An overview of the European Union’s new defence strategy and its implications for regional and international security
On 19th March 2025, the European Union unveiled a new Defence Strategy aimed at enhancing its security autonomy, maintaining regional stability, and safeguarding its core interests in the face of growing threats and a gradual decline of the United States’ role as Europe’s security guarantor. What are the foundation for the formulation of this Strategy, its key components, and its potential impacts on regional and international security? These are pressing questions that have attracted significant attention from the international community.
In the face of rapid, complex, unpredictable developments throughout the world and in the region, numerous European Union (EU) senior officials have stated that it is time for the EU to act more decisively and proactively. Accordingly, on 19th March 2025, the EU unveiled a new Defence Strategy aimed at enhancing its security autonomy, maintaining regional stability, and safeguarding its core interests.
According to EU leaders, the announcement of the new Defence Strategy at this point in time reflects a shared understanding among member states regarding the shifting security landscape in Europe and beyond, particularly since the outbreak of the Russia - Ukraine conflict. The Strategy also signals a renewed consensus within the Union on the need to invest in defence - an area that has long been under-prioritised - in response to escalating threats to the security of both the EU and the wider European region. The EU has identified Russia as the most direct and fundamental threat to the Union’s survival. Meanwhile, China is viewed as a challenge not only economically but also in terms of security, due to its differing political system and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. In addition, the new Defence Strategy highlights ongoing instability in the Middle East, stemming from the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the conflict in Gaza, the growing threat of cyber-attacks and sabotage of critical infrastructure, and many other challenges to the EU’s security interests both regionally and globally.
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German soldiers participate in an exercise in Altengrabow (photo: AFP/VNA) |
In particular, the “cracks” in the strategic transatlantic alliance since US President Donald Trump assumed office in January 2025 have become a key factor compelling the EU to re-evaluate its stance on defence and security “autonomy”. Many of the EU’s strategy planners acknowledge that the Trump administration’s shift in foreign policy priorities - scaling back its role as Europe’s primary “security guarantor” in order to focus on the strategically vital Indo-Pacific region - has served as a stark warning about the “security gaps” that the leadership of the “Old Continent” must urgently address. French President Emmanuel Macron has stated that the conflict in Ukraine, coupled with the policies of President Trump’s administration, is encouraging Europe to pursue a more independent path. He stressed that Europe must become more united and proactive in addressing matters of collective security.
In assessing the EU’s announcement of its new Defence Strategy, international analysts have described it as an “ambitious move” by the Union to establish itself as a viable “defence pillar” capable of safeguarding its own security and interests amid growing regional and global instability, increasing threats, and the United States’ gradual retreat from its role as Europe’s security guarantor.
According to these analysts, the EU’s new Defence Strategy centres on three main priorities: (1) enhancing defence capabilities, (2) supporting Ukraine, and (3) strengthening cooperation in defence and security. Of these, boosting defence capacity is considered the decisive factor in enabling the Union to achieve true defence autonomy. The strategy outlines seven key areas for investment: air defence; artillery; missile systems; munitions; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and counter-UAV systems; cyber defence, and personnel capable of conducting large-scale military operations. The Strategy also underscores the necessity of maximising resource efficiency through the development of a modern command and operations structure, the establishment of an independent EU defence industrial strategy, and the promotion of joint research, development, and production of weapons systems within the EU or in cooperation with its partners. EU military officials argue that joint research and development of military equipment will help reduce costs, optimise resource use, and address ongoing interoperability challenges between different weapons systems across the Union’s defence infrastructure. The EU has already approved several major initiatives aimed at enhancing common defence capabilities, such as integrated missile and air defence systems, procurement of counter-UAV technologies, air defence missiles, and munitions, development of “European warships”, creation of shared data platforms, and development of joint doctrines, training programmes, and exercises, and a common framework for electronic warfare, etc.
The new Defence Strategy also emphasises plans to mobilise financial resources to accelerate Europe’s rearmament, including the “ReArm Europe” initiative, with an estimated budget of around €800 billion to support member states and enhance the Union’s collective military and defence capabilities. Priority will be given to investing in the modernisation and improvement of rapid response forces’ combat readiness as well as renovating and upgrading hundreds of infrastructures, such as bridges, ports, airports, tunnels, and roads in member states to serve military purposes. In particular, the EU is also focusing on investment in cutting-edge defence areas, such as digital technology, clean and resource-efficient technology and biotechnology, as well as cyber security, naval and undersea warfare, simulation and training technologies, integrated joint command systems, multi-functional information distribution systems, human - AI interaction, specialised defence application chips, and advanced personal equipment for soldiers operating in extreme environments.
