Seventy years ago, the triumph of the 1953 - 1954 Winter Spring strategic offensive, culminating in the Victory at Dien Bien Phu, played a decisive role in ending the resistance war against French colonial invasion. The Victory of Dien Bien Phu not only showcased Vietnam’s progress in military artistry but also left behind invaluable lessons and experiences in the art of warfare, aiding operational and strategic-level cadres within the Army in learning and creatively applying them to the endeavors of bulding and protecting the Fatherland.

The military artistry is the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting war, born and developed in conjunction with the history of warfare worldwide. At its core, military artistry is the art of smoothly resolving the factors of “force, position, opportunity, and, strategy” in warfare. In the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, Vietnam’s military artistry saw remarkable advancements in “force, position, opportunity, and strategy,” as evidenced by several key aspects:

Regarding force: The Victory of Dien Bien Phu was the triumph of the highly-developed people’s art of war, with armed forces as the backbone, creating comprehensive strength to defeat the enemy. Since the onset of the resistance war against French colonialism, our Party had identified the method of warfare as people’s war, with the strategy of “all people and all aspects,” “simultaneously fighting and building the nation,” aiming to mobilise the strength of the entire nation to defeat the enemy. The reality showed that during the 1953 - 1954 Winter Spring campaign, our people, from liberated to enemy rear areas, from the rear to the frontlines, from mountainous regions to plains, and from old to young, all enthusiastically contributed their efforts to the war. With this spirit, hundreds of thousands of people marched to the battlefield and served in combat, making significant contributions to the overall victory of the nation. Assessing the immense contribution of the entire population, General Vo Nguyen Giap affirmed that “Never in the years of resistance have our people contributed as much as during 1953 - 1954 Winter Spring Campaign, supporting the army in killing the enemy. The imperialists and reactionaries could never gauge the strength of an entire nation, the strength of the people.” Faced with the strength of the entire Vietnamese nation, General Navarre also had to admit that “The French expeditionary force not only had to contend with a regular army but also had to confront an entire nation.”

President Ho Chi Minh, General Vo Nguyen Giap and other state leaders dicussed the launch of Dien Bien Phu Campaign in 1954 (Photo; VNA)

In people’s war, armed forces play a pivotal role, determining the success of each combat operation. In the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, we utilised four infantry divisions (304, 308, 312, and 316) and Artillery Division 351, with a total of over 51,000 troops. Comparing numbers, we created an advantage of more than three times the enemy’s forces but were inferior to the enemy in tanks and aircraft. This was also a campaign where our Army practiced joint arms combat on the largest scale among infantry, artillery, mortars, and engineering, forming overwhelming strength to attack and annihilate the enemy’s strongest defensive positions in mountainous areas. For the first time in the resistance against France, through joint arms combat, we sequentially broke through each stronghold, cluster of strongholds, and zone. Meanwhile, we constructed fortifications and communication trenches, gradually tightening the encirclement, attacking the outer defensive centres through “peeling off” layers of resistance, gradually breaking the depth of the enemy’s defence to advance straight into the most critical defensive areas within their innermost defensive lines.

In the new revolutionary period, the training of cadres in the Army needs to emphasise the communicating and continuously enhancing awareness and scope of thinking for the contingent of campaign and strategic-level cadres regarding the role of the method of people’s war and the thorough grasping and creative application of the Party’s national defence strategy into practical leadership and unit command activities. Accordingly, the active role of the operational and strategic-level cadres is maximised in planning and organising the successful implementation of military and national defence tasks entrusted by the Party, the State, and the Army, contributing to building a solid national defence foundation. Each campaign and strategic-level cadre must actively contribute to harnessing the strength of the entire nation in building a comprehensive national defence; diligently building a strong three-component armed forces, with high quality and rational quantity structure according to the Resolution of the 13^th Party Congress, focusing on political construction as the decisive factor; continuously improving the level and scale of joint arms combat capability; and paying attention to the construction of a modern, dual-use national defence industry capable of equipping the Army with relatively modern and advanced weapons to enhance the combat readiness and combat capability of the armed forces, being ready to successfully cope with future forms of warfare and firmly protecting the Fatherland.

