for the General Offensive. With flexible tactics and fighting methods, including “deep infiltration, critical blow”, and in coordination with other forces, our Special Force contingents fought bravely and relentlessly to hold on to captured positions. Brilliant assaults by our special units in the General Offensive shocked the U.S. and the international community, surprised and awed the White House and the Pentagon, making an important contribution to the great victory of the Campaign, and forcing the U.S. imperialists to “de-escalate” their invasion war in Vietnam. The glorious victory of our people in general and of the Special Force in particular during the Spring 1968 General Offensive and Uprising left us many invaluable lessons; in which, the unique feature of the art of special warfare operation was a fundamental and significant issue that needs to be further studied, developed and applied to the cause of national defence today.

First, heavily focus on making meticulous and comprehensive for special operation missions. To realise the plan for the General Offensive and Uprising Spring 1968 of the Central Party Committee, under the leadership and direction of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence, the Special Force Corps paid special attention to the preparation for the upcoming campaign. First, the Corps focused on selecting cadres and soldiers that had good physical condition and high morale; and strengthened the organisational structure of combat units on that basis; conducted training on disguise and infiltration techniques, and assault tactics against enemy bases, warehouses, airbases, and urban targets as well as fighting in coordination with infantry, artillery, and local forces; and built and developed special operation contingents both in quality and quantity to increase the combat power of the Special Force on the battlefield. On the basis of firmly grasping the enemy’s situation, the Special Force conducted clever and secret unit dispositions at strategical, operational, and tactical levels to meet requirements for deep infiltrations, in-depth strikes, simultaneous multi-prong assaults, and independent as well as coordinated operations. At the same time, the Corps urgently made adjustments to force distribution, leadership, and command, prioritising key areas and critical targets; and deployed special operation units of each Military Region, Zone, division, and province close to the assigned targets and areas. As a result, “Close to the Tet Holiday, tens of thousands of special operation cadres and soldiers, dozens of tons of weapons were already delivered to the rendezvous positions. Special operation units were like sharp knives, ready to cut the enemy throat once ordered”. At the same time, the Corps focused on preparing logistics materials and infrastructure; improving weapons and equipment; studying and developing fighting tactics against urban and underwater targets; and composing training documents for the troops. In addition, educational activities were held to boost the political will and fighting spirit for the cause of national liberation and reunification for soldiers.

Upholding this valuable experience, agencies, units and training schools of the Special Forcer Corps today must thoroughly grasp and effectively implement the Party’s military and national defence policy, resolutions, strategies, plans, etc. on the Military force adjustments in the new period, transform the Corps into a “revolutionary, standardised, elite and advance to modernity” force, with the “elite in terms of politics” as the basis, overcoming difficulties and challenges to successfully complete all assigned tasks. The Corps determines to basically complete the goal of building an “elite, compact, strong” force by 2025, and being fully modernised by 2030 to ensure good training quality, high combat readiness and success in any combat mission in any situation, worthy of being a political force and an elite special force that is absolutely loyal and trustworthy of the Party, the State, the Military and the People. In addition, the Corps must also be effective in advising the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence on force building, technical supply and acquisition, and special operation training. Besides, the Special Force Corps must strengthen the study and development of special operation tactics, especially the art of disguise, camouflage, infiltration, and target approachment in modern warfare. Additionally, the Corps must complete and implement the plan for “the building, development and utilisation of the Special Force of the military by 2025” and the project for “the development of the theory of special operation tactics in the cause of defending the Motherland”. Also, studies and surveys on battlefield situations in strategic directions and key areas must be organised; and adjustments and supplementations of combat-related documents at all levels must be made in accordance to missions, area conditions, and force capabilities and equipment. Furthermore, the Force must combine the procurement of specialised weapons and equipment with the improvement of in-use hardware in accordance to “compact, light, convenient, concealed, highly destructive” standards in association with the implementation of weapons and equipment supply and maintenance strategy for the special force in the period of 2021 – 2030.

