Under the leadership of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh, our people and army won Dien Bien Phu victory that “resounded across the five continents and shook the globe”. Over the past 70 years, there have been a lot of studies into this victory in various aspects, including French generals’ admission of defeat in Dien Bien Phu as objective, convincing evidence, thus contributing to elevating the significance of this great victory.
The battle of 1954 Dien Bien Phu took place 70 years ago, about which there have been a lot of books and articles by foreign generals, politicians, scholars and journalists. People around the world continue to wonder why Vietnam, a small, poor, low-tech country which had just successfully carried out the August Revolution with its nascent army, was able to defeat French colonialists. In order to answer this question, the article will briefly relate admissions by French generals who joined the war in Indochina in general, the battle of Dien Bien Phu in particular.
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| French veteran Jacques Bouthier (on the right) said he “respects Vietnamese troops” (photo: VTV) |
Admission of the French defeat in the battle of Dien Bien Phu
After many days of preparations under the new combat motto of “steady attack, steady advance”, at 17h00 prompt on 13 March 1954, units of Division 312 opened fire on the Him Lam fortification, officially commencing Dien Bien Phu Campaign. This fortification was equipped with strong firepower and manpower to neutralise all attacks from the outside; however, it fell quickly, which took French troops by surprise. Notably, the French Command was completely surprised at our artillery fire, and they did not believe that Vietnamese troops could haul artillery into high hills downwards to the Dien Bien Phu basin. From the very beginning, shelling attacks by the Viet Minh overwhelmed French artillery. General Yves Gras wrote that “the battle started with the appearance of the Viet Minh’s artillery as a really tactical surprise,… The Viet Minh’s artillery pieces were disposed separately along the Eastern mountainside of the basin,… Such dispersion helped the Viet Minh avoid counter-artillery attacks and bombardments from the French air force. The Viet Minh’s artillery units opened fire directly and were able to fire continuously with a certain intensity,… French artillery pieces were easily destroyed by shells from the mountain”.
On the night of 15 March 1954, Regiment 165 under Division 308 and Regiment 88 under Division 308 launched attacks on the Doc Lap fortification occupied by the 5th Battalion (comprised of 4 companies) under the 7th Algerian Infantry Regiment. Thanks to greater numbers of troops, proper combat methods, and great determination, after 3 hours, our units completely seized control of the Doc Lap fortification and captured a lot of prisoners of wars. Commander-in-Chief Henri Navarre admitted: “The loss of the two fortifications led to very serious consequences. The North and Northeast part of the heavily fortified entrenched camp have been exposed and the opponent could bring artillery closer to us. We suffered heavy losses and consumed a large quantity of ammunition. It will take time to build up our reserves which were reduced considerably. If we think that we could win the battle of Dien Bien Phu, after such catastrophic days (14 March and 15 March), the chances of success are nil”. One of the events that surprised and panicked French officers and soldiers in the heavily fortified entrenched camp was the suicide of Colonel Piroth – Artillery Commander by using a grenade on 16 March 1954. Prior to the battle at Him Lam, Piroth confidently announced that he would neutralise the Viet Minh’s artillery only after some minutes of firing. However, losses suffered by the French troops, especially their artillery forces after the battles of Him Lam and Doc Lap made Piroth completely desperate. The defeat of the enemy right in the first phase of the Campaign was very heavy. In some French generals’ memoirs, they were shocked by the rapid collapse of the two most powerful fortifications of the heavily fortified entrenched camp. French Prime Minister Laniel wrote that he could find no reason why the outer fortifications of Beatrice and Gabrielle fell within 6 – 12 hours only. Those fortifications were protected by a large extra defensive line, occupied by elite units, and perfectly commanded. General Navarre complained that “we have suffered heavy losses and wasted a large number of weapons; our reserves are at a very low level, which will take time to build up”. Meanwhile, General Cogny admitted that “Dien Bien Phu is truly a trap for us, not for the Viet Minh”.
On the afternoon of 30 March 1954, the second wave of attack on the enemy’s heavily fortified entrenched camp commenced. Regarding our troops’ tactics in the second wave, General Yves Gras wrote that “during that period, Mr Giap did not launch large-scale attacks to destroy a large quantity of our troops and ammunition. He disturbed and attacked each outer fortification in order to encircle the central zone. He adopted the method of “encroachment” by laying siege to the fulcrum via a system of trenches that would finally closely surround it as is the case when a spider catches insects in its web. In doing so, the position will be isolated, blocked, and quickly strangled due to a lack of ammunition, food, particularly water”.
