Early in 1975, after the vigorous attacks and uprisings of the Tay Nguyen Campaign and the Hue – Da Nang liberation campaign, our army and people achieved great victories in both political and military affairs; destroyed and broke up a huge part of the enemy forces, and overturned their strategic defensive systems; completely liberating a large area and opening a context that was advantageous for us. When the historic opportunity came, on 14 April 1975, the Politburo decided to launch the Ho Chi Minh Campaign to completely liberate the South and reunify the country. Given the special importance of the Campaign, the Politburo sent 03 Politburo members to the South and established the Campaign Command (with General Van Tien Dung as the commander, and comrade Pham Hung as the Political Commissar) to directly direct and command the forces to join the combat.

Before the opening of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, our army and people had built a widespread and solid posture of people’s war. In terms of forces, we mobilised almost all units of combined forces and other units of Air Defence – Air Force, Navy, local forces, commandoes, militia and guerilla, armed security forces, etc. To gain the complete victory, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign Command used 04 corps (1, 2, 3, 4) and Army Corps 232 (which was equivalent to a corps), which were main forces having the capacity of great assault power, fast mobility and combat experience, to form 5 armed wings attacking in 5 directions, making quick thrusts and capturing major targets of the enemies in the inner parts of Sai Gon. With the “fast, bold, unexpected, sure to win” motto and the synergy of all forces combined with offensives and uprisings, etc., after 3 days of attacking, all main corps made the successful accomplishment of their tasks. At 11.30 on 30 April 1975, the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, which was the strategic battle of the  1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, won the complete victory, creating conditions for our army and people to liberate the remaining provinces in the Mekong River Delta, victoriously ending the resistance war against America for national salvation and reunification of the country.

The victory of Ho Chi Minh Campaign is a pinnacle of Vietnamese military art of people’s war, especially the art of using the combined forces in offensive operations and the organisation of strategic forces; the close combination between the regular war and guerilla war and the people’s uprising. It also confirms the pivotal roles of the main corps, which are considered as core forces and “iron fists” in conducting primarily military attacks and massively destroying the enemies, together with other forces creating an invincible strength to achieve a great victory in the cause of resistance war against America for national salvation.

Division 325 of Army Corps 12 conducts live-firing exercise (Photo; qdnd.vn)

Inheriting and bringing into play the lesson of organising, using and bringing into play the roles of the main corps in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, on implementing the Party’s guidelines, in recent years, the Central Military Commission (CMC), Ministry of National Defence has paid more attention to their leadership and direction on force adjustment in an “elite, compact, strong” way. The CMC has dissolved 4 corps, newly established Army Corps 12 and 34, which have been organised with larger scale and forces, assigned with heavier functions and duties, equipped with many types of modern weapons and equipment, and placed in newly strategic positions, creating a foundation to build the modernised Army meeting the requirements of reinforcing the national defence and safeguarding the Fatherland in the new situation. To make these corps deserve “iron fists”, highly-skilled and battle-hardened forces in the cause of Fatherland protection, it is necessary to make more investments and improve the overall quality and combat power with some solutions as follows:

Firstly, continuously building corps being highly-skilled in politics. In their construction, the Party Committees and Commands of all corps need to thoroughly grasp all resolutions and directives of the State and CMC on the military and defence tasks, building and safeguarding the Fatherland, especially the task of building the Army being strong in politics as “military affairs without politics are like trees without roots, which is useless and harmful”. They need to actively renovate and improve the quality and effectiveness of political-ideological education; enhance the learning and following of Ho Chi Minh’s thought, morality and style combined with implementing Resolution No. 847-NQ/QUTW by the CMC on promoting the qualities of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers”, and firmly preventing the individualism in the new situation; the Campaign on promoting traditions, devoting talents, deserving to be “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” in the new period; effectively maintain the Determined-to-win emulation movements, culminating and breaking emulation phases. Together, they need to attach importance and properly conduct the propaganda, timely orient soldiers’ thought of new and complex issues; well bring into play the roles of organisations and forces in struggling against and refuting any wrong and hostile viewpoints, enhancing the protection of ideological foundation of the Party within the Army.

Secondly, paying attention to building the regular, mobile and highly-qualified corps. All corps need to continuously grasp and effectively implement resolutions, directives and conclusions by the Politburo, CMC and Ministry of National Defence on building the Army being elite, compact, strong, towards modernity, focusing on well conducting three breakthroughs according to the Resolutions of the XI Military Party Congress. They intensely make research, general and synchronous solutions to solve complex and new problems, etc. in order to balance all components, forces and their capacity of accomplishing their tasks, making contribution to building elite, compact, strong corps towards modernity, deserving to regular, mobile and highly-qualified corps. These corps direct offices and units to follow the new organisation and payroll, give priority of personnel to units doing their duty of combat readiness and the ones in major areas; timely complete the combat plans and determination, make research to build and complement plans, define the timeline of adjusting the placement of forces and vehicles, making them suitable with the stationed positions of the corps and requirements of modern warfare.

