In the war or resistance against the United States for national salvation, although the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign of 1969 used a small scale force, due to correct selection of direction of attack, creation and flexible transformation of posture, good leverage of methods of warfare, combination of force concentration and widespread attack, etc., it achieved high combat effectiveness and contributed to generation of posture and strength in favour of us in the Northern and Northeastern Belt of Sai Gon.

After failure in the Spring and Summer 1969, to confront our operational activities in important strategic areas and directions, the enemy deployed more forces to defend the rears, towns, and vital lines of communication with a view to stepping up the “rapid stabilisation” programme. This was aimed to hunt down our revolutionary bases, strengthen the apparatus of the puppet government, and make the Sai Gon military stronger, capable of taking over the role of American troops in the South. To realise this plot, in the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop area, the enemy attached importance to concentration of forces and equipment with the aim of firmly defending the springboard, timely engaging and defeating our offensives, and creating a safety corridor in the Northern and Northeastern Sai Gon.

As for our side, the Politburo advocated bringing the revolutionary war to a new stage of development by means of general assault and general uprising; using units of the main force to destroy every army corps of the Sai Gon military as well as attract, restrain, and annihilate every unit of U.S. military in the jungle and mountainous theatre of war. To do so, on the basis of analysing and evaluating situation of the enemy and our side, the Headquarters of the Liberation Army of South Viet Nam decided to launch the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign in the area of Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces (Binh Phuoc province presently) with the aim of annihilating enemy forces, destroying their weapons and equipment, and stopping their supply routes via the 13th and 14th National Roads while killing fiends and breaking the enemy grip in Bu Dop, Phuoc Binh, and Loc Ninh. Under the leadership of the Liberation Army of South Viet Nam Party Committee and Headquarters, given the unique military art, we attacked continually and dealt a heavy blow to the enemy, thereby successfully safeguarding the strategic transpotation corridor and warehouses in the Viet Nam – Cambodia border and creating favourable posture and strength in the Northern and Northeastern Belt of Sai Gon. Victory of the Campaign marks a new development in the ability of the main force of the Liberation Army of South Viet Nam to conduct and command concentrated operations. Of note, the art of applying flexible, creative methods of warfare is a prominent feature.

First, attacking on weak and vital places in the enemy’s defensive system to assure victory. This is a critical content of the operational method of offensive operations in general, a unique method of warfare of forces participating in the Campaign in particular. As for small-cale offensive campaigns, the selection of proper operational areas to launch attack on the enemy’s vulnerable places is the art and vital factor for breaking the enemy’s posture and swiftly attacking primary targets to make the enemy totally surprised, weaker and weaker, move from one mistake to another, and defeated while creating posture and strength conducive to us. 

In the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign, when selecting the operational area, the Campaign Command had attached importance to research and careful assessment of situation in every aspect before choosing Bu Dop town as the key operational area. Bu Dop town was an important area in the the enemy’s defensive system in Northern and Northeastern Sai Gon and built into a fairly complete military sub-area with a view to obstructing and controlling the vital road linking border provinces and Sai Gon. However, we realised that the enemy’s defensive formation revealed many vulnerable points and could not create an uninterrupted posture. The posture established along the 13th National Road was long and thin, thus being vulnerable to siege, isolation, and complete annihilation. From our perspective, Bu Dop was situated within the base area of the Liberation Army of South Viet Nam, a vital link of the Chon Thanh – Loc Ninh – Bu Dop corridor, and along the supply route from the Indochina T-junction to Southern theatre of war. If we won victory and controlled this important area we would protect the strategic transportation corridor and create a robust, uninterrupted posture to threaten Sai Gon directly from the Northern and Northeastern directions. Furthermore, Bu Dop was adjacent to Cambodia, covered in jungles and mountains, and suitable for our forces to establish an offensive posture, leverage firepower and methods of warfare, and ensure secrecy, surprise, and victory. More importantly, when we attacked Bu Dop area, it would certainly make the enemy send in reinforcements, thus creating opportunities for us to destroy a large number of enemy forces and vehicles outside trenches. Thanks to correct selection of an operational area, at the onset of the Campaign, we caused great losses to enemy troops by means of assaulting battle positions and entrenched fortifications to the west of Phuoc Binh, Bu Dop military sub-area, which forced the enemy to use the elite force to reinforce this area, bringing about opportunities for us to pursue destruction of reinforcements. Moreover, we repeatedly attacked and defeated the enemy’s stabilisation operation on the 13th and 14th National Roads, turning these places into roads full of blood and tears for American and puppet militaries and contributing to successful application of our methods of warfare.

