Seventy years ago, implementing the 1953 - 1954 Winter - Spring operational plan, our Army launched several strategic offensive directions with numerous campaigns across key regions, including the Northern Central Highlands Campaign. This Campaign was highly effective, marked by its unique and distinctive artistic tactics, notably the art of the opening battle. It created significant shifts and propelled the Campaign towards resounding victory.

After the heavy defeat in Lai Chau, the enemy’s “Nava Plan” was on the verge of complete collapse, with their strategic mobile forces increasingly dispersed to counter our operations in strategic directions in the Central Highlands, Upper Laos, Central - Lower Laos, and Northeast Cambodia. In Inter-region 5, along with launching Operation Atlante to sweep our liberated areas in the Central Coastal Plain, the enemy strenuously fortified the Northern Central Highlands area to maintain the initiative and create a foothold for their operations. In line with this intent and to establish a continuous defensive posture with the main forces stationed inside Kon Tum town, the enemy organised defence in three areas (Northern, Southern, and Eastern) surrounding the town. Among these, the Eastern area was the most crucial, including strongholds along Road 05, guarding the vital road linking Kon Tum and Quang Ngai.

On our side, implementing the 1953 - 1954 Winter - Spring operational plan, the Politburo and the General Military Commission defined launching the Offensive Campaign in the Northern Central Highlands as the most critical task for Inter-region 5. Moreover, it was vital for our Army to protect and consolidate the liberated areas, forcing the enemy to disperse their strategic mobile forces and prevent them from concentrating in the Northern Delta, a crucial area of the country. To carry out this task on the strategic front, the Party Committee and High Command of Inter-region 5 decided to concentrate all main forces to launch the Offensive Campaign in the Northern Central Highlands. Meanwhile, the responsibility of protecting the liberated areas was assigned to local troops and guerrilla forces. With high determination and the innovative application of unique military tactics, the Campaign achieved a resounding victory, completely shattering the enemy’s defensive system in the strategically important Northern Central Highlands. This contributed to expanding the liberated area of Inter-region 5, connecting it with the liberation area of Lower Laos. Besides, it forced the enemy to maintain a large number of their main forces in the Central Highlands, intensifying the contradiction between “concentration and dispersion” of their strategic mobile forces. The victory of the Campaign marked the maturation of the main forces of Inter-region 5, especially in terms of organisational skills and campaign practice, where the art of the opening battle in the Campaign was an outstanding feature. 

Firstly, there was a clever use of deceptive tactics to mislead the enemy, ensuring secrecy and surprise for the main offensive direction and the opening battle. Determined to secure a sure victory for the Campaign’s opening battle, we proactively intensified deceptive operations in the enemy’s rear areas. This aimed to distract them, leading them to negligence, lowered vigilance, and exposed vulnerabilities in our main offensive’s direction, location, and targets in the Northern Central Highlands. To carry out this intention, before the Campaign unfolded, from early January 1954, the Campaign Command directed local armed forces, in collaboration with the people, to intensify widespread combat activities, uprising to eliminate traitors, disrupt enemy control, and expand the liberated areas in Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Dak Lak, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, etc. In addition, to enhance the effectiveness of our deceptive tactic, units boldly “infiltrated and attacked” the towns of Hoi An and Phan Thiet, destroyed fuel depots in Nha Trang, and raided the enemy’s logistics bases in Ninh Hoa and Dak Lak. This dispersed the enemy’s attention, making them concentrate their defence forces towards the Central Coastal Plain and Southern Central Highlands, thereby revealing several vulnerabilities and lowering their vigilance in the Northern Central Highlands. As a result, they became confused and unable to predict our operational intentions, especially the target of the Campaign’s opening battle.

The Interregion 5 dicuss Northern Central Highlands Campaign in 1954

In addition to the widespread combat operations in the enemy’s rear areas, on the Northern Central Highlands front, we proactively initiated gunfire on a secondary front one day before the Campaign to draw the enemy’s attention southward. The Campaign Command deployed Regiment 120 to unexpectedly attack and annihilate the strongholds of Ka Tung, Ba - Ka Tu and Bup Be on Road 19 - An Khe. This created a “mixed real and fake”, “partly illusioned and partly real” situation, catching the enemy off guard and unable to discern our offensive intentions. They focused all their efforts on the secondary front, leaving the main targets exposed, with their defences unprepared and vulnerable. This was a favourable condition and opportunity for us to manoeuvre our forces and deploy the attack formation on the main front, ensuring secrecy and surprise in line with our operational intentions. Therefore, when Regiment 108 and the Regional Special Forces Battalion simultaneously opened fire and launched the Campaign at Mang Den, Mang But, and Kon Bray, the enemy was completely reactive, unable to respond in time, flustered in their counteractions, and disordered in command and coordination, thus quickly being defeated.