Regarding position: It is the position of people’s war, forcing the enemy into a passive, strategically dispersed state to be surrounded and divided in campaigns and tactics. The position of people’s war is the harmonious combination of the comprehensive position of the three components of armed forces: the regular army, the local army, and the guerrilla, forming the backbone for the entire nation to fight the enemy. This is a distinctive feature in Vietnam’s military artistry and is a factor contributing to the victory of each resistance for national independence and preservation. In the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, the position of people’s war was vividly demonstrated in strategic, operational, and tactical positions.

Regarding the strategic position, based on a clear understanding of the enemy’s intentions, to break through Navarre’s Plan, we advocated “stretching the enemy out to fight them,” dispersing their strategic mobile forces, forcing them to react passively, unable to concentrate forces for decisive combat against our main forces on the battlefields they chose. By successfully conducting 5 strategic offensives in areas: Lai Chau, Central Laos, Lower Laos and Northeast Cambodia, Northwest Highlands, and Upper Laos, we forced the enemy into a passive state, dispersing their strategic mobile forces to deal with, giving us the initiative on the battlefield, creating favourable conditions to establish the strategic battle position of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign.

Regarding the campaign position, prior to the commencement of hostilities following the principle of “strike firmly, advance firmly,” we formed a siege campaign position, cutting off all escape routes for the enemy. In terms of terrain, the enemy’s defensive system was arranged at the centre of the Dien Bien Phu basin, while we deployed forces on high points around, forming a position to attack from above, placing the enemy at a disadvantage. With this position, our artillery was deployed in bunkers and on high points around with effective suppression capabilities, providing timely support for our infantry to launch attacks on the enemy. On the other hand, as Dien Bien Phu was a mountainous battlefield, completely isolated and far from the enemy’s rear bases, all their supplies depended on air routes. Our control over such routes severed the enemy’s supply and reinforcement sources, pushing them into dire straits.

The General Staff of the VPA studied operational plan (Photo; VNA)

In terms of tactics, during the execution of combat operations and the implementation of the principle “strike firmly, advance firmly,” our forces established a siege position, gradually tightening each stronghold and group of strongholds, cutting off the continuous positions of the enemy. From the beginning of January 1954, our system of hundreds of kilometers of trenches tightly squeesed each zone and each stronghold. All retreat plans of the French forces could not be executed because our trenches had tightened the encirclement, pressing against the enemy. With the creative approach of “encircling, infiltrating, assaulting, breaking, and exterminating,” we “bound the enemy” to eliminate each of their stronghold, group of strongholds, and ultimately achieve a complete victory.

For education and training in the Army today, the distinctive features of the art of establishing position in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign still retain their theoretical and practical value, requiring the National Defence Academy to continue researching and applying them to the training process, aiming to develop a contingent of cadres with campaign and strategic thinking, capable of meeting mission requirements. First and foremost, it is necessary to equip the cadres with a deep understanding of the role of the position and position establishment in combat operations, serving as the foundation for application in building a comprehensive national defence position, ready to transform into a people’s war position when war breaks out. On that basis, the operational and strategic-level cadres should utilise their intelligence in actively providing advice to the Party, State, Central Military Commission, and Ministry of National Defence in building a strong national defence battlefield; building a solid “people’s heart-and-mind posture” as the foundation; and building strong defensive areas at provincial and district levels within the overall arrangement of forces and means, forming the nation’s collective position, to protect the Fatherland early and from afar.

In terms opportunity: it is essential to grasp the enemy situation and timely change the combat strategy. Accurate assessment of the enemy situation and timely selection of appropriate offensive opportunities plays is of extreme importance in campaign combat operations. In the initial stage of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, we advocated attacking the enemy with the principle of “strike quickly, resolve quickly.” However, after some time, we realised that the enemy was no longer in a temporary defensive state but had become a solid defensive stronghold group. Moreover, our campaign preparation work still faced many difficulties, while a portion of our artillery had not been positioned,... If we had continued to advance against the enemy, casualties and losses would have been inevitable, and the mission would have been difficult to complete. From this assessment, the Campaign Command Headquarters decided to shift to the principle of “strike firmly, advance firmly” to both utilise time to transform the comparative situation of position and force in a favourable direction for us and implement the correct guiding ideology and determination to fight for a firm victory and not to fight without a firm victory. This was a wise decision, demonstrating the ability to accurately assess the enemy situation, creatively apply the factor of opportunity, and set forth the correct guiding principle, and was one of the decisive factors for the success of the Campaign.

