The year-long establishment of Army Corps 12 (hereinafter the Corps for short) has proved the sound and timely line of the Party, State, and Central Military Commission (CMC) on building an “adept, compact, strong” Army Corps towards modernity. Nevertheless, for the sake of the Corps’ continued organisational stability and improved task performance, the Party Committee and Command of Army Corps 12 have concentrated their leadership and direction on synchronously adopting various measures, with a focus on raising the quality and effectiveness of party and political work.

Under the Politburo’s Resolution and the CMC’s Resolution, on 21 November 2023, the Minister of National Defence signed Decision 6012/QĐ-BQP on establishing Army Corps 12 - the first “adept, compact, strong” Army Corps of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) on the basis of merging offices and units of Army Corps 1 and Army Corps 2.

The Corps Command inspects documents on party and political work at the launch of the training season of 2024

Following milestone adjustments in the Corps’ organisational structure and task requirements, the Corps’ Party Committee and Command have focused their leadership and direction on carrying out party and political work in a synchronous, orderly, comprehensive, and effective way, thus significantly contributing to achieving stability, unity, and development within the Corps. Besides, the Corps Party Committee has issued a resolution on leading and directing ideological work, organisational work, and policy work with great importance attached to stepping up political and ideological education work, regularly grasping the overall situation, opportunely dealing with difficulties, and creating unity and consensus in the implementation process. All-level party committees have proactively made preparations for the transfer, merger, and establishment of party organisations in compliance with party regulations and principles, proactively developing party organisations’ leadership and working regulations, strictly maintaining party meetings and principles of leadership, particularly the principle of democratic centralism. Moreover, all-level party committees have seriously carried out personnel work, with an emphasis placed on streamlining a contingent of key cadres in tandem with personnel preparations for new-tenure party committees and well implementing policies for cadres who would face redundancy or those whose age of service would be inappropriate for appointment. Offices and units within the Corps have regularly grasped and closely managed issues on internal politics and political security, actively combating wrong perceptions and viewpoints about the line of building an “adept, compact, strong” Corps. Great value has been attached to conducting party and political work, enhancing mass mobilisation work and the Determined to Win Emulation Movement, stringently executing the Grass-Roots Democracy Regulations, opportunely settling troops’ difficulties and meeting troops’ legitimate aspirations, etc., thereby contributing to encouraging troops to surmount hardships, allowing offices and units to quickly stabilise their organisational structure and properly perform their functions and tasks, building strong organisations, and asserting the Corps’ synergy and combat power for undertaking and successfully fulfilling all assigned tasks.

Currently, new organisational structure and scale, more demanding tasks, large area of deployment, and modern weapons and technical equipment are posing new challenges to the Corps, particularly to its ideological and organisational and policy work. Meanwhile, the tasks of VPA building and Fatherland protection are facing higher requirements. Against that backdrop, the Corps’ Party Committee and Command have considered raising the quality and effectiveness of party and political work as a determining factor in the building of an “adept, compact, strong” Corps towards modernity, via several main measures as follows.

First, enhancing political and ideological education work, building up political stance, and heightening a sense of responsibility and resolve among cadres and soldiers. To that end, it is necessary to render all cadres, particularly the key ones fully aware of the Corps’ task requirements, advantages, difficulties, and challenges in the building of an “adept, compact, strong” Corps towards modernity. Due attention should be paid to closely combining fundamental political education with the organisation of political campaigns to widely disseminate higher echelons’ documents, directives, and guidance on this line. Great value should be attached to managing troops’ ideological developments, proactively, effectively settling all difficulties, drawbacks, and especially ideological issues, and opportunely formulating measures to orientate public opinion and deal with wrong perceptions and signs of fearfulness for tasks. At the same time, it is important to step up the Determined to Win Emulation Movement and ensure troops’ cultural and mental life. Doing so will help build up troops’ political steadfastness, political resolve, and faith in the Party’s leadership and maintain unity to successfully accomplish all assigned tasks.