Special force troops conduct training

Second, use appropriate forces, organise unexpected spearheads, dealing simultaneous, rapid and critical blows to key targets to complete missions. During the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1968, on the basis of surveying and firmly grasping the enemy’s situation and position, and the capability and the means of fighting of our forces, the General Command and the Special Force Corps used special operation contingents appropriately to promote our fighting forte in combination with creative combat actions in specific conditions, maximising our combat power at decisive moments and opportunities to simultaneously destroy targets in Saigon, Hue, Da Nang and many other cities and towns in the South. In Saigon, we used 11 commando squads to simultaneously attack the most critical targets, such as the U.S. embassy, the Independence Palace, the General Staff Headquarters of the puppet army, the police headquarters, etc. In the inner city of Hue and the outskirts, we used 03 special operation battalions and 06 commando squads, 08 infantry battalions, and several local companies in multiple directions to attack and capture 39 key targets such as Mang Ca Station, Tan Loc Airfield, the Citadel, the enemy headquarters in Nam Giao, Tam Thai, etc., and destroyed 03 enemy battalions. In other cities and towns in the South, our special force units were the core detachments and the spearheads in capturing the most critical targets (military sub-zones, military special zones, provincial headquarters, armour bases, fire support stations, etc.). With creative, flexible and unique fighting methods such as: secret assault, disguised assault, fire assault, etc, our special force units were truly the spearheads in capturing strategic and operational targets in both the frontline and behind the enemy line, on land and in the water, they also held positions against the enemy’s counterattacks, took complete or partial controls of targets, enabling other forces and the masses to conduct the offensive and uprising. It can be said that, during the General Uprising and Offensive, without aerial and armoured support, with limited artillery firepower, and the lack of support from combined arms units which mainly fought in the outer perimeters, the simultaneous strikes of our special force units against critical targets throughout the battlefield in the South achieved great effects, not only inflicted major casualties to the enemy, but also heavy damage to their fighting spirit and military posture.

In the current situation, in order to meet the requirements of national defence, our Special Force needs to further study and creatively apply these lessons to the process of identifying key targets and locations, important events of the country and the Military; on that basis, concentrate forces and materials to protect those targets and events. In addition, there should be a clear classification of permanent and extraordinary objectives and tasks for each units and detachments. Also, the corps must develop plans in accordance to the nature of the objectives, characteristics of the areas, and force capabilities; and anticipate contingencies and ways to deal with them. In addition, the Corps and Special Force units must firmly grasp the defensive plan in each strategic direction, of each military region, service and locality, and have clear understanding of the enemy force structure and fighting methods on land, river and sea to advise the Ministry of National Defence, military regions and army corps, etc. to identify targets and on how to use special force units in each combat situation and environment. Besides, the Corps must further study and develop combat methods for land, urban and underwater special force units against each type of target and terrain; focusing on new types of method, unit and force. Additionally, special force units must increase exercises for both independent operations and joint combined arms operations, taking these exercises as the basis to supplement and develop theories of using special forces in protecting our targets and destroying the enemy’s targets in the condition of modern warfare.

Third, strengthen coordination and cooperation with other forces, build and promote the people warfare posture, the “posture of people’s hearts and minds”, creating total strength to successfully complete the strategic offensive. Lessons learnt from the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1968, especially in strategic locations such as: Hue, Da Nang, Saigon, and Southern provinces showed that special force units, especially urban commando contingents conducted close coordination and cooperation with units fighting inside the cities, Military Regions’ units, and local units on all directions to gather enemy intel, identify targets, and make appropriate dispositions of special force detachments. In the inner city, special force units focused on coordinating with secret self-defence teams, public security detachments, armed groups, party committees, and local authorities to expand secret assets to create corridors and springboards close to enemy bases; at the same time, using secret networks of allies and local units to infiltrate forces and transport hardware and logistic supply for the upcoming offensive. During the combat phase, as the core force of the offensive, our special force units proactively coordinated with infantry, artillery, and on-site armed forces and the masses to maximise our combat power to launch simultaneous and unexpected assaults to capture the majority of assigned targets throughout the battlefield, making an important contribution for the success of the General Offensive.

Inheriting, developing, and applying this lesson in the cause of national defence, the Special Force needs to closely coordinate and cooperate with other forces in conducting the A2 task, anti-terrorist missions, etc. in accordance to the combat plans at all levels. The Special Force Corps should focus on coordinating with the 2^nd General Department in assessing the enemy’s situation, with the Navy and the Coast Guard in responding to maritime situations; with local units of military regions and provinces (cities) in implementing defensive strategies; with the Capital Command in protecting critical targets and important political events of the international community, the country and the Military taking place in the area. Naturally, in performing their tasks, special force units need the support and protection of the people, therefore they must strengthen and promote “the posture of people’s hearts and minds”, utilising political and material resources among the people to conduct on-site diversion, camouflage, logistical and technical activities. In addition, the Corps needs to encourage the people to not only protect the secrecy of special force units’ operations but also provide intel on assigned targets and areas and the enemy’s situation; voluntarily assisting special force contingents in performing their tasks, becoming the true mainstay in all aspects for the Special Force to fulfil its demanding and noble duty entrusted by the Party, the State, the People, and the Military, and to be worthy of the tradition of “especially elite, great heroic, clever and creative, daring assaults for brilliant victories” – and two-time recipient of the title “Hero of the People’s Armed Force”.

Major General HOANG MINH SON, Commander of the Special Force Corps