Second, promoting favourite methods of warfare and applying various types of tactics flexibly and effectively to win victory in each battle. A striking feature of the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign is that the Campaign occured in a large terrain and involved many different types of opponents, targets, and consecutive, concurrent battles. Consequently, to bring into play capabilities and forte of every force, the Campaign Command requested flexible, creative application of methods of warfare in connection with each type of tactics, ensuring suitability for situations about the enemy and terrain and high combat effectiveness in each battle. Accordingly, when attacking enemy troops in fortified positions, we used force concentration, combined arms operations, and close coordination between the infantry and artillery to attack consecutively to infiltrate and destroy the primary target and break the enemy’s defensive posture. Having identified that Height 244 was an important entrenched fortification, we used the 141st Infantry Regiment and the artillery of the Campaign to quickly attack and break the enemy’s posture. We destroyed 2 American armoured detachments and accomplished assigned tasks. Together with using main force’s combined arms operations, based on practical situations, we brought into play independent methods of warfare of each arm to deal heavy blow to the enemy. A typical example is the assault on enemy troops in the Cau mountain. Through using its forte, the 28th Commando Battalion infiltrated secretly and opened fire suddenly on a company of American military, causing great losses to this unit. The 94th Military Engineering Battalion used land mines to ambush and destroy many enemy tanks and armoured vehicles on the 14th Road, achieving high combat effectiveness. In the “ignition” battles in sub-areas, ranger stations, commanding positions at campsites, etc., when the adversaries shifted to defence in fortified trenches, we applied offensive in association with encirclement. A typical example is the attack on Phuoc Tien Ranger Barrack, which forced the 9th Combat Unit to send in its reinforcements, creating opportunities for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment to attack and destroy 1 enemy company completely in Northeastern Phuoc Tien.

Third, shifting posture timely; seizing and maintain initiative in attack. Facing rapid developments of situations, to defeat the enemy’s tactics, we transformed posture timely and constantly seize and maintain initiative in attack. A prominent example of posture transformation is the attack on enemy tanks at the Thi Tinh Bridge. According to the plan, the 6th Battalion, 165th Regiment was tasked with ambushing and destroying the enemy. Nevertheless, having discovered the enemy on the move, we timely shifted the posture from static ambush to mobile ambush to engage in close combat, continually attacking and killing many enemy troops and destroying their equipment and vehicles. Then, to kill more enemy troops and exploit outcomes of mobile ambush, when the enemy shifted to a temporary halt, we flexibly opened fire and launched a commando raid, thereby driving the enemy into surprise, confusion, paralysis and failure.

Fourth, increasing extensive operational activities and creating overall power to achieve victory throughout the Campaign area. To provide effective support to our primary offensive force, we intensified extensive operational activities and pursued establishment of our posture together with destroying the enemy’s posture, placing them on the horns of a dilemma and forcing them to scatter their forces, thus exposing vulnerabilities and creating conditions for us to annihilate them. Usually, the primary extensive operational force is the local armed forces. However, we used both the main force and local force for extensive operational activities in the Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign. This is a prominent feature of the art of employing forces. Accordingly, to stretch the enemy forces and drive them into passivity, we use units of the 165th Regiment and the local armed forces to attack enemy troops in Mang Cai, forcing them to airdrop one battalion of American troops to the north of Village 10 and another battalion on Height 244 to reinforce these places. At the same time, we ambushed the enemy at Cong Chanh T-junction and caused great losses to a company of American troops. In addition to the primary direction of attack, in other directions, the main force of the Campaign cooperated with the local armed forces in launching assaults on the rear and lines of communication such as Road 748 and Phuoc Qua Military Sub-area with a view to luring the enemy into our methods of warfare, thus steadily making them lose the initiative and creating conditions for units in the primary direction of attack to destroy the main target. Under the unified command and control of the Campaign Command, battles took place consecutively across all types of terrain, from the rural areas to urban areas, both at the front and the back of the enemy. The previous battles brought about conditions for the following ones and generated the posture and opportunities for the key battle. The battles achieved high effectiveness, which contributed to complete victory of the Campaign.

Phuoc Binh – Bu Dop Campaign is a small-scale offensive campaign, but of significant importance. It enables us to conduct subsequent campaigns at a larger scale and force to defeat the US’s strategy of Vietnamisation.  Lessons learnt on military art, especially the art of applying methods of warfare deserve further research and creative use in today’s cause of safeguarding the Fatherland.

Senior Colonel, Doctor NGUYEN HUNG CHIEN, Army Academy