The ideological - cultural work within the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) is part of the Party’s ideological work and a basic component of the party and political work, aimed at maintaining the Party’s leadership over the Military and building a politically strong VPA. Over the past 75 years, thoroughly grasping the Party’s guidelines, under the leadership by the Central Military Commission ( CMC) and the Ministry of National Defence, particularly the General Political Department (GPD), all-level party committees, commissars, commanders, and political offices have focused their leadership and direction on carrying out the ideological - cultural work via various synchronous measures. In the process, especially during the performance of new, difficult, complex tasks, the Military’s ideological - cultural work has always stayed one step ahead and played a vanguard role in orientating troops’ awareness and action, while helping opportunely deal with new ideological issues and resolutely fight against wrong viewpoints and ideological deviations, acting as a sharp weapon, combining with other spheres of the party and political work to become the “soul and blood vessel” of our Military, and contributing to defending the Party’s ideological foundation within the VPA. Offices and cadres in charge of the propaganda and training work at all levels have always preserved and promoted the virtues of “Uncle Ho’s soldiers” to build up their tradition of “steadfastness, proactiveness, flexibility, creativity, unity, and determination of win.”

However, a part from good results, several key cadres within offices and units, particularly at grass-roots level have yet to be fully aware of the importance of the ideological - cultural work. There have been several weaknesses in grasping, managing and anticipating troops’ ideological situation and social relationship, leading to violations of the Military’s discipline, negatively impacting on the image of “Uncle Ho’s soldiers.” The provision of information on complex, sensitive events and issues for troops and the people within some units has yet to be really proactive.

A conference by the Expert Group to give advice to the Central Military Commission on the studying and following of Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, ethics and lifestyle

Currently, the hostile forces and political opportunists are enhancing their sabotage strategy against our revolution, particularly in the ideological - cultural field. More seriously, they demand to “depoliticise” our VPA, promote “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” within our Military, and undermine the Military’s prestige and the virtues of “Uncle Ho’s soldiers.” Things mentioned above impose more demanding requirements on the Party’s ideological - cultural work in general, that work within the Military in particular. According to the Resolution of the 13^th National Party Congress, it is necessary to “continue drastically renewing the contents and methods of the ideological work in a proactive, practical, timely, effective manner, grasp, correctly anticipate, and opportunely handle ideological issues within the Party and the society as well as orientate public opinions to ensure consensus within the Party and the society.” To that end, offices and units of the VPA should focus on several basic measures as follows.

First, continue to promote the responsibility of party committees, party organisations, commissars, commanders, and political offices at all levels for the ideological - cultural work. All-level party committees, party organisations, commissars, commanders and political offices should be acutely aware of the importance of the ideological - cultural work and focus their leadership and direction on carrying out this work. Emphasis should be placed on achieving a consensus on the policy to build a revolutionary, regular, elite, gradually modern VPA, with several services, corps, and forces moving straight to modernity. Cadres and soldiers within the Military must be fully aware that by 2025, basically, we shall finish building a compact, strong VPA as the prerequisite for making the Military revolutionary, regular, seasoned, and modern from 2030. Due attention should be paid to grasping offices and units’ political task and all-level party organisations’ resolutions to formulate measures for focalised leadership and direction over the ideological - cultural work under the guidelines set by the Party and the CMC. Great value should be attached to exercising leadership over surmounting weaknesses, particularly at crucial, sensitive moments and within offices and units with complex ideological developments. The role of heads of offices and units in conducting the ideological work must be encouraged. The leadership method and style should be renewed in a focalised, synchronous, drastic, effective fashion, while words must be matched with action. Political offices at all levels should proactively correctly assess the situation to opportunely give advice to their party committees and commands. At the same time, they should closely work with organisations and forces to create the synergy for raising the quality and effectiveness of the ideological work, detect new issues and propose remedial measures. Consideration should be given to inspecting, supervising, and reviewing the ideological - cultural work to draw lessons, while due regard should be paid to multiplying effective models and typical examples and opportunely dealing with the lack of responsibility for this work.

