In the early years of the resistance war against the US for national salvation, Ba Gia Campaign was described as a typical campaign on the battlefield of Military Region 5. Victory of the Campaign is a combination of various elements; however, the most noticeable one is the art of launching key and decisive battle.

By 1965, the situation on the South battlefield had been changed in our favour. In spite of great strength and modern weapons and means of war supplied by the US, severe defeats in Binh Gia and Dong Xoai made the Saigon puppet army expose its weaknesses when it had to face our “iron fists”. Therefore, when its “Special War” strategy within Military Region 5 was on the verge of collapse, the US decided to deploy 3^rd Marine Division to Da Nang and establish Chu Lai military base in a bid to create a foothold for the Saigon puppet army to resist our offensives. With tremendous support and assistance from the US, the Saigon puppet army deployed its forces and means into a strong military posture in North Quang Ngai so as to maintain the system of “strategic hamlets”, stations, posts, subzones, district capitals, and key transport routes.

A soldier from Regiment 1, Military Region 5 during 1965 Ba Gia Campaign (file photo)

To defeat the enemy’s “Special War” strategy, our Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission directed Military Region 5’s Party Committee and Command to launch 1965 Spring - Summer offensive operations in the Central Highlands, Binh Dinh, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai. Realising the Party’s resolve, Military Region 5’s Command decided to launch Ba Gia Campaign in North Quang Ngai in order to annihilate a significant section of enemy troops, disintegrate the enemy’s paramilitary forces, expand the liberated zone in Son Tinh - Tra Bong, provide support for our political movement, and maintain the corridor connecting the mountainous area with the plain area within the South Central Coast. With great combat resolve and unique military art, the Campaign Command directed forces to conduct intense, continuous battles, including a key and decisive battle in Phuoc Loc and Chop Non hill, quickly winning victory. During the key and decisive battle, our main forces (Regiment 1 of Military Region 5) destroyed a highly skilled puppet battlegroup (including 1 strategic reserve battalion). Victory of the Campaign marked a robust development of Military Region 5’s armed forces and our Military’s offensive campaign art in the initial phase of the resistance war against the US for national salvation; in this regard, the art of conducting key and decisive battle is manifested as follows.

First, correctly selecting the theatre and targets of the key and decisive battle. Based on situational researches, assessments, and conclusions, we selected Route 623, from Son Tinh to Ba Gia, as theatre of combat for the key and decisive battle, with puppet mobile battlegroup for reinforcement and rescue as our main target. That was an absolutely correct selection reflecting the Campaign Command’s vision, creativity, and acumen. As an area of strategic importance, the theatre of the battle was located nearly 10 km far from Quang Ngai town and about 20 km far from the enemy’s Chu Lai base (where 4 US marine battalions were stationed); if the area is under our attack, the enemy could not “stand idly by” and they would definitely deploy reinforcements and immediately carry out “search and destroy” operations to “showcase their strength”. The area also provided a favourable condition for us to realise the motto of “conducting manoeuvrable warfare and attacking enemy forces outside fortifications as the main method, destroying enemy battalions one by one, and ensuring victory in every engagement”, thereby allowing us to gain and maintain the initiative and strong combat performance. As the area was adjacent to the enemy’s major strongholds, a victory for us here would be like “throwing cold water” on US - puppet forces’ efforts and would help encourage the troops and people of Military Region 5 to rise up to destroy the system of “strategic hamlets” and expand liberated zones.

Besides, in case we besiege Ba Gia and control the airspace, the 51^st Regiment - the puppet army’s elite force, and armoured squadron M113 in Quang Ngai would have to move their forces through Phuoc Loc area and Chop Non hill as the only way of reinforcement and rescue. That was an isolated route with many small bridges and streams and especially Tra Khuc river in the South as natural barriers; if we destroy the route, the enemy’s formation would be easily divided into small clusters, leading to difficulties in reinforcement and rescue efforts. Besides, the two sides of the route had many low hills, which provided a favourable condition for us to deploy troops and firepower, set up a formidable offensive battle formation, besiege and destroy every enemy battalion, and reduce casualties against their attacks.

Realities of the Campaign revealed that thanks to correct selection of the theatre and targets of the key and decisive battle, when we encircled Ba Gia post and attacked its surrounding targets, the Saigon puppet army immediately deployed a strong force for reinforcement and rescue along the route from Son Tinh to Ba Gia, quickly falling into the trap we had set. With strong determination to fight and well-prepared battle formation, our Regiment 1 encircled, isolated, and eliminated the 2^nd Battalion of the 51^st Regiment in Phuoc Loc village, alongside the 3^rd marine battalion in Ma To area and Height 47, and the 39^th ranger battalion in Chop Non hill, successfully accomplishing the key and decisive battle of the Campaign.

