After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the confrontation between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been escalating, leading to increased tensions in several strategically important military regions, including the Suwalki Gap. So why Suwalki is considered the “weak link” of this military alliance and what is the current state of strategic competition over the Suwalki Gap in the international geopolitical landscape ?
The “weak link” of NATO
Suwalki, or the Suwalki corridor, is a strip of land named after the town of Suwalki in Poland. It stretches for about 60 kilometres and is nearly 115 kilometres wide, running along the border between Poland and Lithuania. Its western end is blocked by Kaliningrad, which belongs to Russia, and its eastern end borders Belarus, a traditional ally of Russia. After World War II, this area was a peaceful region with little strategic significance and not much attention from many nations. At that time, Lithuania, which shares its northern border with Suwalki and Kaliningrad, was part of the Soviet Union, while Poland, located to the south of Suwalki and Kaliningrad, was an ally of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, issues related to Suwalki began to surface, especially as several former Soviet republics, including Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, along with Poland, left the “orbit” of Russia, the country that inherited the remnants of the Soviet Union’s legacy, to join the European Union (EU) and NATO. At this point, Suwalki became the only land connecting Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the rest of the EU, while Kaliningrad became Russian territory nestled between Western countries.
NATO’s concerns regarding the Suwalki Gap have been increasing since the 2014 Ukrainian coup and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea peninsula. In 2022, when Russia launched the “special military operation” in Ukraine, relations between Russia and NATO became increasingly tense. The confrontation between the two sides in the Suwalki region became more evident, especially as Lithuania and Poland became NATO members and provided support to Ukraine. According to military experts, Suwalki is considered the “Achilles’ heel” in NATO’s eastern defence system because it is in a “vulnerable, difficult-to-defend” position. If conflict were to arise between Russia and NATO, Russia could easily control this corridor through a pincer attack, with one thrust from the northwest (Kaliningrad) and another from the southeast (Belarus, a Russian ally). In such a scenario, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would be encircled and isolated.
While the Suwalki Gap is often referred to as the “weak link” of NATO, Kaliningrad is regarded as Russia’s formidable outpost in the West. Besides serving as the “main base” of the Baltic Fleet, Kaliningrad is an ideal location for deploying the Iskander-M ballistic missile system, which has a range capable of reaching Warsaw (Poland), Budapest (Hungary), Prague (Czech Republic), and even Vienna (Austria). Additionally, Russia’s advanced air defence system in Kaliningrad, combined with the air defence system near St. Petersburg and the missile defence system in Belarus, could effectively control the entire airspace over Suwalki, providing support to ground forces if Russia aims to establish a land connection from Belarus through Suwalki to the Baltic Sea. In other words, from the Western perspective, the Suwalki Gap is considered a critical chokepoint. If Russia or Belarus were to gain strategic control over this area or simply disrupt the transportation routes in Suwalki, NATO would be unable to send reinforcements to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by land, forcing them to rely on aerial and maritime operations. However, timely and comprehensive aerial and maritime support for the three Baltic member states would be challenging.
At present, the likelihood of Russia launching an attack on the Suwalki Gap is very low. If such an action were to occur, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty on collective defence would be triggered, potentially expanding the conflict to multiple European countries. Nevertheless, both sides continue to bolster their forces and enhance deterrent activities in the increasingly tense region squeezed between Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Lithuania.
The dangerous race
In the context of escalating tensions, to protect the alliance’s Eastern flank, NATO has taken measures to improve defence capabilities in the Baltic states. In 2017, the alliance established four multinational battalion-sized battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, NATO continued to create four additional battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Simultaneously, it doubled the number of ground troops and expanded its military presence along the eastern borders of the alliance, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. These four battlegroups operate directly under NATO command through the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland. Among them, the largest contingent in the Baltic region is stationed in Latvia, led by Canada, with approximately 1,840 soldiers. In Estonia, the United Kingdom commands a battlegroup of around 800 British soldiers and about 300 French and Danish troops. In Lithuania, a battlegroup of approximately 1,800 soldiers from various countries, including Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Norway, is led by Germany. Additionally, Germany has decided to establish a permanent military presence of around 4,000 soldiers in Lithuania and is currently developing the necessary infrastructure to support this force. In recent times, Spain has also deployed the modern NASAMS anti-aircraft missile system with a range of up to 120 kilometres, along with eight Eurofighter combat aircraft, at the Amari Air Base in Estonia, as part of its commitment to NATO in the Baltic region. According to the Spanish Ministry of Defence, these combat aircraft, together with NATO forces, will participate in air patrols over the airspace of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
Some NATO officials have stated that the alliance’s forces in the Baltic region will play a role as a “speed bump” to slow down external attacks and provide a warning to the remaining members. In the event of conflict, the spearhead forces (around 13,000 troops) would be mobilised and ready for deployment within 48 hours, paving the way for special forces (around 27,000 troops) to engage 30 days later. Along the border with Belarus, Poland has planned to reinforce approximately 10,000 soldiers, including 4,000 from special military units, and nearly 1,000 troops from an engineering battalion deployed to the Suwalki Gap. Many military experts believe that Belarus being an ally of Russia makes Poland cautious, especially as President Alexander Lukashenko’s government has accepted about 8,000 mercenaries from the Wagner military group.
