The amphibious campaign in Bokor* is a remarkable feat of arms by the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) and a potent symbol of the combat solidarity between the militaries and peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia. The campaign’s victory contributed to defending national border, sea, and island sovereignty in the Southwest of Vietnam and reinforcing the advantage and strength for the Vietnamese Volunteer Army in cooperation with the Cambodian revolutionary armed forces and people to liberate Cambodia – land of temples- from the genocide.

Vice Admiral Pham Hoai Nam addresses the Ceremony to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Bokor amphibious campaign in Kien Giang province on December 24 (Photo: VNA)

After 1975, the Khmer Rouge exposed their hostility and brutality towards both Cambodian people and other countries. Since June 1978, they had stepped up a war of encroachment and changed it into a war of aggression with the participation of many divisions along the whole Southwestern border of Vietnam, massacring thousands of Vietnamese civilians, burning and destroying our people’s numerous villages and peaceful life. To safeguard the Homeland’s sacred sovereignty and respond to the fervent call by the Cambodian United Front for National Salvation for international assistance, in late December 1978, we launched counter-attacks in the Southwestern border against the Khmer Rouge’s war of aggression and assisted the Cambodian people in overthrowing the brutal dictatorship of Pol Pot – Ieng Sary and liberating this country from the genocide.

On December 22^nd 1978, the VPN was assigned to be in charge of an important operational direction. Focuses of its mission were to land on Bokor beach, annihilate and contain the enemy’s coastal defence force, protect the flanks, cooperate with the ground force in conducting operations along the coast, and take charge of attacking and controlling the port of Kompong Som (also known as Sihanoukville) and the naval base of Ream as well as separating the Southeast of Cambodia.

The landing zone of Bokor is about 300m long, located at the base of Bokor mountain in the province of Kampot, Cambodia, in the north of Vietnam’s Phu Quoc island, 20km far from Kampot town to the East, 90km far from the port of Kompong Som to the West. Its terrain and hydrological condition were unfavourable for the landing. In this area, the enemy forces included the Naval Division 164, the Border Guard Regiment 17, units of the special region of Kompong Song and the province of Koh Kong with a total of over 5,000 troops and 172 vessels of various types. The VPN’s forces in the campaign consisted of the Brigade 127 and the Brigade 101 (Naval Zone 5), the Marine Brigade 126, the Brigade 125, the Fleet 171, and a force from the Naval Zone 4 including 16 battalions (infantry, marine, commando, firepower, armour) and 160 vessels of different types. Moreover, the forces for combat coordination included the Regiment 962 under the Military Region 9, the ground force of the Army Corps 2, and aircraft of the Air Defence – Air Force.

After undertaking the mission, the Navy quickly made preparations. Until January 5^th 1979, our forces participating in the campaign assembled in the area of Phu Quoc, Nam Du and An Thoi islands in readiness for combat. According to the plan, on the nights of January 4^th and 5^th, commando sections of the Brigade 126 secretly intruded into the landing zone and established a beachhead. On the night of January 6^th, our landing on Bokor beach officially commenced. As we maintained the secrecy, our landing was basically successful; only a section of technical equipment was in difficulty, behind the schedule, and had adjustments. In collaboration with the landing direction from Bokor, the Naval Zone 5’s artillery force from Phu Quoc and Hon Doc islands effectively suppressed the enemy’s firepower battlefields on land and islands in the area, thereby preventing the enemy from supporting Bokor. Also on the night of January 6^th and in the early morning of January 7^th, squadrons of the Brigade 127 and the Fleet 171 severely fought the enemy’s groups of warships, sinking and burning many of their ships, repelling their counter-attacks, organizing many blocking positions and patrols to protect the two flanks of our landing formation. To disperse the enemy’s forces, the Navy employed a number of ships as a diversion in the area of Kompong Som and then manoeuvred the artillery force into the naval base of Ream in order to facilitate our forces’ landing and attack. In spite of elaborate preparation, we had not forecast the issues arising from reality. As the enemy’s resistance had been strong, and the ground force of the Army Corps 2 had come late, our landing force had to fight independently and suffered losses. On January 7^th, the Navy used the reserve force (2 battalions under the Brigade 101) to continue landing on Bokor. With the support of armour and tanks, this force cooperated with units of the Brigade 126, the ground force of the Army Corps 2, and our Friend’s force in launching raids to destroy the outer targets and attack to control Kompong Som and Ream naval base on January 10^th. Despite losses, the campaign was successful. We defeated the Naval Division 164, the Border Guard Regiment 17, and the coastal defence force of the enemy, annihilating and capturing over 2,900 enemy troops, sinking, burning and destroying nearly 70 enemy ships, thus basically destroying the enemy’s naval force, completely liberating the sea, island, coastal area of Southeastern Cambodia from Bokor to Ream naval base and Western Kompong Som (which was nearly 100km long and 30-40km deep).

