Tuesday, September 25, 2018, 07:17 (GMT+7)
Building strong Vietnam Coast Guard politically in the new period

Our Party advocates making the revolutionary Army politically strong. This is a principle and basis for building the “compact, strong, highly professional” Vietnam Coast Guard and making it “revolutionary, regular, seasoned, modern”, contributing to its fulfilment of function and task of law enforcement in the sea.

As a force of the State in charge of protecting national sovereignty, managing security and order, and maintaining the observance of the law in Vietnam’s sea and continental shelf, over the past 20 years (1998-2018), in any circumstance, the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) has always accomplished its assigned tasks and built up the tradition of “bravery, hardship endurance, unity, and law observance”, thereby being given many noble awards by the State and the Ministry of National Defence (MND). Those achievements have been mainly attributed to the VCG’s Party Committee and High Command’s concentrated leadership and direction over the building of politically strong force via synchronous, focalized measures in accordance with reality.

The situation in the world and the region, particularly in the East Sea now witnesses complex, unpredictable developments. In addition to advantages, the VCG is confronted with difficulties and challenges. Hostile forces have been stepping up their “peaceful evolution” strategy via foxy artifices in order to “depoliticize” our Army and encourage “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” within the Army, make our troops diverge from the combat ideal, and undermine our troops’ faith in the Party and socialist regime. Moreover, negative aspects of the social life and market economy are continuously impacting on troops’ thought and sentiment. Against that backdrop, to fulfil the assigned task, party committees and commanders at all level within the whole Force should grasp and effectively conduct the work of building the strong VCG politically. This is a matter of principle and a task of both urgency and routine. To do so, focuses should be placed on the following measures.

First, enhancing the Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the VCG. This is a matter of principle during the process of building, fighting and maturing of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) in general, the VCG in particular. Thus, the VCG’s Party Committee and High Command should continue to grasp and well implement the Party’s guidelines, the State’s law and policy, directives and resolutions by the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the MND, particularly the 9th Politburo’s Resolution 51-NQ/TW, the CMC’s Resolution 513-NQ/ĐUQSTW on “continuing to complete the mechanism for the Party’s leadership and implement the regime of one commander in line with the regime of political commissar within the VPA”. At the same time, the VCG’s Party Committee and High Command should direct party committees to closely combine the Party building and rectification under the Resolution of the Party Central Committee’s 4th Plenum (12th tenure) with the implementation of the 12th Politburo’s Directive 05-CT/TW on “studying and following Ho Chi Minh’s thought, morality and lifestyle” and the Campaign “promoting tradition, devoting talent, deserving to be Uncle Ho’s soldiers” via specific, practical deeds. Focuses should be placed on maintaining the principle of democratic centralism, enhancing criticism and self-criticism, and strengthening party organizations’ leadership and combativeness. In the process, importance should be attached to building the internal unity, aligning the building of party committee members with that of key cadres, and the building of pure, strong party organizations with that of comprehensively strong units. Great value should be attached to encouraging the pioneering, exemplary role of party committee secretaries and unit commanders, enhancing inspection and supervision, strictly implementing the Grass-Roots Level Democratic Regulations, managing relations, particularly between commanders and commissars, aligning the “building” with the “fighting”, and resolutely fighting against the degradation in political ideology, morality and lifestyle as well as the signs of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” from within.

Second, actively renewing and improving the quality of political education and ideological orientation for troops. In any circumstance, the VCG’s cadres and troops have been always fully aware of revolutionary ideal and the goal of national independence and socialism, absolutely loyal to the Party, Homeland, people and socialism; possessed pure morality; kept the faith in the Party’s leadership and maintained a close-knit relationship with the people; and stood firm in the face of temptation during operations, and been ready to fight for national independence, sovereignty and peace in the Homeland’s seas and islands. Thus, the VCG’s Party Committee and High Command should direct units to conduct the work of political education to equip cadres and troops with basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s thought, the Party’s guidelines, and the State’s law and policies, especially the Strategy to defend the Homeland in the new situation, the Vietnam Marine Strategy as well as the issues related to the Force’s law enforcement, the military, defence, Homeland protection tasks, and the building of “compact, elite, highly professional” VCG. At the same time, units should enhance education on patriotism, national pride, and revolutionary tradition of the Party, the country, “Uncle Ho’s soldiers” and units. To do so, all-level party committees and commanders should actively renew the contents, programs, forms and methods of political education and ideological orientation to make it relevant to reality, particularly sensitive issues, while combining political education with the discipline management, regularity building and promotion of organizations, forces and units’ system of cultural institutions. Units should also well carry out the work of ideological orientation, management and settlement, grasp cadres and troops’ thought, aspirations and families’ circumstance to take measures to opportunely encourage them. As a result, each cadre and soldier have been fully aware of the situation and task, distinguished between “partners” and “opponents”, maintained revolutionary vigilance, and accomplished their assigned task.

