During the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, our army and people stood side by side with the Military Logistics Branch to overcome numerous challenges, hardships, and sacrifices, successfully addressing the “greatest difficulty” encountered during the Campaign, thus creating a miracle in the assurance work and conveying valuable lessons that still hold significant value in the cause of nation-building and protection.
The French colonialists contemplated before choosing Dien Bien Phu to establish a stronghold in order to attract and “crush” our main forces as this region presented formidable challenges, namely: dense forests, treacherous mountains, isolated transportation routes, extreme weather conditions, sparse population, impoverished economy, and 500-700km far from our strategic rear. General Navarre, the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, asserted: “The Viet Minh cannot overcome the difficulties to ensure sustained and prolonged large-scale combat in this remote mountainous battlefield”. In early December 1953, the Politburo decided to launch the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. Based on research and assessment of the situation, the General Military Commission concluded: “To launch this massive campaign, we have to face several challenges, with the greatest being the supply, primarily the issue of transportation roads”. General Vo Nguyen Giap also noted: “On the Dien Bien Phu front, the provision of food and ammunition is of equal importance to tactical issues. The urgency of the supply situation matches that of the combat situation, day by day, hour by hour”.
Moreover, the difficulties compounded as this was the first time we provided logistical support for such a large-scale campaign aimed at eliminating the biggest stronghold of the French colonialists in Indochina. Meanwhile, our forces, resources, and logistical capabilities were still limited; transportation routes were under enemy control and subjected to severe disruption and destruction. The Campaign’s motto and operational plan were shifted from “fast fight, quick victory” to “certain attack and success”, leading to the fact that we had to ensure logistical support for nearly two months instead of the initially planned two days and three nights. Consequently, the demand for various aspects of logistical support surged and became increasingly complex within the constraints of short preparation time.
However, based on a thorough grasp of the Campaign’s strategic determination and importance, as well as the role of logistics work, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Government led by President Ho Chi Minh, we elevated our spirit of self-reliance and resilience to its highest level. Besides, we mobilised the combined strength of the rear, the people’s logistics, and the support from our international friends while leveraging the pivotal role of the Military Logistics Branch to overcome all difficulties and challenges and successfully fulfil the task of ensuring logistical support for the Campaign.
We took proactive steps in logistics work to overcome the difficulties in ensuring logistical support for this decisive strategic battle. Immediately after the Politburo decided to launch the Campaign, the Government established the Central Front Supply Council and the Supply Councils of Inter-zones 3, 4, Northwest, and Viet Bac. The General Department of Supply dispatched a Forward unit and organised it into a Campaign Logistics agency. With the spirit of “All for the front, and all for victory”, we initiated a comprehensive mobilisation of human and material resources to support the frontline. Thanks to the combination of mobilisation from the rear with active exploitation of local resources and significant assistance from the Chinese people, we supported our forces in Dien Bien Phu with a massive amount of materials that the French could never have imagined, with a total of over 25,056 tons of food, 907 tons of meat, and thousands of other foodstuffs. The materials sent to the troops totalled 20,000 tons, including 1,200 tons of ammunition, 1,783 tons of fuel, 14,950 tons of rice, 268 tons of salt, nearly 557 tons of meat, 1,034 tons of food, and 177 tons of other materials. Notably, the people of the Northwest region alone provided nearly 50% of the rice and food needs, 100% of vegetables and pack horses, making a great contribution to ensuring logistical support for the Campaign.
 |
| Transporting supplies to the Dien Bien Phu front with bycicles |
During this Campaign, we successfully established an offensive posture and organised logistics work to meet the requirements of a strategic campaign. Accordingly, the Logistics Branch set up two supply lines: the rear line, managed by the General Department of Supply and the Supply Councils of Inter-zones 3, 4, and Viet Bac, responsible for creating resources and providing support for the campaign line; and the campaign line, managed by the General Department of Frontline Supply and the Northwest Inter-Regional Supply Council, responsible for organising four military stations to directly secure the frontline. At the end of the preparation phase, the military stations were adjusted into three terraced lines from rear to front to adapt to the battlefield situation. This was the first time we implemented a multi-tiered logistical support system between strategic logistics and campaign logistics, between campaign logistics and combat operations. Practice has shown that clearly defining the functions and scope of each line (level) facilitated smooth command, coordination, and integrated logistical support, forming a coherent and interconnected support system, mutually reinforcing and assisting each other. This provided an essential foundation for logistics units at all levels to provide support for continuous and prolonged combat operations under extremely harsh conditions.
To ensure the transportation of large volumes of materials to remote mountainous battlefields like Dien Bien Phu, where the rear was distant and the roads were challenging, transportation and securing bridges and roads played a paramount role. After the decision to launch the Campaign, the General Department of Supply urgently embarked on two major tasks, namely opening roads and transporting rice and ammunition to Dien Bien Phu. With high determination and will, millions of workdays of military personnel, civilian labour, and people from the Northwest provinces were mobilised to repair and construct hundreds of kilometres of roads for automobiles, multiple routes for rudimentary vehicles, and to clear obstacles and rapids for water transportation, forming a transportation network linking the rear to the battlefield. During the Campaign, transportation was identified as “the central focus of logistics work”. Therefore, the General Department of Supply directed the effective resolution of transportation tasks, ranging from route allocation, identification of roads and paths, command, and control to transportation security and protection. Following the motto of “Fully exploiting mechanisation while making the most of all rudimentary vehicles”, the Campaign mobilised and utilised all 16 companies with a total of 628 available transport vehicles at that time. Additionally, nearly 21 thousand bicycles, nearly 1 thousand pack horses, 11,600 makeshift rafts, and over 261 thousand labourers with 12 million workdays served the Campaign. By maximising the capacity of mechanised transportation, integrating mechanised with rudimentary means, especially using rudimentary vehicles and human power to bypass and transfer goods through key points when roads were cut off and deliver goods to places inaccessible by mechanised transportation, the “greatest difficulty” of the Campaign was resolved.
