65 years ago, to create a diversion and favourable condition for our units in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign to transform the posture, we launched the Upper Laos Campaign (January 29^th 1954 to February 13^th 1954) and gained a significant victory. The Campaign provides us with lessons on the art of strategic diversion which remains valuable both theoretically and practically.

In early 1954, under the command of the general Navarre, the French concentrated their force and means of warfare on Dien Bien Phu and built it into a strong group of fortresses to determinedly defeat our troops. To successfully fulfil the mission of Dien Bien Phu Campaign especially after we had changed the combat direction from “quick fight, rapid victory” to “steady fight, steady advance”, on January 26^th 1954, the General Command ordered the Division 308 to launch the Upper Laos Campaign. This Campaign was aimed at destroying the defensive corridor of the Dien Bien Phu group of fortresses, creating a diversion to disperse the French mobile strategic forces, and isolating the French troops, thereby providing an essential precondition for our units in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign to manoeuvre their force and means of warfare back to the rendezvous safely and make all necessary preparations for realizing the new combat direction, and at the same time helping Laos expand the liberated area. Generally speaking, the Upper Laos Campaign in 1954 is seen as a combat spell which was on a small scale, short, but strategically important. We successfully organized and carried out the Campaign, achieved the strategic and campaign-level targets, and learnt many valuable lessons.

First, correctly selecting the areas and targets to create a diversion. Theoretically, the areas and targets selected to create a diversion are normally the enemy’s   strategic areas and central defensive targets. If we attack the accurately selected targets, we would attract the enemy’s great attention and force them to take drastic defensive actions. On the contrary, we could not draw their attention or achieve the preset goals. In the Upper Laos Campaign, the General Military Commission selected the Nam Hu River defensive line as our target to divert the enemy’s attention. That was an absolutely correct choice as that defensive line included a series of the French’s crucial fortresses along the Nam Hu River stretching from Pac U, Muong Ngoi to Muong Khoa to defend the Upper Laos. Moreover, since this area was rather close to the Dien Bien Phu group of fortresses, it could be seen as a strategic rear base of the enemy where they could quickly provide reinforcements and means of warfare to rescue Dien Bien Phu. Also, it could be regarded as an important corridor for the French troops to flee to Luang Prabang in the event. If losing this area, the French would be confronted with many disadvantages as they would be isolated, and the Dien Bien Phu group of fortresses would face a high risk of being defeated. Therefore, attacking the Upper Laos would draw the enemy’s great attention and force them to concentrate their force on defending this area. When the Division 308 mounted attacks on the Nam Hu River defensive line, the French troops across the battlefield immediately concentrated fully upon the Upper Laos, thereby creating a favourable condition for our units in Dien Bien Phu to manoeuvre force and means of warfare to the rendezvous safely.

Second, using the forces scientifically and properly. In this Campaign, the battlefield was distant, and we faced a lot of difficulties in logistics support, particularly in ordnance and military medicine. Therefore, grasping the enemy’s situation, the General Command directed the organization of a small-scale campaign. Following that order, the Campaign’s Command decided to use the whole Division 308 in cooperation with some military units of the Pathet Lao to carry out the Campaign. That was a sound decision following the direction of “fighting to clinch victory” in accordance with the rule of force use when we launched a distant offensive and the enemy was in defence. In this Campaign, the enemy stationed in the Nam Hu River defensive line included 6 battalions while the Division 308 used all of its units, namely 3 regiments (102, 88, and 36), the Air Defence Battalion, the Battalion of 102mm mortar and other affiliates. In spite of the fact that the enemy possessed great firepower and a system of solid fortifications, a section of the enemy’s troops panicked and fled when hearing of the Division 308’s full-strength use. That drew a great deal of attention of the whole French troops across the battlefield to the Upper Laos.