Second, proactively, flexibly identify the guidelines and central points during the performance of the ideological - cultural work. Offices and units across the Military should continue to effectively implement the 12^th Politburo’s 05-CT/TW, dated May 15^th, 2016, the CMC Standing Board’s Directive 87-CT/QUTW, dated July 8^th, 2016, and the Campaign entitled “promoting tradition, devoting talent, deserving to be Uncle Ho’s soldiers” in the new period via effective, creative approaches so as to make themselves typically politically strong. Moreover, it is essential to well carry out the work of political education, social science and humanity education, and tradition education for troops. Emphasis should be placed on rendering cadres and soldiers fully aware of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, the Party’s guidelines, the State’s law, their units’ task, the hostile forces’ nature, plots, and artifices, and the Vietnamese revolution’s partners and opponents. Importance should be attached to studying, introducing, and executing the Resolutions of the 13^th National Party Congress, the 11^th Military Party Congress, and all-level party congresses. Also, it is necessary to grasp and perform pieces of the party and political work and the propaganda and training work in the new situation. The Propaganda and Training Branch should continue to effectively implement the approved projects and plans. The ideological work within the Military should be centred around improving cadres’ skills in grasping, anticipating, and settling soldiers’ ideological issues, closely combining “building” with “combating,” and using “positive things” against “negative practices.” It is vital to proactively grasp the situation and opportunely provide information to orientate public opinion against complex, sensitive issues. Besides, it is necessary to renew the work of emulation, commendation, culture, and publishing in an effective, practical manner.

Third, due regard should be paid to building a contingent of propaganda and training cadres at all levels. Grasping the CMC’s Resolution 109-NQ/TW, dated February 11^th, 2019 on “building a pool of military cadres, particularly at strategic, campaign levels to meet the task requirements in the new situation” and the Project on “training leaders and commanders within the VPA in the new situation,” offices and units should proactively detect and select cadres to train them in the propaganda and work, with the proper structure and the increasingly high quality so that they will be “red and expert,” and capable of meeting the task requirements in both long and short terms. Significance should be attached to giving advice to Commander of the GPD on building a contingent of cadres within the Department of Propaganda and Training, who are “expert in giving advice, direction, and instructions, detecting and correctly anticipating the situation as well as dealing with new complex issues.” To that end, it is necessary to closely combine training at academies and schools both inside and outside the Military with regular refresher courses within offices and units. Every political cadre should keep improving their political zeal, theoretical and practical knowledge, information technology level, working method, and capabilities in advising party committees and organisations on directing the ideological work and managing troops’ ideological situation, particularly at grass-roots level. At the same time, it is important to modernise facilities and provide sufficient information for cadres in charge of propaganda and training.

Fourth, proactively fight to thwart all plots and artifices of the hostile forces so as to defend the Party’s ideological foundation within the VPA. All-level party committees and commands should continue to grasp and execute the 12^th Politburo’s Resolution 35-NQ/TW, dated October 22^nd, 2018 on “enhancing the defence of the Party’s ideological foundation and the fight against wrong, hostile viewpoints in the new situation,” the Project titled “the Military prevents and combats the hostile forces’ ‘peaceful evolution’ strategy in the ideological - cultural field in the new situation” as well as the GPD’s directives and guiding documents. At each level, it is essential to grasp and flexibly handle information, closely manage the internal situation, correctly assess the ideological issues and public opinion, opportunely conduct the work of propagation and education to raise the responsibility of cadres, soldiers, and citizens. Besides, it is important to promote the synergy of organisations and forces and enhance the efficiency of the core, specialised force for the ideological - cultural work. Forms and methods of struggle via press agencies, mass media, the Internet, and social networks should be diversified to fight against wrong viewpoints and evil information and make contributions to maintaining the Party’s ideological foundation within the Military.

Bringing into play the recorded results, offices, units, and the Propaganda and Training Branch across the Military should continue synchronously implementing measures to renew and improve the ideological - cultural work to build a politically strong VPA as the basis for raising its synergy and combat power.

Maj. Gen. NGUYEN VAN DUC, Director of the Department of Propaganda and Training