These corps also need to make education and grasp for all cadres and soldiers to clearly realise the positions, roles and importance of the regular and mobile corps, then improve their awareness and responsibility for building such elite, compact, strong and high-quality corps; focus on building cadres at all levels who have a comprehensive competence, good morality, spirit of “7 dares”, and pioneering and exemplary behaviours. Together, these corps frequently take care of the soldiers’ material and spiritual life; build the solidarity among comrades, between the seniors and juniors; encourage all cadres and soldiers to proactively overcome difficulties and be determined to successfully accomplish all assigned tasks.

Leader of Army Corps 12 meets and encourages with troops participating in the live-firing exercise of 2024 (Photo: qdnd.vn)

Thirdly, improving the quality of training, military exercises and combat readiness. All corps need to make breakthroughs in improving the quality of training, military exercises and combat readiness; continue to grasp and effectively implement resolutions and directives by the seniors on the education and training. They also focus on the training preparation; appreciate the training, further training and bring into play cadres’ self-study and self-training, especially the ones directly doing the training, platoon commanders and section commanders. In training, the corps closely count on the functions and tasks of the Army, corps and the reality of each office and unit; closely combine the military training with political education and physical training, between training and transmission of combat experience and traditions of the corps to soldiers. They organise the training in a synchronous and professional way and close to the combat reality; closely follow the mottos, viewpoints, principles and combinations of training; focus on training for operations of combined forces; increase the night training, training on situations, in mobility and through fieldtrips, and training to use weapons and equipment; enhance the application of IT and simulation technology in training and exercises. Together, all corps pay attention to improving the quality of military exercises, especially the ones of combined forces, defence zones and the ones of protecting the sovereignty over seas and islands. They frequently maintain the order of combat readiness; firmly hold the security and political situations in the region, the world, internal and external borders, in the air, at sea and in cyberspace, then timely make effective solutions for any situations, avoiding the passiveness and unexpectedness.

Fourthly, synchronously making solutions for regularity building, discipline training; ensuring enough logistics and technical support to tasks. All corps need to grasp and seriously implement all directives, guidelines and regulations by the seniors on the obedience of law and discipline. They should strengthen solutions for managing and training soldiers, creating stable changes in the obedience of law and discipline; multiply the exemplary models of line-up training and regularity building; bring into play the responsibility of the party committees, commanders, political commissars and other unions for the discipline management; the exemplarity and self-consciousness of all soldiers in complying with the law and discipline; limit to the lowest rate of normal discipline violations, and avoid any serious ones.

Together, all corps should pay attention to the logistics and technical support to both regular and unexpected tasks in the way of enhancing the levels of devolution and decentralisation to offices and units; continue to effectively exploit all sources combined with completing the mechanism, methods and postures of logistics support, creating drastic changes in the logistics support to all tasks, especially the ones of training and combat readiness. Besides, they need to improve the quality and effectiveness of the technical work, timely providing enough weapons and technical equipment for forces and tasks; give priorities on providing new and modern weapons and equipment for newly established or reorganised units; continue to plan and build more logistics and technical bases to meet the requirements and tasks both in the short and long run.

Fifthly, closely coordinating with the local party committees and governments in the stationed areas. Bringing into play the roles as “an army ready for combat, an army ready for work and an army ready for production”, all corps need to intensely lead and direct offices and units to closely coordinate with the local party committees and governments to well implement the military and defence tasks; actively and proactively take part in building the strong local political bases. Together with the Police, Border Guard and local military commands, all corps maintain the political security, social order and safety, assuring the absolute safety for all party and state organs, military units, military and defence buildings in the stationed areas; regularly maintain the twinning activities with the localities; well conduct the propaganda, take part in the development of economy, culture and society, building the new rural areas; help the people eliminate hunger, alleviate poverty, prevent the natural disasters, do the search and rescue, etc., contributing to building the strong “people’s hearts and minds” posture and all-people national defence.

In the war to safeguard the Fatherland (if happens), we still need to conduct the people’s war with the armed forces of three categories as the core; combine the operations of defence zones and the ones by regular corps with the joint strength of modern services and arms. Therefore, the  lesson of organising, using and bringing into play the roles of regular and mobile corps in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign needs to be flexibly and creatively applied in the building of elite, compact, strong corps towards modernity, deserving to be regular and mobile forces of the Ministry of National Defence; a sharp tool to protect the Party, State and People, together with the entire army and people to firmly safeguard the Fatherland in the new situation.

Sr. Lt. Gen., Assoc. Prof., Dr TRAN VIET KHOA, Member of the Party Central Committee, Member of the Central Military Commission, Director of the National Defence Academy