When he was alive, President Ho Chi Minh said that “we must do our best to turn our Army into a powerful people’s army, a revolutionary army towards regularity and modernity, for the sake of peace maintenance and Fatherland protection”. In the new situation, building a revolutionary, regular, elite, modern Vietnam People’s Army (VPA), especially making it politically elite constitute our Party and State’s strategic vision and thinking for the cause of Fatherland construction and protection.

The eliteness of an army is demonstrated in its “political eliteness” and the “eliteness of its weapons, equipment, and combat methods”, among which the former plays a decisive role in the synergy and combat power of that army. In this regard, according to President Ho Chi Minh, to bolster our Army’s determination to fight and to win, it is necessary to take care of troops’ material life, improve the Army’s tactical and technical capacity, and especially step up political education to maintain the Army’s political steadfastness and the working class’ leadership. Doing so will help build a revolutionary and elite Army in terms of military technique and art, capable of winning victories against any enemy, in any space, time, situation, and circumstance, successfully fulfilling its functions and tasks. The political eliteness of an army is expressed in its political steadfastness and its acuteness in staff and forecast work; that army always succeeds in holding the strategic initiative, avoids falling into passivity in any circumstance, and successfully fulfills all assigned tasks.

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Gau inspecting party and political work performed by Military Region 5 in the first half of 2023 (photo: qdnd.vn)

Building a politically elite VPA is an objective demand; it is an important aspect of the building of a revolutionary, regular, elite, modern People’s Army; it is also the highest requirement of building a powerful army in the new situation especially when the VPA must perform new, complex tasks, such as “combat” in peacetime, non-traditional security challenges prevention, combat, and mitigation, and participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The core contents and manifestations of the political eliteness are very comprehensive, such as great perception of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh Thought, the Party’s guidelines, and the State’s policies and law, political awareness with theoretical thinking remaining at a high level, always maintaining the ideological foundation and working-class nature, “immunity” against all kinds of evil ideologies, absolutely loyalty to the Fatherland, Party, State, people, and socialist regime, steadfastness in combat goal and ideal for national independence and socialism against all difficulties and challenges, always maintaining political acumen against passivity in any circumstance, being proactive in staff work and opportunely, correctly dealing with all situations relating to defence, security, and international relations, particularly military international relations, shrewdness and efficiency in political struggle, successfully fulfilling all political tasks entrusted by the Party, State, and people. In this regard, the highest manifestation is the readiness to fight and sacrifice for Fatherland independence and freedom, for socialism, accomplish any task, overcome any difficulty, and defeat any enemy.

The building of a politically elite VPA is a process during which subjects form and improve the expertise, steadfastness, and acuteness with reference to political awareness and behavior of each troop and the whole Army to ensure that the VPA will always be an absolutely loyal, reliable political force ready to undertake and successfully fulfill all political tasks assigned by the Party, State, and people.

Over the years, under the Party’s leadership, the State’s focalized, uniformed management, and the leadership and direction by the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Ministry of National Defence (MND), and the General Department of Politics (GDP), all-level party committees, commissars, and commands have been fully aware of the building of a politically elite VPA and seriously, closely performed this task, thus gaining significant achievements. Cadres and soldiers across the VPA have always been steadfast in combat goal and ideal, absolutely loyal to the Party, State, and people. The VPA has brought into play its proactive roles in fighting to thwart hostile forces’ plots and artifices of “peaceful evolution” and “depoliticization” of our Army as well as in actively combating wrong, hostile viewpoints to defend the Party’s ideological foundation within itself.

However, fundamental theories about building a politically elite army have yet to be researched comprehensively or deeply. The system of concepts, categories, laws, and principles for building a politically elite army, the relationship between the building of a politically elite army and the building of a compact, lean, strong army as well as the relationship between men and modern, smart weaponry have yet to be clarified sufficiently. A transition between cadres who underwent wars and young generations who live in peacetime is taking place. Researching, applying, and developing Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought have yet to be really relevant to reality. Hostile forces have been stepping up their political sabotage strategy in cyberspace owing to the rapid development and negative, multi-dimensional impacts from communications, social networks, and artificial intelligence. All those things have been posing new challenges to the building of a politically elite VPA.

