Operation Northern Central Highlands in 1972, with the victory of Dak To – Tan Canh battle, contributed to changing the situation in the Central Highlands to our advantage. Many distinctive arts of fighting can be learnt from this highly efficient battle, notably the art of fighting key battle.

In late 1971, the enemy appreciated that Northern Central Highlands would be our main offensive direction in 1972. Therefore, they deployed their Paratroop Brigade 2 from Sai Gon to Central Highlands to build a new defensive line in the west of Po Co river to intercept us from afar and break our raids into Kon Tum town. In order to hold their main target of Kon Tum town, the enemy established an inter-connected defensive line along Road 14 from Dak To, Dak Lak to Quang Duc and on the 18, 15, 21 and 7 routes, a defensive line west of Po Co river and 3 defensive groupings, namely Dak To – Tan Canh, Kon Tum town and Pleiku town, in which Dak To – Tan Canh and Kon Tum are two strongholds.

On our side, to coordinate with the main offensive direction in the 1972 Strategic Offensive, the Politburo and Central Military Commission directed the troops and people of the Central Highlands to launch an offensive campaign into the North Central Highlands, in order to "destroy an important part of the enemy’s 2^nd Army Corps' main force and their general reserve force, liberating the Dak To - Tan Canh area, Kon Tum town,…”. Implementing the determination of the Party Central Committee, the Ministry of National Defence mobilised forces and means equivalent to 01 corps for the Campaign. After studying the situation, the Campaign Command determined that Dak To - Tan Canh was the key battle to start and carry out the preparation and practice of the campaign. After more than 10 hours of fierce fighting, our troops and people completely destroyed the enemy's Dak To - Tan Canh defensive grouping, creating an opportunity to develop the Campaign to the south of Kon Tum town. The victory of the Dak To - Tan Canh offensive was made by many factors, with many unique fighting arts, notably:

1. Accurately selecting offensive target and direction. Before the start of the campaign, enemy in the North Central Highlands were formed into strong defensive groupings with solidly built fortifications, but their layout from Pleiku to Kon Tum to Dak To - Tan Canh was set vertically with narrow width, hence prone to separation. Therefore, in order to protect the main objectives, the enemy established an outer defence line west of Road 14 and west of Po Co River in combination with 03 defensive groupings Dak To - Tan Canh, Kon Tum town and Pleiku, forming a continuous defensive battle. Firmly grasping the enemy's intentions, especially their defensive posture, the Campaign Command chose Dak To - Tan Canh as the target for our starting key battle. This selection shows the vision, sharp and creative thinking of the Campaign’s Party Committee and Command because out of the three above defensive groupings, Kon Tum is the most important and powerful while Pleiku is located deep in the enemy's rear. If we attacked these two defensive groupings, we would have to break into the strong defensive centres, hence victory might not be the case. On the other hand, when we attacked Kon Tum, the enemy troops from Pleiku and Dak To - Tan Canh would move to rescue, if we attacked Pleiku, we would encounter difficulties in logistic supplies. As for Dak To - Tan Canh, though it was also a strong defensive grouping, it was close to the rear of the Campaign, so logistic supply would be easier for us. Moreover, the enemy's defensive formation stretched along Road 14, so we can divide, surround and separate Dak To - Tan Canh from Kon Tum and Pleiku towns, then concentrate our forces to destroy this defensive grouping.

In addition to accurately deciding the assault target, the assault direction was also wisely chosen by the Campaign Command. Realising that the enemy still concentrated their strength in the West and North of Dak To - Tan Canh, while neglecting the East where the headquarters of their 22^nd Division was located. Therefore, the Campaign Command decided to concentrate forces and means to attack into east of Dak To - Tan Canh, the most dangerous place of the enemy.  The fact shows that the Campaign Command decided to attack Dak To - Tan Canh from the East took the enemy by surprise and frightened them, quickly destroying the enemy headquarters, making them unable to react, leading to the fall of the Dak To - Tan Canh defensive grouping in a very short time.