In the direction of Muong Khoa - Muong Sai, as the enemy’s bases were far from one another with many weaknesses, and a proportion of the enemy’s troops panicked and fled outside the fortifications, the Division 308 employed the Regiment 102 to attack, hunt down and annihilate the enemy. The Division 308 used the military intelligence force in cooperation with several company-level units under the Regiment 102’s battalions and a company under the Pathet Lao’s Battalion 920 to quickly move ahead of the enemy and encircle and stop them from fleeing. The remaining forces of the Regiment 102 closely cooperated with the Lao on-spot armed forces in encircling and isolating the enemy and forming many directions to attack and hunt down the enemy who were fleeing and annihilate those who were coming to a halt in the area of Muong Khoa and Muong Sai.

In the direction of Nam Bac - Luang Prabang, since this area was mountainous and complex, and the French Headquarters was located here, the Campaign’s Command deployed 2 regiments (88 and 36) in cooperation with the Lao local armed forces to attack and annihilate the enemy. During the Campaign, the Air Defence Battalion, the Battalion of 102mm mortar, and several affiliated companies were used as the general fire support force in coordination with other battalions and regiments in each direction, flexibly applying combat methods, attacking, encircling, isolating, hunting down, and destroying the enemy. Due to the proper use of forces, during the operations, our forces promoted their strength to the utmost, maintained smooth combat coordination in various directions rather uniformly and conveniently. As a result, only in the short duration, the enemy in both main directions of the Campaign suffered heavy losses and were forced to deploy their mobile Battalion No.1 Nguy Thai from Muong Sai, establish an airlift, and send the reinforcements from Dien Bien Phu and other bases to rescue the French Headquarters in Nam Nga from being completely destroyed.

Thanks to the scientific and proper force organization and deployment, the Campaign reached the established goal, placed considerable pressure on the enemy, and drew the attention of the entire French troops across the battlefield to the Upper Laos, thereby creating a favourable condition for our units in the Dien Bien Phu to flexibly transform the posture following the new combat direction.

Third, flexibly employing methods of diversion. This is an inevitable part of the art of combat diversion. The Upper Laos Campaign flexibly applied various methods of diversion, making the enemy on the Indochina battlefield in general, in the area of Dien Bien Phu in particular focus all their attention and effort on monitoring and dealing with our operations. It should be noted that the Division 308 during its movement from Dien Bien Phu to Upper Laos effectively used methods to draw the enemy’s attention to one direction. Its forces both manoeuvred and grasped the enemy’s situation, areas, and force disposition. Besides, the Division 308 deliberately unveiled some certain pieces of information, making them know that we were manoeuvring the force towards Laos, thereby drawing the attention of general Navarre and the French bases on the battlefield to the Upper Laos. As a result, after 3 days of movement (from the 26^th to the 29^th of February 1954), no sooner had the Division 308 arrived in Nam Hu (Upper Laos) than our General Command delivered the message: “The enemy discovered the Division 308 leaving Dien Bien Phu for Laos, they ordered the withdrawal of troops from Muong Khoa and adjacent bases to Nam Bac”.

While attacking, hunting down and annihilating the enemy, the Division 308 flexibly employed combat methods to show off its strength in a bid to attract the enemy’s attention. It deployed 3 regiments (102, 88, and 36) to attack, raid, encircle and destroy the enemy, cooperated with the Pathet Lao’s Battalion 920 and Battalion 970 in encircling and annihilating the enemy, and combined infantry operations with firepower to attack the enemy. Adopting those methods, we not only destroyed a part of the enemy’s strength, but also encircled and isolated the French’s Headquarters, thereby drawing the great attention of the French troops, forcing general Navarre to establish an airlift and send the reinforcements. In addition to those methods, the Division 308 effectively carried out agitprop among the enemy’s troops, spread rumour about the results of our operations in an effort to draw the enemy’s attention to the Upper Laos and create a favourable condition for our forces in Dien Bien Phu to transform the posture under the motto of “steady fight, steady advance”.

Flexibly adopting those above-mentioned measures, the Upper Laos Campaign conducted by the Division 308 drew the great attention of the French troops on the Indochina battlefield to the Upper Laos, thereby forming the basis for our forces in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign to make all necessary preparations for realizing the new combat direction.

Sr. Col. Vuong Van Yen, Sr. Col. Pham Anh Tuan