The 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Viet Nam (CPV) set the goal of basically building an elite, compact, strong Army and Public Security by 2025, which provides a firm foundation for building a revolutionary, regular, elite, modern People’s Army and People’s Public Security by 2030. To be a revolutionary army requires our military first and foremost to be politically elite. This is also the most pivotal matter that lays the basis for making the military elite in every aspect. So, what does eliteness in political terms mean? What is the building of a politically elite Viet Nam People’s Army (VPA)? What are solutions to building of our politically elite military in the new situation?To answer these questions, the National Defence Journal would like to introduce a series of article written by author Nguyen Ngoc Hoi.

I. Building in political aspect: An inevitable task of all militaries

In the most popular terms, politics is all of activities that relate to the relationship among classes, peoples, and walks of life. The key issue of politics is to seize and maintain power as well as maintain and employ state power. Politics of a military is the politics of the class and state that organise and raise that military. To talk about politics of a military means the nature of the class of that military. There are no militaries that are classless, apolitical, or politically neutral because a military is a product of the society with classes and class struggle, a violent tool of a state used for combating and defending results achieved by the struggles for power. Therefore, a military always has the nature of the state that organise and raise it. Both theory and realities in the past and at present affirm this thing.

Building a military in political aspect is to establish the military’s social relationships, in which the key thing is to foster the nature of the class of the military. As part of a state, militaries of any political establishments must be dependent on political guidelines of the ruling classes and fight and serve political objectives of the ruling power. The ruling political forces find every way to keep militaries under control by means of politics, ideology, organisation, and policies, in which to build militaries in political terms is always essential to any militaries, ensuring that the militaries are always their absolutely faithful forces. The only difference is how important the building of a military in political aspect is as compared with the building of a military in terms of weapons and equipment. As for militaries of the bourgeois political establishment, under the influence of the theory of armament, building of militaries in terms of weapons and equipment always come to the fore. However, the bourgeoisie still pay attention to building of militaries in political aspect through ideological education and organisation and policy work. Specifically, they educate soldiers about combat objectives and implement the guidelines of the class in the process of building the corps of officers.

Regarding militaries of the socialist political establishment, building of militaries in political terms is placed at the forefront and considered the vital basis for building militaries. While the communists never underestimate the role of weapons and equipment, they always regard man as the deciding factor. “In all wars, victory eventually depends on the spirit of the masses, who are shedding their blood on the battlefield. Confidence in just wars and the enlightenment about the need to sacrifice lives for the happiness of brothers are factors that promote spirit of soldiers and enable them to endure difficulties never occurred in their life,” said Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Given this spirit, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin considered building of politically strong militaries a fundamental principle for building new-style militaries of the working class. He categorically criticised the  concealment of the bourgeois militaries’ nature of politics and class. “Refraining from involving militaries in politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and Tsarist regime in Russia, who in fact have already involved militaries in reactionary politics,” said Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Having pointed out the nature of the class of new-style militaries openly, he laid out and implemented the principle that the Red Army had to be placed under the leadership of the Communist Party. He regarded this as the most pivotal principle aimed to ensure the military’s absolute faithfulness to the Party and working class and readiness for combatting and sacrificing their lives for the socialist Fatherland and people’s happiness.

A conference on building the VPA pollitically elite in the new period held by Military Region 1 (Photo credit: qdnd.vn)

To build a politically strong military, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin requested constant strengthening of the Communist Party’s leadership of the military; implementation of the party work and political work in the military; establishment of political departments at all echelons and realisation of commissar regime in the military. He affirmed that no commissars meant no Red Army and where discipline was kept and political work and commissars’ work were conducted carefully there was no chance of undisciplinedness, thus the military became more disciplined and their spirit was further enhanced. The thought of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin is a lodestar of building militaries in socialist countries in the past and at the present time. If militaries diverge from this fundamental principle, they will be nolonger revolutionary militaries of the working class and a trustworthy violent tool of the Communist Party to safeguard the socialist regime and socialist Fatherland. In fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has offered many important lessons on building militaries in political aspect. Since the Soviet Armed Forces renounced the Communist Party’s leadership of the military and basic principles of building a politically strong military, they lost political direction and failed to defend the socialist regime and state despite their enormous number and modern equipment.