It should be noted that NATO’s reinforcement of defence capabilities in the Baltic countries serves not only to protect the alliance’s eastern borders but also as a strategy to neutralise and isolate Russia’s military fortress in Kaliningrad, thereby enhancing the security of the Suwalki Gap. Regarding this issue, Bernd Schutt, chief of Germany’s Joint Forces Command also acknowledges the high risk of military escalation with Russia in the NATO’s Northeastern flank. The Suwalki Gap will be one of the new hotspots, and in this region, armies can move relatively swiftly, followed by a ground offensive. Therefore, establishing a reliable deterrent system in Suwalki is of paramount importance. Apart from increasing military presence in the countries, NATO has conducted large-scale naval exercises in the Baltic Sea, simulating scenarios of repelling a Russian attack on European countries and the Suwalki Gap. According to Russian military experts, NATO aspires to turn the Baltic Sea into a “home pond,” and to achieve this goal, the US-led military alliance is considering the “militarisation” of large islands in the Baltic Sea, such as the Åland Islands (Finland), Gotland Island (Sweden), and Bornholm Island (Denmark), to create a closed circle that surrounds Kaliningrad.
In response to NATO’s military activities in the Baltic region, Russia has also taken several measures to strengthen Kaliningrad. Together with the deployment of Iskander-M missile system, Russia also sent K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) missiles (with a range of 300 kilometres) and SPU-35V "Redut" (SSC-1 Sepal) missiles (with a range of 450 kilometres) there. The number of troops stationed in Kaliningrad has been increased to 18,000, in the formation of the 11th Army Corps. Furthermore, Russia has deployed Su-30SM, Su-24, and Su-27 aircraft to its air force units in Kaliningrad and increased the number of surface warships in the Baltic Fleet to 52, including 4 Steregushchiy-class corvettes equipped with cruise missiles, 2 Buyan-class corvettes armed with Kalibr land-attack missiles, and 1 Kilo-class submarine, among others. Particularly, in December 2023, Russia declared the establishment of the Kaliningrad Military District and deployed additional units to the region. According to many military experts, the military equipment enhancements help Kaliningrad become a robust outpost following the A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) model, with the goal of keeping NATO at a distance from the Baltic region.
In addition to fortifying Kaliningrad as an impregnable fortress, Russia has also conducted military exercises in the Baltic Sea region. Notably, the “Ocean Shield 2023” exercise aimed to assess the combat readiness of naval forces in protecting national interests in this crucial area and evaluate the interaction of command levels in managing and controlling the forces responsible for coastal defence in sea transportation of troops and military goods. Alongside Russia, Belarus has also increased its military activities and participated in exercises as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In the context of deteriorating relations with Poland and Lithuania, Belarus has conducted exercises near the Suwalki Gap in the Grodno region, enhanced training for unmanned aerial vehicles, and improved coordination between tank and motorised rifle units with other units in the armed forces.
More than three decades have passed since the end of the Cold War, and now Europe is facing the risk of a new war - the confrontation between NATO and Russia. From a state of maintained dialogue through the Agreement on Support, Cooperation and Security (signed in 1997), Russia’s relationship with NATO has now returned to rivalry, with retaliation against each other in many areas. In the context of the conflict in Ukraine not ending, the war between Israel - Hamas broke out and tensions increased in the Baltic region, causing Europe to enter a new Cold War, giving rise to an arms race. This is a scenario that no country wants as it brings Russia’s relationship with NATO to a dead end. At the same time, it creates dangerous scenarios for global security. International public opinion holds that parties should reduce tensions and resolve disagreements through dialogue for a world of peace, stability, and prosperous development.
LAM PHUONG - VU TRANG