Second, focusing on streamlining and building typically strong, pure party committees and party organisations, raising the quality of cadres and party members. This is a key measure to maintain and enhance the Party’s absolute, direct, all-round leadership over the building of an “adept, compact, strong” Corps towards modernity. Therefore, the Corps Party Committee Standing Board should grasp and seriously execute directives, resolutions, and regulations by the Party and the CMC on Party building and rectification, on example-setting responsibility, and on things that party members must not do. Emphasis should be placed on streamlining party committees and party organisations both qualitatively and qualitatively and making them really pure, typically strong, and capable of playing a central role in leadership and the building of “exemplarily, typically” comprehensively strong offices and units. Consideration should be given to renewing leadership style and strictly maintaining the Party’s principles of organisation, particularly democratic centralism, collective leadership, and individual accountability. It is essential to continue reviewing, supplementing, and completing leadership and working regulations properly. Due attention should be paid to managing and educating cadres and party members, improving their combativeness and pioneering role in political zeal, morality, and lifestyle. Significance should be attached to raising the quality of inspection, supervision, and Party discipline work, initiating new members into the Party, and closely combining the building of a pool of party members with the development of a contingent of cadres, particularly party committee members and key cadres. It is vital to step up the study and following of Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, ethics, and lifestyle, the Campaign entitled “promoting tradition, devoting talent, deserving to be Uncle Ho’s Soldiers in the new era”, and the CMC’s Resolution 847-NQ/QUTW, dated 28 December 2021, on bringing into play the virtues of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” and resolutely fighting individualism in the new situation as a favourable condition for cadres and party members’ self-improvement.

Third, promoting synergy of forces and organisations, actively renewing the content, forms, and methods of party and political work. This measure has been tested in practice and should be brought into play in the new situation. To that end, political agencies at all levels should proactively overcome difficulties, promote their role in helping party committees, political commissars, junior political commissars, and commanders to exercise their leadership and direction over party and political work. Political cadres, especially all-level political commissars and junior political commissars should heighten a sense of responsibility, while demonstrating their political steadfastness, pure morality, sense of discipline, and scientific work style. They should improve their skills in educating, convincing, and mobilising the masses, match their words with action, and align theory with practice. At the same time, they should be active and proactive in self-study and self-training, improving their professional competence, scientific work style, and acumen to deserve to be “brothers, sisters, and friends” of soldiers.

Additionally, offices and units should actively renew, diversify, and modernise the content, forms, and methods of party and political work in accordance with troops’ training, combat readiness, and daily life. It is necessary to closely maintain coordination between political commissars and commands as well as between political agencies and other organisations and forces in carrying out party and political work. Due attention should be paid to closely combining education and persuasion with administrative and disciplinary measures, researching and applying lessons from party and political work, and selectively employing new matters in practice to create attractiveness and substantive effectiveness. Party and political work during missions, particularly training, combat readiness, contests, regularity building, discipline management, logistics and technical support work, natural disaster and epidemic prevention and control, search and rescue, and participation in building political bases, fostering socio-economic development, hunger eradication and poverty reduction should be renewed and improved. Great weight should be given to conducting preliminary and final reviews to draw lessons after each task and period, well carrying out commendation work, multiplying effective models and typical examples, and resolutely fighting formalism, rigidity, or delegation of all responsibilities to political cadres and political agencies. At the same time, it is necessary to promote synergy of forces, particularly Steering Boards 35 and specialised task force at all levels to proactively, flexibly, resolutely thwart hostile forces’ “peaceful evolution” strategy and plot to “depoliticise” our VPA. Due attention should be paid to combating wrong perceptions, wrong viewpoints, and distortions of the Party’s lines on building the VPA in general, the Corps in particular, thus contributing to firmly protecting the Party’s ideological foundation, achieving a consensus among cadres and soldiers, encouraging troops to surmount difficulties and promote the noble virtues of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” for the building of an “adept, compact, strong” Corps worthy of a strategic mobile force of paramount importance to safeguarding the Fatherland in any circumstances.

Maj. Gen. NGUYEN DUC HUNG

Political Commissar of the Corps