2. Deceiving and creating an advantageous battle position. Determining to win the opening key battle of Dak To - Tan Canh, the Campaign Command directed the units to take many diversionary measures, to create a favourable position before attacking. Accordingly, in order to attract enemy troops towards Kon Tum and buy time for units attacking Dak To - Tan Canh to prepare, the Campaign Command directed the engineers to coordinate with local armed forces to build 02 roads for motor vehicles in the armpit of Kon Tum town. This diversion made the enemy think that we were about to fight Kon Tum, so they deployed their Airborne Brigade and the 22^nd Ranger Group to intercept. Thus, by building two diversionary roads, we not only lured the enemy’s main force and paratroopers out of their fortifications, but also prevented them from re-concentrating forces when we assaulted Dak To - Tan Canh. In addition, this also allowed us to build a road connecting Road 14 to the East of Tan Canh, which is the approach of our main direction.

Besides diversion and luring the enemy out of their fortifications, we also separated the enemy in Dak To - Tan Canh from Kon Tum and Pleiku towns. Accordingly, we used 02 infantry regiments together with the local armed forces to destroy traffic roads and intercept the enemy on Route 14 in the North (Vo Dinh section) and in the South (Chu Thoi section) of Kon Tum town; at the same time, engage the enemy on Road 19, An Khe section. The 320^th Division attacked the enemy at heights 1015, 1049, etc., broke through the enemy’s defence line west of the Po Co River, and surrounded Vo Dinh. It was the above activities of the armed forces and people of the North Central Highlands that earned an advantage for the units attacking Dak To - Tan Canh, because the enemy’s 23^rd Division was held in Chu Thoi, their Airborne Division had to retreat to protect Kon Tum town, in the area of Dak To – Tan Canh, there was only the 22^nd division but it was also surrounded without reinforcements.

Thus, by deceiving and luring the enemy out of the fortifications to annihilate and hold them, we created advantageous condition and a flexible position to attack Dak To - Tan Canh. This is a unique military art of deceiving, luring and creating battle position for the key opening battle of the campaign.

3. Deciding the right tactics, grasping the opportunity to attack and destroy the enemy. Dak To - Tan Canh is a stronghold with firmly established fortifications and battlefields, and complete defence formation, protected by a division, supported with strong firepower with a defensive line west of Po Co River on the outer perimeter, and reinforced by  defensive groupings of Kon Tum and Pleiku. To defeat this defensive grouping, it is necessary to use a suitable way of fighting and determine the right time to attack. Thoroughly making all-round assessments, especially the enemy’s reaction when came under attack and our capabilities, the Campaign Command advocated the attack of the Dak To - Tan Canh by joint-force combat. To begin with, we lured the enemy out of their fortifications, annihilate, encircle, and divide their defensive groupings, to establish a favourable posture. Then we concentrate our forces and equipment to break into the centre of Dak To - Tan Canh. This is a scientific fighting method, suitable with practical conditions, because the campaign is reinforced with a number of powerful technical weapons. It was also in this battle that we used tanks in combat in the Central Highlands battlefield. The reality of the Campaign has proven that, with the flexible, bold and effective diversionary operations to separate the enemy on Routes 14 and 19, we destroyed a series of strong points, broke the outer defence line, destroying the enemy in the West of Po Co River and North of Vo Dinh. At that time, the enemy decided to send the Airborne Division back to Binh Long because they anticipated that the North Central Highlands would not be our main offensive direction in the 1972 strategic offensive, making the defensive grouping Dak To - Tan Canh completely isolated. Seizing the opportunity and with joint-force combat, the Campaign Command used anti-aircraft artillery to control the air, and the artillery to bombard the defence centre, making the enemy troops in the Dak To - Tan Canh base panicky and dispirited. Under the support of artillery fire, on the morning of April 24, 1972, our infantry and tanks quickly broke through into the headquarters of the 22^nd Division, 42^nd Regiment and the enemy artillery battlefield at base 42, Tan Canh. Another column attacked into the enemy 47^th Regiment base at Dak To 2 airport. After more than 10 hours of fighting, by 11 a.m. April 24, 1972, we completely controlled the Dak To – Tan Canh defensive grouping.

All in all, after a series of diversionary activities, the key battle that opened the North Central Highlands Campaign ended victoriously, Dak To - Tan Canh base was destroyed, the northern defensive grouping of Kon Tum fell rapidly afterward. This is an important victory, creating a new situation beneficial to us on the Central Highlands battlefield. That victory left us many valuable lessons about operational command, especially the art of launching key first battle, which should be further studied, developed and applied in the cause to safeguard the Fatherland.

Senior Colonel PHAM DUC TRUONG, MA, Viet Nam Military History Institute