At 17h00 on 1 May 1954, we launched the third wave of attack, and on 7 May 1954, Dien Bien Phu Campaign was completely victorious. After 56 days and nights of courageous combat, our people and troops won a landslide victory and dealt a death blow to the French's last-ditch effort in Vietnam. General Philippe Leclerc summarised the French defeat by saying that “it is impossible to use power to destroy Vietnam’s nationalism”.
Reasons for the French defeat
Dien Bien Phu victory was derived from many factors, including logistics work. In preparation for the battle of Dien Bien Phu, General Navarre and the Command of the French expeditionary forces always thought that we would not be able to surmount difficulties in transport and supply, and that our rear was too poor to ensure logistics supply for large-scale main units operating on a distant battlefield like Dien Bien Phu. Nevertheless, with the strength of the whole nation, Vietnamese people and troops worked a miracle on the logistics front for the front line, foiling all plans by the French expeditionary forces in Dien Bien Phu. According to General Yves Gras, “All logistics operations were commanded from two ends, namely Tuan Giao base (in the front) and General Department of Supply at Chu Market near Thai Nguyen (in the rear), which were connected with each other by a series of stations. The transport system was divided into a number of routes with about 30 vehicles for each. Thousands of conscripted labourers were deployed along the routes at tough positions to facilitate the movement of vehicles when necessary. Wherever it was inaccessible by vehicles, they employed conscripted labourers, packhorses, oxcarts and boats. Obviously, they had to fix roads, construct a new 80-km-long road from Tuan Giao to Dien Bien Phu, and opened necessary trails for their artillery units to occupy positions close to the battlefield. It took only nearly two months to complete such tough work (on 20 January 1954). It was such a real miracle made by unlimited human resources thanks to mass mobilisation,…”.
Our Army displayed great maturity during Dien Bien Phu Campaign, dealing devastating blows to the enemy. Surviving the battle of Dien Bien Phu that “shook the globe”, Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Bigeard (later General, Minister of Defence of France) wrote about the reasons for the French defeat in response to General Vo Nguyen Giap’s extraordinary capabilities in building, organising and commanding our Army: “Those trained by General Giap were truly wonderful warriors! Vietnamese counterattacks blocked our artillery, and our mortars could not fire”. “I was a prisoner of those small Vietnamese people, who French soldiers had dismissed as trivial nurses and drivers. They had extremely dauntless combat morale with a view of driving the French away. It took General Giap and his men 9 years to defeat our expeditionary forces, which is an undisputed fact”. Marcel Bigeard wondered himself: “Who would believe that those small Tonkin people who were hard-working peasants and equipped with limited political and military knowledge could transform into such formidable opponents? On the contrary, we were not able to appoint one or two or even three generals to jointly command our units in Dien Bien Phu”.
General Christian de Castries, who had dropped leaflets to challenge General Vo Nguyen Giap to the battle of Dien Bien Phu, confessed that “General Giap is a knowledgeable, courageous person, an expert at commanding guerrilla warfare. We have clearly understood that. Now via the battle of Dien Bien Phu, I know that General Giap is expert at commanding not only guerrilla warfare, but also battlefield, joint operations and diversion”. “Our French expeditionary forces, generals, and high-ranking officers constituted a professional, battle-tested army with modern equipment. General Giap's talent took us by surprise. It is true that he is more talented than me, even than General Cogny and General Navarre. It was such an honour to be General Giap's opponent and to be defeated by a talented man like him. I admire and respect him”.
There are many other admissions by French generals of the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954. According to most of the assessments, our victory is derived from the strength of the entire Vietnamese nation, from the sound leadership exercised by Party Central Committee led by President Ho Chi Minh, from the brilliant command of General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Campaign Command, from the courage of Vietnamese troops, and from the wisdom and strong will of a nation which knows how to surmount every obstacle to win the battle. On the other hand, in spite of their superiority in terms of strength and equipment together with the command of many famous French generals in the heavily fortified entrenched camp of Dien Bien Phu, in the end, French colonialists suffered a defeat. French generals’ admissions of the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu is the most objective evidence for the Vietnamese nation’s victory, contributing to combating hostile forces’ distortions, to elevating its significance despite the passing of time and to allowing the spirit of Dien Bien Phu victory to live on.
Sr. Col. TRUONG MAI HUONG, PhD