In the event of war to protect the Fatherland (if it occurs), our combat objectives undergo significant changes, developing in terms of forces, resources, and methods of conducting warfare. In addition, combat operations occur at a high tempo, with rapidly changing, complex, and intense combat situations. This demands that the commanders at the campaign and strategic levels must possess steadfast qualities, firmness, and the ability to think strategically to timely cope with modern combat situations. Regarding the training of the contingent of campaign and strategic-level cadres today, it is essential to prioritise equipping them with a worldview and dialectical materialist methodology of Marxism-Leninism, the military ideology of Ho Chi Minh, and the ability to apply creatively and effectively in practice. At the same time, there must be continuous improvement in the capacity to assess and evaluate the enemy situation in combat, sharp analytical thinking, and decisive capabilities in proposing methods and approaches to dealing with strategic-level combat situations to be: creative, practical, suitable, and highly efficient. In the training process, it is crucial to implement the principle that “The quality of education and training provided by the institution is the readiness of the unit to engage in combat”, emphasising practical training, exercises, rehearsals,... to enhance the ability to handle combat situations for the campaign and strategic-level cadres.

In terms of strategy: it is necessary to effectively execute deception operations to force the enemy into a passive posture. During the 1953 - 1954 Winter Spring warfare, our strategy was to use all means to force the enemy to disperse their main mobile forces, directing them northwestward to the direction we chose and hold them back to concentrate forces for the decisive campaign operation, ending the war. From mid-November 1953, upon learning that our main forces were marching northwestward, Navarre decided to deploy troops to Dien Bien Phu to support Lai Chau, block us, and protect Upper Laos. In response to the enemy’s actions, General Vo Nguyen Giap made a very important observation: “Regardless of how the situation develops, the enemy’s parachuting into Dien Bien Phu is fundamentally beneficial to us.”

In preparation for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, when changing the combat strategy from “strike quickly, resolve quickly” to “strike firmly, advance firmly,” to attract enemy forces, forcing Navarre to disperse his strategic mobile units, we directed Division 308 to launch an offensive to destroy a portion of the enemy’s vital forces, breaking through the “Nậm Hu River defence line,” expanding the liberated area in Upper Laos. Seeing that our troops did not open the Dien Bien Phu Campaign on the day the enemy predicted (January 25^th), they thought we had “given up.” As a countermeasure, we advanced our forces to Upper Laos, further proving their misjudgment and creating more favourable conditions for completing the preparations for the Dien Bien Phu battlefield according to the new combat strategy. On the other hand, by breaking the Luang Prabang - Dien Bien Phu corridor, we “cut off” the enemy’s retreat route from Dien Bien to Laos (according to the Xenophon plan), completely isolating the Dien Bien Phu stronghold group. The art of decepting and deceiving the enemy demonstrates the peak intelligence of the entire Party, the entire Army, and the entire people.

In the new revolutionary period, military training needs to focus on nurturing and continually improving comprehensive knowledge, with the central focus being on the military knowledge for the contingent of operational and strategic-level cadres. In combat, the challenge for operational and strategic-level cadres is the ability to assess the enemy situation, flexibility, logical thinking, keen judgment,... “thinking up schemes, devising strategies,” to gradually put the enemy into a passive position.

Especially, to meet the current requirements of protecting the Fatherland early and from afar, even in peacetime, our Army needs to pay attention to building a contingent of cadres at all levels with sufficient qualities and capabilities, particularly the high-level cadres with campaign and strategic thinking. It is necessary to focus on nurturing the operational and strategic-level cadres with knowledge about military history, educating military tradition, and imparting experiences and values of the military culture of the nation and mankind. Then, it is to continuously enhance qualities, thinking, and ability to apply experiences and military knowledge in general, and military artistry in particular from the Dien Bien Phu Campaign into practical military and defence activities at the operational and strategic levels, contributing to the development of Vietnam’s military art, implementing the Party’s defence and military line, firmly protecting the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in all circumstances.

Senior Lieutenant General, Associate Professor, Dr. TRAN VIET KHOA, Member of the Party Central Committee, Member of the Central Military Commission, Director of the National Defence Academy