Secondly, there was a precise selection of the direction and targets for the opening battle of the Campaign, ensuring a victory. Given the enemy’s superior forces and resources, to gain the initiative in combat, making the enemy stunned and disoriented, the Campaign Command attached importance to thoroughly researching and accurately selecting the direction and targets of the Campaign’s opening battle to guarantee a sure victory. Based on a precise understanding, assessment, and conclusion of the enemy situation, our forces, the terrain, and the weather in the operational area, the Campaign Command decided to choose the Northern Central Highlands as the main offensive direction to initiate the Campaign. This was a wise choice, reflecting the foresight, keen thinking, and creativity of the Campaign’s Party Committee and Command, as the Central Highlands was a strategic area for both our army and the enemy in Southern Vietnam and the Indochina, with the Northern Central Highlands being an important defensive area of the enemy, connecting our liberated areas in the Central Coastal Plain and Lower Laos, creating a continuous front. If we could gain victory and liberate the town of Kon Tum, it would bring a strategic impact, advancing the revolutionary movement and forcing the enemy to disperse their strategic mobile forces to counter our combat activities. Notably, in the main offensive direction of the Northern Central Highlands, the Campaign Command identified simultaneous attacks on the targets of Mang Den, Mang But, and Kon Bray for the opening battle. This was because these were pivotal strongholds, significantly impacting the stability of the enemy’s defence when attacked. However, there were multiple vulnerabilities in their defensive organisation as these strongholds were scattered, isolated, poorly defended, and did not form a continuous front, which limited mutual support during combat. Additionally, the Campaign’s opening battle targets were located relatively far from the town of Kon Tum; the terrain was mountainous with only single-track roads, making the mobilisation of forces and rescue vehicles challenging. Therefore, if we secretly surrounded and approached them, the enemy would quickly become isolated, allowing our forces to act freely and respond flexibly in a favourable position. The practice proved that when we simultaneously attacked Mang Den, Mang But, and Kon Bray at the beginning of the Campaign, the enemy in Kon Tum dared not come out to respond, while their dozens of main mobile battalions were stuck in Phu Yen, unable to mobilise in time. Consequently, we quickly “flattened” these important targets, fulfilling the Campaign’s purpose.

Thirdly, there was a rational use of forces and tight coordination among units, creating a combined strength to secure a victory. During the preparation process, through reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, we identified Mang Den, Mang But, and Kon Bray as strong points in the Northern Central Highlands’ defensive system, especially the Mang Den, with its relatively solid construction of fortifications, battlefields, and obstacles. These were critical strongholds guarding the gateway to Kon Tum town, and only by “flattening” these three strongholds could we create a breakthrough, facilitating the smooth progress of the Campaign. Therefore, to ensure superior strength and a victory for the Campaign’s opening battle, we concentrated all our main forces of the Region, including Regiment 108 and Regiment 803, special forces, engineers, artillery, etc., on the main offensive direction. On the secondary offensive direction, the Campaign Command decided to only use Regiment 120 from local forces to eliminate the enemy at the strongholds of Ka Tung and Ba - Ka Tu, then to advance to fight along Road 19. Thanks to the concentrated use of forces, when we simultaneously attacked the three strongholds of Mang Den, Mang But, and Kon Bray, we significantly overpowered the enemy, achieving continuous breakthroughs and shattering the enemy’s key defensive cluster in Northern Kon Tum. Eventually, the gateway into Kon Tum was wide open. The victory of the opening battle created a breakthrough, establishing a position and force that allowed us to quickly surround this town, thus opening up conditions and opportunities to drive the Campaign towards a complete victory.

Apart from the art of force concentration to create a combined strength, the Campaign Command organised tight coordination among combat units, leveraging the capabilities and strengths of each unit and force. As a result, in the main offensive direction, when Regiment 108 waged the attack on Mang Den, Battalion 19 attacking zone A faced difficulties due to the enemy’s fierce resistance as they relied on fortifications and underground bunkers. Meanwhile, after attacking zone B, Battalion 79 proactively manoeuvred past the airport to form a new attacking direction, striking the enemy’s formation at zone A from the flanks and rear. It coordinated with Battalion 19 to create overwhelming strength, surrounding and attacking the enemy from different directions, hence continuously breaking through and destroying the solid defensive positions, and wiping out the enemy force to gain victory.

The victory of the 1954 Northern Central Highlands Campaign not only holds practical value and significance in the art of the opening battle but also carries strategic importance - serving as a condition and essential premise along with campaigns on other strategic fronts to propel the 1953 - 1954 Winter - Spring Campaign and the strategic decisive Dien Bien Phu Campaign to victory. In a nutshell, this combat art needs further research, application, and development in Homeland protection.

Senior Colonel, Dr. TRAN VAN CAO, Army College No.1