In the upcoming years, global and regional situations will continue witnessing rapid, complex, unpredictable developments. Strategic competition between major powers, local conflicts, and disputes over territories, seas, and islands will continue to be complicated and intense, thereby seriously challenging the trend of peace, cooperation, and development. Domestically, after nearly 40 years of national renovation, in addition to great achievements of historic significance, our country is confronted with a lot of difficulties and challenges. Corruption, wastefulness, bureaucracy, and the degradation in political ideology, ethics, and lifestyle as well as “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” committed by a section of cadres and party members have impacted on military cadres and soldiers’ ideology and sentiment. Hostile forces are directly, drastically attacking our Army’s political work, with a focus on distorting and removing the Party’s ideological foundation, validating the Party’s leadership over the VPA, promoting “depoliticization” of our Army with a view to separating the VPA from the Party’s leadership and weakening our Army’s political eliteness and combat strength.

Building a politically elite VPA is an objective requirement; there must be great political determination, creative, drastic action, and comprehensive, synchronous measures. Grounded on the task requirements in the new revolutionary period, it is necessary to well implement several basic measures as follows.

First, maintaining and enhancing the Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the building of a politically elite VPA in the new situation. Communist Party’s leadership over army is a fundamental rule for the building of a new-style army of the working class. Our Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the building of a politically elite VPA is clearly manifested when the Party formulates guidelines and orientations and directs the identification of objectives, subjects, forces, rules, viewpoints, and methods of implementation. Maintaining and enhancing the Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the building of a politically elite VPA will help guarantee our Army’s absolute loyalty to the Fatherland, Party, State, and people. Thus, it is necessary to frequently grasp and creatively, effectively apply the Party’s viewpoints on VPA building in general, the building of a politically elite VPA in particular.

The whole VPA shall continue effectively implementing the 9^th Politburo’s Resolution 51-NQ/TW, dated July 20^th, 2005 on continuing to complete the Party’s leadership mechanism, implementing commissar regime within the VPA, the CMC’s Resolution 513-NQ/ĐUQSTW, dated November 17^th, 2005, Resolution of the Party Central Committee’s 4^th Plenum (11^th, 12^th, 13^th tenure) and the 13^th Party Central Committee’s Conclusion 21-KL/TW, dated October 25^th, 2021 on stepping up the building and rectification of the Party and political system, resolutely preventing, pushing back, and seriously handling the degradation in political ideology, ethics, and lifestyle as well as “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” among cadres and party members in tandem with the 12^th Politburo’s Directive 05-CT/TW, dated May 5^th, 2016 on studying and following Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, ethics, and lifestyle and the CMC Standing Board’s Directive 855-CT/QUTW, dated August 12^th, 2019 on enhancing the Campaign titled “Promoting tradition, devoting talent, deserving to be Uncle’s Soldiers in the new period”. Emphasis should be placed on building a really pure, strong, exemplary, and typical Army Party Organization to meet the entire Party, people, and VPA’s confidence and expectation, making it increasingly strong in terms of politics, ideology, morality, organization, and personnel, enhancing party committees and organizations’ leadership and combativeness as well as cadres and party members’ pioneering, exemplary role across the entire VPA and society.

Second, raising awareness and responsibility of subjects and forces towards the building of a politically elite army. Subjects and forces shall be fully aware of the importance of building a politically elite VPA, the tasks of Army building and Fatherland protection in the new situation as well as hostile forces’ plots and artifices. They shall grasp viewpoints, principles, and requirements regarding the building of a politically elite Army and advantages and disadvantages in the process. They shall also clearly understand their responsibility and authority in identifying requirements, rules, directions, objectives, and methods of building a politically elite Army.

Building a politically elite VPA is set in the Party’s guidelines on army building; therefore, it must be correctly perceived across the entire Party, people, and VPA in order to promote roles and responsibilities of organizations and forces as well as mobilize all possible resources in the process. The CMC, MND, competent offices of the MND and GDP, and party committees, commissars, and commands at all levels should enhance their leadership and direction over the building of a politically elite VPA. Due attention should be paid to grasping and effectively implementing resolutions and conclusions by the Party, State, CMC, and MND on military-defence and Fatherland protection tasks and Army building in the new situation. Priority should be given to grasping the viewpoint set by the 13^th National Party Congress on building a revolutionary, regular, elite, gradually modern VPA, with a number of services, corps, and forces moving straight to modernity, the Politburo’s Resolution 05-NQ/TW, dated January 17^th, 2022 on organizing the VPA in the period of 2021 – 2030 and beyond, the CMC’s Resolution 230-NQ/QUTW, dated April 2^nd, 2022 on leadership over the organization of the VPA in the period of 2021 – 2030 and beyond, the MND’s Plan 1228/KH-BQP, dated April 25^th, 2022 on the organization of the VPA in the period of 2021 – 2030 and beyond.