To maintain the smooth “flow” of transportation, especially in key areas such as Pha Din Pass, Lung Lo Pass, and Co Noi, amidst intense enemy attacks and disruptions, particular attention was paid to ensuring transportation and protecting bridges and roads. The Campaign utilised up to 50% of artillery forces, two signal companies, four engineer battalions, and tens of thousands of labourers to protect transportation and repair bridges and roads. Despite constant enemy attacks and disruptions during days and nights, compounded by harsh weather conditions, the Campaign’s transportation routes remained open, and logistical support was continuously provided to fully and timely meet the needs of combat operations.
The achievements of logistics work in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign also greatly benefited from the significant contribution of the frontline logistics work. Logistics units executed their assigned functions and tasks excellently, especially in providing necessities, feeding and taking care of troops’ health, rescuing, treating, and rehabilitating the wounded and sick in conditions of having to “dig mountains, sleep in underground bunkers, and cope with sparse rations under prolonged rainy days”. They left enduring marks on the unwavering spirit of serving the troops to their last breath. Through this Campaign, the Hoang Cam kitchen became a symbol associated with tactical-level logistical support, embodying the task of “feeding troops to fight the enemy” of the Military Logistics Branch.
The logistical support for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign is likened to a miracle in Vietnam’s military history. The achievements of logistics work resulted from the Party’s policy of comprehensive people’s warfare, aiming at both resistance and nation-building; from the building and harnessing of the immense strength of the rear and people’s logistical support; from the combination of military logistics with people’s logistics; and by maximising the core role of the Military Logistics Branch in commanding, directing, and providing logistical support. These achievements were also brought about by the merits and sacrifices of heroic martyrs, logistics officers, employers, and soldiers, frontline workers, and people, who spared no effort, sweat and blood, standing shoulder to shoulder with the Military Logistics Branch to overcome all the difficulties to fulfil the assigned tasks.
Currently, the task of building the Army, strengthening national defence, and safeguarding the Fatherland in the new situation poses high demands and significant challenges for the entire Party, people, and Army. Inheriting and promoting the invaluable lessons from the logistics work in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, we need to thoroughly grasp the Party’s policy of all-people national defence, all-people warfare, and all-people logistics and to fully understand the role of the rear and logistics in the cause of Homeland protection. On that basis, we must prioritise the construction of a strong strategic rear, enhance research, and develop the potential and posture of the people’s warfare logistics. In particular, the construction of widespread people’s logistics should be the foundation; solid logistics defence of military regions and defensive areas should serve as the cornerstone; campaign and strategic logistics should be the backbone; the combination of on-site logistics with mobile logistics should establish a coherent and robust logistics posture capable of independently ensuring logistical support for each region and strategic directions in all situations. On the other hand, emphasis should be placed on building an “elite, compact, and strong” Military Logistics Branch that advances towards modernity and is capable of sufficiently and timely supporting all types of combat operations in modern warfare conditions in which high-tech weapons are used.
To realise this goal, all levels, sectors, and localities must continue promoting socio-economic development while consolidating national defence and security, enhancing national defence capabilities and logistics potential, especially in strategic areas. It is also essential to strengthen the construction of the logistics posture, focusing on the defensive logistics posture of military regions and provinces (cities) and strategic logistics posture in different zones, regions, and directions. Additionally, it is crucial to build high-quality reserve logistics forces. Moreover, attention should be given to perfecting mechanisms, policies, mobilisation plans, and incentives for logistical support, as well as efficiently managing national reserves for national defence purposes in line with the market economy and other relevant factors.
The Military Logistics Branch must uphold its core role and continue to effectively implement Resolution No. 1658-NQ/QUTW, dated 12 December 2022, of the Central Military Commission on “Military logistics work until 2030 and beyond” associated with the implementation of the Resolution of the 8th Plenum of the Party Central Committee (13th tenure) on “The strategy for Homeland protection in the new situation” and relevant specialised strategies. Moreover, it is crucial for the Logistics Branch to proactively study, grasp, accurately forecast, and fulfil its advisory role, especially at the strategic level regarding logistics work. In the immediate term, the Logistics Branch should coordinate to lead and direct the successful merge of the Military Logistics Branch and the Military Technical Branch as per Resolution No. 230-NQ/QUTW of the Central Military Commission and Plan No. 1228/KH-BQP of the Ministry of National Defence. Then, efforts should be made to rapidly consolidate the organisational structure of logistics - technical units at all levels, making them comprehensively strong, “exemplary and typical”. Logistics units at all levels should actively review, supplement, and perfect the system of logistics operational documents while maintaining strict adherence to combat readiness regimes, prepared to respond to all situations. Besides, the Logistics Branch should implement synchronised measures to innovate and enhance the quality of all aspects of logistical support and promote administrative reforms, the application of information technology and digital transformation in logistics work. In addition, it should strengthen the work of summarising, researching, and developing logistics theory, aligning with the development of military art, organisational structure, equipment of armed forces, and the new conditions of Homeland protection warfare. It is important that the Logistics Branch carry out training and exercises effectively, with a focus on enhancing the mobility for operations to protect sovereignty over seas, islands, and borders and to combat strategic separation. Simultaneously, it should actively participate in international integration and defence diplomacy, consolidate, and expand cooperation relations in logistics with the armies of other countries, contributing to maintaining a peaceful and stable environment, strengthening national defence capabilities, logistics potential, and technical capacities to meet the requirements of building the Army and safeguarding the Homeland in the new situation.
Lieutenant General TRAN DUY GIANG, Head of the General Department of Logistics