The victory of the campaign is of significance to the war for the Southwestern border defence and the international mission in Cambodia, giving us valuable lessons on combat organization and preparation, and operation at sea. That victory as a result of the flexible application of the Party’s viewpoints on the people’s warfare expresses the faithful, pure international solidarity between the Vietnamese People’s Army and people and the Cambodian revolutionary armed forces. That was the first time the VPN had deployed a large force to conduct campaign-level joint operations at sea and on islands and land far from the rear and under the complex conditions. In early 1979, while our Navy’s experience and capability in amphibious warfare as well as its materiel and means of landing were very limited, it required efforts and strong determination to launch the amphibious campaign in Bokor. Liberating the whole sea, islands and coast which held a position of strategic importance in Southwestern Cambodia, the campaign contributed to changing the complexion of the war, creating a favourable condition for the Vietnamese Volunteer Army and Cambodian revolutionary armed forces’ operations on land and at sea to completely liberate Cambodia.

40 years have elapsed, but historical values and lessons drawn from the amphibious campaign in Bokor remain valid and should be studied, developed and applied to the new conditions of the people’s warfare to defend the Homeland, to campaigns of all types at sea, especially amphibious campaigns. At present, the situation in the world and the region, especially in the East Sea has complex, unpredictable developments; the Navy’s task is very onerous. To well fulfil its function as the core fore in managing and protecting the Homeland’s sea and island sovereignty, the Navy has been adopting synchronous measures to improve the synergy and combat strength as well as to apply and develop lessons drawn from the amphibious campaign in Bokor 40 years ago.

The campaign’s victory in hard condition proves the courage, sacrifice, and strong determination of our previous generations. Promoting that tradition, the Navy should attach great value to the work of political and ideological education to build up its troops’ political will, combat morale, and faith in victory to readily sacrifice for the Homeland’s sacred sovereignty over seas and islands. In addition to building the politico-spiritual foundation, the Navy should grasp the Party’s military-defence guidelines, further study and review reality, and complete the system of theories about the naval military arts in accord with the situation, the task requirements, the developments of its organizational structure and force, and the modernization of its weapons and equipment. Consideration should be given to studying and applying invaluable lessons from the Bokor amphibious campaign and recent wars worldwide, grasping changes in other countries’ organizational structure, materiel and means of landing, proactively making forecasts about hostile schemes, artifices, and possible scenarios at seas and on islands as the basis for developing, supplementing and completing projects for amphibious warfare and the ones against the enemy’s amphibious warfare, avoiding falling into passivity. Notably, the Navy should attach importance to building the force and naval posture at sea and on islands. Due regard should be paid to building the Naval Marine Force and landing craft units, making this force really “compact, strong, mobile, flexible, synchronous, specialized” and expert in conducting amphibious warfare, fighting the enemy’s amphibious warfare, and defending our islands and bases. At the same time, it is necessary to direct naval units and clusters of naval units to renew and raise the quality of training and exercises under the motto of “basics, practicality, and thorough grasp” as well as to make training and exercises relevant to the task, object of struggle, battlefield, organizational structure and materiel. It is important to increase training on combat coordination between the naval marine force, island defence force and other forces as well as between the on-the-spot defence force and the mobile force; to step up nighttime training and field training at sea to improve commanders and office’ capability in command and coordination as well as troops’ skills, tactics, and resilience. The losses we suffered in the Bokor amphibious campaign was attributed to the fact we had not well carried out the work of grasping the enemy’s situation and the terrain as well as the work of navigational support. Learning from that lesson, the Navy should order its affiliates to proactively formulate projects for operational support and logistics-technical support right in peacetime in accordance with the particularities of each sea and island area. Moreover, the pure, faithful international solidarity in the war for the Southwestern border defence and in the Bokor amphibious campaign should be promoted and flexibly applied to defence diplomacy and naval diplomacy as the basis for creating the synergy and building a revolutionary, regular, elite, modern Navy, safeguarding the Homeland’s sea and island sovereignty and territorial integrity at sea.

Vice Admiral Pham Hoai Nam, Member of the Party Central Committee, Commander of the Navy

* The campaign took place from 6^th to 10^th of January, 1979 in the area of Bokor (also known as Ta Lon), Kampot province, Cambodia