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The emergence of a new strategic order in the Middle East

Recently, the political and security situation in the Middle East has become increasingly complex, leading to a significant change in the region’s strategic order. This transformation is not simply a return to “the old order” or “a unipolar system”, but rather a shift towards a new and more complex strategic order. Consequently, what causes this change and what the emerging order looks like have attracted growing attention from the international community.

The Middle East holds vast oil reserves and lies along critical maritime routes, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, giving it exceptional geostrategic importance.

According to researchers, any country or organisation capable of controlling this region would, in effect, control energy supplies and major transport routes. For decades, the Middle East has been one of the most volatile geopolitical regions in the world, deeply shaped by the interventions of major powers, most notably the United States, the former Soviet Union (now Russia), and several European powers. At the same time, this region has also been influenced by fierce power rivalries among regional countries such as Iran, Turkey, and Arab states, by factional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, and by struggles for influence among various Islamic factions and ethnic groups. Chief among these are the conflicts between Arab states and Israel, between Israel and Palestine, between Israel and Syria or Iran.

Israeli forces in Nablus city, West Bank (photo: VNA)

Historically, the strategic order of the Middle East was largely shaped by the military presence of external powers, especially the United States, which sought to maintain a balance of power among states, factions and political forces. In recent years, however, external influences combined with internal regional dynamics, most notably the US’s declining military presence in the region, the rise of other major powers, ethnic, sectarian and factional conflicts, along with pressure from non-traditional security challenges, have led to a reconfiguration of the regional strategic order. This transformation is not simply a return to “the old order” or “a unipolar system” dominated by the United States, but rather a transition towards a complex, multi-centred strategic order, characterised by local dynamics and cross-regional linkages.

The causes of the shift in the Middle East’s strategic order

According to international analysts, the transformation of the Middle East’s strategic order stems from multiple factors, which can generally be grouped into the following.

First, a crisis of commitment from the United States and other major powers. The inconsistency of some major powers, especially the United States, in their Middle East policies, such as abrupt troop withdrawals, failure to maintain a continuous military presence, or the redirection of strategic priorities towards other regions, has been one of the primary reasons for the erosion of the old strategic order. In fact, during various periods of time, Washington and several other major powers have shifted their strategic priorities and resources towards the Asia - Pacific region without maintaining the level of commitment to direct military operations in the Middle East. This has inadvertently created a “strategic vacuum”, providing a favourable condition for regional actors and other major powers to expand their influence. However, Washington still attempts to maintain a short-term involvement in the region instead of the dense military presence it once relied on. In other words, the White House only intervenes in the Middle East when its core interests in the region are under threat, without a widespread military presence. This new approach shows that the US aims to shape a regional order without direct, heavy-handed intervention, which operates flexibly through alliances and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, while enabling regional countries to “self-govern” and maintain mutual balance.

Second, the rise of major powers. According to international researchers, as the United States and several major powers have gradually reduced their commitments to the Middle East, the region has increasingly become a strategic crossroads of influence connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa through key transport routes, energy and gas networks, as well as emerging supply chains. The Middle East is now inseparable from the global strategic order and from the strategic competitive pressure exerted by major powers. While the US continues to maintain a degree of influence, Russia and China have notably expanded their presence, not only in Syria and Libya, but also through their growing involvement in infrastructure, energy, technology, economic and trade projects.

From the perspective of many analysts, under the “security and development” model, Beijing views the Middle East as a key area for advancing its “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Since the launch of BRI, China has invested over USD 120 billion in this region; between 2020 and 2021 alone, Chinese investment in Arab and Middle Eastern countries rose by about 360%, while construction activity increased by nearly 120%. Beyond being a top trade and investment partner, Beijing has also been deeply involved in other areas, most notably by mediating reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. China’s growing engagement has provided several Middle Eastern countries with alternative development capital and strategic balance beyond US influence.

Alongside China, Russia’s role and influence in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, remain significant. Although Russia is currently concentrating its resources on the “special military operation” in Ukraine and Syria’s political landscape is undergoing major shifts, a new axis of cooperation between Damascus and Moscow is forming, reflecting strategic calculations from the two sides. This relationship could become a key factor in reshaping the power dynamics of the Middle East amid regional volatility. International observers suggest that the growing influence of major powers in the region indicates that the new strategic order is not solely a matter for Middle Eastern countries, but rather a complex interplay of broader geopolitical axes.

