High Command of the Ho Chi Minh campaign discussed combat method (File photo)

The anti-US resistance war for national salvation was a severe fight between the Vietnamese nation and the US imperialists and its lackeys. It was one of the longest, biggest and greatest wars in the Vietnam’s history of countering foreign aggressors. In terms of strategy, it was divided into two basic phases. The first phase lasted from 1954 to 1973, aimed at fighting for the withdrawal of the US troops. The second phase lasted from 1973 to 1975, aimed at fighting for the fall of the puppet government and national liberation and reunification.

The most decisive factor to the victory of the war was the leadership of the Party with sound, creative and sharp guidance  of the “Supreme Command”, led by our Party and President Ho Chi Minh, which were shown clearly during the war for both the Southern big front and the Northern big rear. Thereby, we defeated the US strategies of “special war”, “local war” and “Vietnamization”. However, the Party’s leadership promoted to its utmost during the General Offensive and Uprising in Spring of 1975. Accordingly, our Party attached importance to mobilizing forces to dominate the enemy in each campaign and in the strategic general offensive; closely coordinated battlefields; combined attacks of the regular army with uprisings of the mass; creatively and flexibly applied Vietnamese military arts in three strategic offensive campaigns to the Central Highlands, Hue – Da Nang, and Sai Gon.

To implement the decided plan our Party ordered to build forces, including regular army, local forces and the mass. Accordingly, in  1974 and in early 1975 we established the four main army corps and some arms, services which made up “iron fists” on the strategic areas. Besides, weapons and equipment were also supplied and supplemented. In the Central Highlands Campaign, we used a dominant force in comparison with the enemy with the ratios of our force to the enemy’s were 4.5/1, 5.5/1, 5/1 in infantry, tank and amoured and mechanized artillery respectively.

The brilliant strategic guidance of our Party in the offensive also lied in the combination of operations among battlefields. In fact, we have complete preparation in assaulting direction, time, location and forces. The Politburo decided to launch Tri-Thien Campaign and Nam Ngai Campaign roughly at the same time of the Central Highlands Campaign in order to disperse the enemy’s forces and prevent them from sending troops from Hue and Da Nang to reinforce the Central Highlands. This was the second biggest operation aiming at the 1st Tactical Zone of the 1st Military Region of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. As a result, the Central Highlands was isolated. The enemy could do nothing to change the situation. For this reason, we gained an easy victory creating a turning point on the battlefield.

The distinction and also the height of Vietnam’s people’s war shown in the anti-US resistance war for national salvation , in general and in the General Offensive and Uprising, in particular was the combination of offensive and uprising. These are the military attacks conducted by the regular army into urban areas, the enemy’s headquarters and their major military installations on a large scale and the uprising of the mass to destroy the puppet government in localities to gain mastership.

Along with military operations and political activities, our Party also facilitated diplomatic activities, strengthening propagation on our just war to gain support of the international community, including American citizens to prevent the US government from conducting military intervention in Vietnam again.

Senior Lieutenant General Do Ba Ty

Member of the Party Central Committee,

Chief of the General Staff - VPA,

Deputy Minister of National Defence