Ba Gia Victory Monument in Tron mountain (photo: Quang Ngai Provincial Youth Union)

Second, establishing a formidable battle formation for the key and decisive battle of the Campaign. To set up a formidable battle formation for certain victory of the key and decisive battle of the Campaign, the Campaign Command deployed attacking forces in various directions to disperse and pin down each enemy section as well as to encircle and isolate enemy forces in charge of reinforcement and rescue. In the secondary direction, we employed local Regiment 83 of Quang Ngai province to attack the subzones and district capitals of Nghia Hanh and Tu Nghia, divert and pin down enemy forces, and create a favourable condition for our local armed forces to destroy enemy control. In the East of Route 1, we deployed local Battalion 48 of Quang Ngai province to prevent enemy manoeuvre from Binh Son to Ba Gia and Phuoc Loc. In the primary direction, our Regiment 1 deployed Battalions 40, 60, and 45 to Southeast Khi mountain, Nhan mountain, Vinh Loc, and the South of Chop Non hill in readiness to carry out the key and decisive battle for annihilating enemy troops in Phuoc Loc and Chop Non hill. Besides, Regiment 1 deployed artillery and air defence firepower near Ba Gia post to prevent the enemy from airborne reinforcement and rescue and suppress enemy firepower at Ba Gia post in support of their main forces under our siege. With the formidable and inter-connected battle formation, we removed the possibility of enemy airborne landing, creating a favourable condition for the key and decisive battle in the selected theatre.

In order to force the enemy’s 51^st Regiment to fall into our pre-established posture, it was necessary for us to conduct “luring” attacks in an accurate and effective manner. To that end, the Campaign Command closely followed the motto of “striking minor reinforcements to draw out main enemy forces”, employing Company 2 (Battalion 90, Regiment 1) to carry out a luring attack on the enemy’s company during their field march towards Dien Nien, thereby forcing the 1^st Battalion of the 51^st Regiment from Ba Gia post to manoeuvre for rescue, and then they were completely destroyed by our forces in Tron mountain. The defeat in Dien Nien put Ba Gia post into a serious danger; the enemy had to deploy powerful forces, including 37^th and 39^th ranger battalions (mobile forces of Tactical Zone 1), 2^nd infantry battalion (51^st Regiment), and armoured battalion M113, into a battlegroup for rescue and reinforcement. Thanks to the establishment of a formidable battle formation and the art of conducting “luring” attacks to “draw out main enemy forces”, the Saigon puppet army quickly fell into our “trap”; their formation was isolated and divided into small groups and unable to respond to our Regiment 1’s attacking strength; as a result, the key and decisive battle of the Campaign in Phuoc Loc and Chop Non hill rapidly achieved complete victory.

Third, commanding the battle in a resolute, flexible way. To command our forces from various attacking directions to act in compliance with a uniform intention and to ensure certain victory of the key and decisive battle, the Campaign Command organised specialised commanding boards for the primary and secondary operational directions, namely North Tra Khuc river and South Tra Khuc river. That was a proper approach allowing us to maintain close, timely leadership and command and provide sufficient support for combat, particularly when the Campaign Headquarters was not located near the operational theatre. Besides, the Campaign Command assigned Regiment 1 to coordinate and directly command other forces involved in the Campaign under a pre-set plan, thus ensuring smoothness between operational tasks and phases, concentrating every effort on winning victory of the key and decisive battle. Thanks to that approach, Regiment 1 was capable of commanding main, local, and guerrilla forces to deal with situations, bringing into play each force’s forte, thwarting every combat method of the enemy, and completely destroying enemy forces in Phuoc Loc and Chop Non hill.

Adhering to combat realities, the Campaign Command directed its units to focus on destroying enemy reinforcement and rescue forces. Realising that surprise element was no longer existent, the Campaign Command directed its units to make force adjustments, transform the battle formation into manoeuvrable offensive operations to annihilate enemy forces in North Phuoc Loc village, Height 47, and Ma To hill, and transform from daytime manoeuvrable attacks into night-time raids to completely eliminate enemy troops. The reason was that the enemy had superiority in terms of air attack during daytime.

Victory of Ba Gia Campaign gave considerable encouragements to our Military and people on the South battlefield, contributing to completely defeating the US “Special War” strategy. The Campaign provides us with many lessons on campaign-level warfare art, including the art of conducting key and decisive battle, which should continue to be studied and creatively applied in a war for Fatherland protection.

Col. VU VAN HUNG, PhD

Infantry Officer College No.1