Third, the demand for security autonomy among Middle Eastern countries. Amid internal crises and mounting non-traditional security challenges, countries across the Middle East have been compelled to seek a more sustainable security model through enhanced regional cooperation. Many states no longer wish to rely entirely on US security guarantees, but instead aim to develop their own defence capabilities and promote regional multilateral cooperation. This shift has led to a restructuring of intra-regional relations, and the formation of new alliances and blocs, and the so-called “central vortexes”. These new linkages are not traditional alliances grounded in ideology or ethnicity, but pragmatic partnerships shaped by strategic interests and the need to maintain a balance of power.

In the current context, several Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - UAE, are pursuing more independent policies. They sometimes engage in dialogue with Iran, and in some cases, take gradual steps towards rapprochement with Israel. Meanwhile, Turkey has been asserting itself as a central regional power through a series of notable foreign policy initiatives, particularly its balanced diplomacy between the United States, Europe, and Russia. Qatar - traditionally a mediator in numerous peace agreements - continues to serve as a “soft balancing” point among various forces and factions. Additionally, a noteworthy proposal involves connecting India with Israel and the UAE (with potential expansion to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia) to form a trans-regional economic-security bloc. This initiative, which complements the US role in the regional security architecture, seeks to share security responsibilities and strengthen collective defence capabilities against threats from armed groups and external instabilities.

The shaping of a new strategic order

According to international researchers, in the current context, no major power in the world possesses the dominant capability to reshape the strategic order in the Middle East. Instead, multiple centres of power will coexist and interact. Although the United States continues to play an important role in addressing certain regional issues, it can no longer maintain exclusive influence. Meanwhile, China and Russia continue to maintain a balanced presence, while other power centres in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, Israel, and their respective alliances, act flexibly depending on specific issues (energy, security, economy, technology). In addition, historical conflicts, ethnic and religious hostilities, divergent national interests, the absence of long-term strategic trust, and competition among emerging power axes all pose major challenges to efforts aimed at reshaping the regional order.

In reality, since the outbreak of the conflict between Palestine and Israel in October 2023, the situation has evolved beyond a fierce confrontation between Israel and Hamas. It has expanded into a wider conflict involving Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi armed group in Yemen, and Iran. This spiral of violence, together with differences in choosing foreign policies among countries in the region, has led to a restructuring of the regional balance of power and placed major powers in the Middle East in markedly different strategic positions. According to international researchers, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are currently in relatively favourable positions within the regional landscape, particularly in their roles as mediators in the Russia-Ukraine and Palestine - Israel conflicts, as well as in their strategic importance to the United States and the West. Meanwhile, Israel, despite its outstanding military and security advantages, has faced diplomatic difficulties, and Tel Aviv may face a situation of “tactical victory but strategic failure”. As for Iran, the situation is even more challenging, as researchers note that its “Axis of Resistance” has suffered losses, and its role and influence in the region have been significantly reduced, etc.

Since 2021, as  waves of reconciliation and development in the Middle East have continued to gain momentum, regional countries have increasingly emphasised their autonomy in choosing their own paths of development and formulating national development strategies. In terms of foreign policy, they do not side with any bloc but make diplomatic decisions based on their national interests. Arab countries have been pursuing diverse cooperation in political, economic, and security fields with the United States, Europe, China, Russia, India, and countries in the Global South. At the same time, they have remained steadfast in maintaining their own stances and solutions regarding regional issues, particularly the Palestine - Israel conflict. However, as coordination among major powers has weakened and international constraints have declined, Middle Eastern countries - while enhancing their strategic autonomy - have also begun to form new alliances and axes to safeguard national interests and maintain a balance of power in the region.

International researchers believe that a new strategic order in the Middle East is gradually taking shape, characterised by a complex and multi-centred structure that intertwines traditional power with non-traditional elements. Within this structure, major powers are expected to play the role of “mediators” rather than imposers, while regional countries will enjoy greater autonomy to balance and cooperate. The international community hopes that once this new strategic order is established, ending conflicts among states, peoples, and factions will become the top priority. Only in this way can peace and stability be achieved in the region, bringing prosperity and well-being to the people of the Middle East.

LAM PHUONG

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