Support for Ukraine against Russia is regarded as a central focus of the EU’s new Defence Strategy. The EU maintains the view that Ukraine remains the “front line of European security and defence” as well as “a key battleground in shaping a new international order”, with “Ukraine’s security being directly linked to that of the EU”. The EU has also introduced what it calls the “porcupine strategy”, which aims to arm Ukraine “so that it can deter any potential attacks and ensure a lasting peace”. At the same time, the EU has pledged to continue supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia by providing weapons and integrating Ukraine into the Union’s initiatives.
Strengthening cooperation in defence and security is also a key component of the EU’s new Defence Strategy. While actively pursuing measures to enhance its defence autonomy, the EU continues to emphasise the decisive role of the transatlantic alliance and NATO in collective defence. The guiding principle is to continue relying on the United States, while also ensuring that the EU has sufficient capability to guarantee its own security in the event that the US reduces its commitment to European security.
Therefore, the EU must develop its own defence capabilities - though still within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Speaking on EU - NATO relations, President of the European Council Antonio Costa stated: “A lot has been done already. But we need to do more. We need to do it better, stronger, faster. And we need to do it together”. The Strategy also mentions expanding defence cooperation with partners beyond Europe, such as India and several other strategic partners.
Many international analysts believe that the EU’s new Defence Strategy, which identifies Russia as the most direct and serious “fundamental threat” while viewing Ukraine as a “proxy battlefield” for confronting Russia, reflects its Cold War mentality. With the EU’s “porcupine strategy” in Ukraine and the application of “double standards” in its dealings with Russia, such an approach may not only lead to a further deterioration in EU - Russia relations, but also increase regional instability and unpredictability in Europe. On the other hand, the EU’s designation of China as both an economic and security challenge is seen as an obstacle to the ongoing efforts to promote equal, mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and China. It has also triggered discontent in Beijing and may intensify geopolitical and geostrategic competition among major powers and global centres of power.
In addition, the EU’s policy of increasing defence investment, focusing on the research, development, and production of next-generation military equipment to enhance deterrence and gain a strategic edge over its adversaries, risks sparking a “high-tech” arms race - an outcome that would not be conducive to peace and stability in the region or globally.
Furthermore, according to many EU military experts, in order to achieve the goal of “defence autonomy” under conditions where the existing defence system still faces numerous shortcomings - especially following the United States’ announcement and implementation of measures to scale back its security guarantees for Europe - member states may need to increase their defence budgets to as much as 4% of GDP, creating a significant financial burden for their national budgets. The “ReArm Europe” plan, with an estimated budget of €800 billion, could result in member states incurring additional debt equivalent to around 1.5% of GDP to fund their defence spending. Experts also point out that many of the EU’s major defence projects - which are inherently very costly - are facing considerable difficulties due to a lack of financial resources and the absence of unity among member states.
Moreover, the EU is also facing the “paradoxical dilemma” that the more it seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States, the more dependent on the US it actually becomes. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2020 and 2024, the US accounted for over 64% of all arms imports into Europe. At present, Europe’s defence infrastructure - including that of France - relies heavily on the US-based Starlink system and American ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities. The armed forces of numerous EU countries are dependent, to varying degrees, on military equipment imported from the US - especially advanced weaponry, such as F-35 fighter jets, Patriot air defence systems, and missile defence systems. Notably, many EU countries continue to procure weapons from the United States despite rising concerns over the reliability of Washington’s security guarantees. Statistics show that, in 2024, the number of F-35 aircraft delivered by the US to Europe was ten times greater than that of Rafale fighter jets. This reality presents serious challenges for the EU’s defence industry and risks further exacerbating internal divisions - long seen as a “chronic illness” within the Union.
Public opinion holds that, in the context of an increasingly complex global landscape marked by both traditional and non-traditional security threats, the EU’s announcement of a new Defence Strategy is hardly surprising. However, the international community hopes that any effort by a nation or organisation to strengthen their military capabilities must strictly adhere to international law. It must not involve the threat or use of force to pursue hegemonic political ambitions. The most important priority is to promote dialogue, build strategic trust, resolve disagreements through cooperation, and work together towards a peaceful, stable, and prosperous world.
DONG DUC - MINH DUC