II. Building a politically strong military: The consistent principle in the building, combat, and development of Vietnam People’s Army

Building a politically strong military, which centres on strengthening of the Party’s leadership and enhanced nature of the working class in connection with fostering the VPA’s deep sense of the people and nation, is a consistent ideology and successful lesson of the Communist Party of Viet Nam (CPV) and President Ho Chi Minh on creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the building of a new-style military of the working class in an underdeveloped economy. History of Vietnamese Revolution has tested and affirmed the soundness of this lesson. The Viet Nam Propaganda Unit of the Liberation Army, which originated from the political struggle of the masses and was established, led, educated, and trained by our Party and leader Ho Chi Minh, right from its foundation, was organised under the party cell-led model. There was a political cadre in charge of political work as guided by the Party’s guidelines beside the commander. Throughout the process of organising, building, leading, educating, and training our military, President Ho Chi Minh constantly embraced the perspective of “men before arms,” regarding politics as the foundation for building the military. He ascertained that “military without politics is like a tree without stump, not only useless but also harmful.” He always reminded us, “Our army possesses an indomitable power because it is a people’s army built, led, and educated by our Party.” Thus, “it is necessary to strengthen the Party’s leadership of the military; promote political education aimed at raising the entire military’s socialist awareness.” On being loyal to and creatively applying Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s thought on building the new-style military of the working class, the CPV is always consistent with the perspective of “taking the building of a politically strong military as the basis for improving comprehensive quality and combat power of the VPA.” In the process of building a politically strong VPA, through political, ideological education, the CPV has propagated its ideological foundation (Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh’s thought) among the Army with a view to building the Army’s ideological foundation and making every cadre and soldier clearly perceive whom they are fighting and sacrificing for, the goals and ideals of the Party are also the goals the Army is fighting for, our Army is also people’s army. By means of organisation work, the CPV has set up a system of party organisations from the Central Military Commission to party cells in the military as well as systems of political departments and organisations of the masses. The Party’s mechanism for leadership of the military has been changed many times to match realities, ceaselessly strengthen the Party’s leadership of the military, and ensure that the military is always under the CPV’s absolute, direct leadership in every aspect. Through cadre work, the Party cares for its most important work, which aims to build the corps of cadres in the Army, in which the political cadres are absolutely faithful to the Party, State, and people; ready to fight and sacrifice for national independence and freedom, socialism, and happiness of the people. Through other working aspects of party work and political work, the Party’s leadership has ensure our military’s deep grasp and strict implementation of the Pary’s guidelines and State’s policies and law. Therefore, all activities of the Army in nearly 80 years have always followed the Party’s “political path”. Military missions have always served political missions of the Party.

Over the past 80 years, the building of a politically strong VPA has recorded undeniable achievements. Since its birth, in any circumstances and periods of the revolution, the VPA has always proved to be the combat force and political force absolutely faithful to the Fatherland, Party, State, and people; played the core role in the liberation wars and the wars to safeguard the Fatherland. The Military Party Committee is always made pure and strong in terms of politics, ideology, organisation, and morality. The military is always steadfast in the Party’s ideological foundation and the combat objective for national independence and socialism; constantly upholds and deepens the nature of the working class and sense of the people and nation; firmly maintains and promotes solidarity and attachment to people as well as within the military. The military is always steadfast in politics and in the vanguard of the struggle for defeating hostile forces’ “peaceful evolution” and “depoliticisation” of the military; proves to be the core force in today’s national defence.

Nevertheless, despite numerous achievements, over the past few year, the building of a politically strong VPA has also revealed some shortcomings and weaknesses. Sometimes, the leadership of building a politically strong military in some departments and units is not carried out regularly by party committees and leading cadres. The consciousness and responsibility of part of cadres and soldiers for building a politically strong military have certain limitations. In the context of evolving international and regional situations and hostile forces’ acts of sabotage through the “peaceful evolution” strategy, some cadres and soldiers have shown signs of fluctuation in ideology. Awareness of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s thought, the Party’s guidelines, and State’s law is not comprehensive and profound. As a result of insufficient, regular training, part of cadres and party members are influenced by the nagative aspect of the market economy, thus violating military discipline and State’s law. Some of them have been disciplined, or faced criminal penalties. Leadership capacity and combat power of some party organisations have not been high. The management, education, and training of party members in some party committees and party cells have not been conducted closely. The inspection, supervision, and punishment of party members and party organisations in violation of disciplines in some party committees and party cells have not been regularly carried out, thus failing to detect and prevent signs of violation. Part of cadres and soldiers have not perceived the military-civil relationship fully and deeply. Outcomes of promoting the relationship between the military and people in some departments and units have not met requirements yet. The effectiveness of the struggle against “peaceful evolution” of hostile forces has not on a par with the role, position, potential, and strength of the military. These shortcomings and weaknesses are attributed to both objective and subjective causes, which demand thorough remedy and further strengthening of a politically strong VPA, i.e. building of an elite VPA in political aspect.

NGUYEN NGOC HOI

(to be continued)