Third, promoting the effectiveness of Party and political work. Party committees at all levels should effectively conduct the works of ideology, organization, personnel, internal political protection, mass mobilization and policy; heighten democracy and discipline; and preserve the internal unity. Moreover, party committees should grasp and strictly implement higher echelons’ resolutions and directives, particularly the Resolution  of the Party Central Committee’s 7th Plenum (12th tenure) on “building the contingent of cadres at all levels, particularly at strategic level, with sufficient qualities, capabilities and prestige on a par with their assigned mission”, the CMC’s Resolution on “building a contingent of military cadres in the 2013-2020 period and beyond” to build the VCG’s contingent of cadres both qualitatively and quantitatively. Importance should be attached to enhancing the effectiveness of Party and political work in performing the tasks, such as training and combat readiness to protect sea and island sovereignty, natural disaster prevention and control, search and rescue, patrol and control, law enforcement in the sea, defence diplomacy, and joint patrol. Contents and forms of mass mobilization should be renewed to be relevant to each area while the model “the coast guard accompany fisher-people” should be multiplied with the participation of local party committees, authorities and organizations. The work of legal propagation, dissemination and education for fisher and coastal people should be well carried out. Besides, due regard should be paid to building strong political offices and cadres comprehensively, particularly their political zeal and capabilities in giving advice, direction and implementation.

Fourth, enhancing the work of internal political protection, actively fighting against wrong, hostile viewpoints, and defending the Party’s ideological basis within the Force. Grasping and strictly implementing the regulations on internal political protection, particularly the 10th Politburo’s Regulations on “some issues on the Party’s internal political protection” and the CMC’s Directive on “enhancing internal political protection within the Military”, party committees and commanders within the Force should take measures to proactively prevent internal information leakage, especially secret information leakage as well as social evils from penetrating into units. At the same time, consideration should be given to fighting against wrong, hostile viewpoints, particularly the plots to encourage “Military depoliticization” and “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” within the Military. This is an “unarmed” struggle that happens regularly and seriously in the ideological and theoretical fields. Thus, party committees and commanders at all levels should pay special attention to this work via comprehensive, synchronous, focalized measures. Significance should be attached to exercising democracy, improving troops’ material and mental life, promoting the role of organizations and forces, particularly cadres, party members, experts, political cadres, and the force 47 in combating hostile plots and artifices in order to maintain the Party’s ideological ground within the units.

Fifth, actively studying the theory about and reviewing the practice of building strong VCG politically. The process of building strong VCG politically has given us valuable lessons which should be developed in the current situation. This is an important task which necessitates units, particularly research offices and schools actively developing plans and helping party committees and commanders at all levels give advice to higher echelons and identify measures to improve the effectiveness of building strong VCG politically. During the course of implementation, it is essential to clarify achievements, weaknesses and causes, propose measures, and multiply good, creative models and approaches for the sake of the enhanced effectiveness of building strong VCG politically.

Successfully implementing the above-mentioned measures will directly contribute to making the VCG politically strong, absolutely loyal to the Party, State, Army and people, and ready to undertake and accomplish the task in every situation.

Maj. Gen. Doan Bao Quyet, Deputy Commissar of the VCG

Your Comment (0)

Military to stay active and proactive in international integration and defence diplomacy in the new context
Thoroughly grasping and implementing the Party’s foreign policy, in recent years, The Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence have attached importance to the active and synchronised implementation of international integration and defence diplomacy. Thanks to innovations and creativity, comprehensive results have been yielded on both bilateral and multilateral fronts, contributing to consolidating and developing Vietnam’s relations with other nations and international organisations.