Third, synchronously, effectively adopting contents, forms, and methods of building a politically elite Army. Emphasis should be placed on renewing the contents of building a politically strong VPA to meet the requirements set by revolutionary tasks in the new situation, particularly enhancing the VPA’s working-class nature, people-ness, and nation-ness, building the Army’s politico-spiritual foundation, educating troops on combat goal and ideal, maintaining and strengthening the Party’s absolute, direct leadership over the VPA, and fostering the close-knit bond between the Army and the people. Due regard should be paid to educating troops on the Party’s new viewpoints and thinking and the State’s policies and law on building the VPA, particularly building a politically, spiritually strong VPA, fostering internal unity in line with building a firm “posture of people’s hearts and minds”, and conducting people’s war for Fatherland protection in the new situation. It is necessary to deal with the issues raised by the 4^th industrial revolution that directly impact on troops’ political steadfastness, the issues on island and sea protection as well as hostile forces’ plots and artifices against the Vietnamese revolution.

Furthermore, it is essential to apply and creatively develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought, review and make textbooks and training materials regarding Marxist-Leninist science, Ho Chi Minh Thought, social science and humanities more relevant to the building of a politically elite VPA. At the same time, it is necessary to research and selectively internalize achievements in modern political doctrines, well perform the task of protecting the Party’s ideological foundation, effectively fight against wrong, hostile viewpoints, particularly hostile forces’ plots and artifices of “depoliticization” of our VPA.

Due attention should be paid to renewing the contents, forms, and methods of carrying out party and political work in the building of a politically strong Army; all activities relating to party and political work must be the “soul and lifeblood” in the building of a politically strong VPA; it is vital to make the components of political awareness and behaviour of each troop and the entire Army increasingly sustainable. All-level party committees and commands shall step up their leadership and direction over political-ideological education, with a focus on building cadres and soldiers’ political steadfastness against all difficulties and challenges. It is essential to renew and diversify forms and methods of ideological work, policy work, and organizational work, while it is important to renew forms and methods of political education, propagation, popular culture, history education, emulation and commendation work in order to ensure the effectiveness of building a politically elite VPA. Great value should be attached to raising the effectiveness of cooperation between subjects and forces both inside and outside the  Army, promoting the synergy and responsibility of central committees, ministries, sectors, local party committees and authorities, Vietnam Fatherland Fronts, politico-social organizations, and social strata in the building of a politically elite VPA.

Fourth, building a contingent of military cadres to satisfy the building of a politically elite VPA. To that end, it is necessary to maintain and enhance the Party’s leadership over personnel work and the building of a contingent of cadres within the Army. It is essential to promote all-level party committees and organizations’ role in leadership and direction over personnel work and raise the quality of personnel planning, training, and employment. Emphasis should be placed on improving the quality of cadre training and cultivation via different forms of training, particularly at campaign and strategic levels. Consideration should be given to renewing programs, contents, forms, and methods of training cadres in a “standardized, modernized” manner, improving cadres’ management and command styles and methods. Due regard should be paid to well implementing policies for the VPA, researching and proposing preferential treatment policies for cadres living and working in border, sea, island, remote, isolated areas. It is important to heighten all-level cadres’ self-awareness in study and training so that cadres, particularly campaign and strategic-level cadres, political cadres, and experts in political theory will always successfully fulfill political tasks to meet the requirements set by the building of a “compact, lean, strong” VPA and especially the building of a politically elite Army in the new situation.

Fifth, formulating, completing, and ensuring mechanisms, policies, and resources for building a politically elite Army. The building of a politically elite VPA must be based on the Party’s guidelines and the State’s policies and law, which are institutionalized into specific laws and regulations, for the Army. Implementing the Party’s guidelines on supplementing and completing the system of laws, mechanisms, and policies on defence and security and relevant to defence and security in the new condition plays an important role in building a politically elite VPA. To satisfy the task requirements in the new situation, it is necessary to raise the quality of conducting research and forecast work and giving advice to the Party and State on renewing methods of budget-based investment and facility assurance for the building of a politically elite Army. It is important to continue reviewing, supplementing, and making mechanisms and policies relevant to the whole VPA and each type of military units. It is vital to deal with a lack of synchronicity between mechanisms, policies, and regulations as well as settle difficulties and drawbacks in the building of a politically elite VPA. Various measures to mobilize, exploit, and use investments in building a politically elite VPA should be implemented.

The eliteness of our VPA is derived from its political eliteness. That is also the most fundamental matter, laying the foundation for building a comprehensively elite VPA. Last but not least, building a politically elite Army is an objective demand and responsibility of the entire Party, political system, and people, particularly all-level party committees and commands as well as all cadres and soldiers across the VPA.

Lt. Gen. NGUYEN VAN GAU

Member of the Party Central Committee

Member of the CMC

Deputy Head of the GDP of the VPA