II. Vietnam’s military art in the resistance against French colonialists and American imperialists

The struggle for national liberation of our military and people under the leadership of the Party lasted continuously for 30 years (1945 - 1975), through two resistance wars against the French colonialists and American imperialists. Facing colonial and imperial powers with superior economic and military potentials, our Party mobilised the strength of the entire people, inherited and creativity implemented the nation’s ideology of safeguarding the country and the military ideology, military art; therefore, conducted a people’s war against the invaders’ war of aggression. Accordingly, Vietnam’s military art in the two resistance wars against the French and Americans is the military art of a people’s war that is very distinctive and unique, based on a combination of traditional and modern elements. It is the military art of a liberation war, gradually developing to reach its peak during the final stage of the resistance war against the Americans for national liberation.

When discussing the military art of the Vietnam people’s war, it is essential to understand its characteristics, nature and content; also to understand the beauty and uniqueness of this military art, which is illustrated clearly through several aspects. Firstly, it is the military art of a people’s war, where the entire nation unites, the whole people fight back the enemy, fundamentally different from the military art of many countries, especially imperialist ones, where the military forces take the primary role. Secondly, the Vietnam people’s war is unique and rich in identity, differing from the people’s wars conducted by some other nations. The people’s war is not exclusive to Vietnam; through many periods, at varying degrees, many countries have waged people’s wars against the aggressor’s war. These often start as armed uprisings and gradually develop into national defence or liberation wars, although some may stop at the stage of armed uprising. However, the Vietnam people’s war, besides sharing general characteristics and nature with the people’s wars of some countries, also possesses distinctive features such as the broad participation of the people; with the three-tier armed forces playing a crucial role, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, was organised tightly and unified. Thirdly, the method of conducting the Vietnam people’s war involves the entire nation fighting the enemy, closely combining regular warfare conducted by main force units with local people’s war led by local armed forces. This synergy maximises the strength of the entire population and each type of military force during the war. Fourthly, the thorough strategic thought of the war is the offensive strategy, which means the main content of Vietnamese military art is reflected primarily in offensive operations. At the strategic level, the offensive thought is  thoroughly understood and consistently implemented; the guiding principle of offense is also applied in campaign and tactical military art; while forms of combat include offensive, counter-offensive, and defensive operations, depending on specific conditions.

The aforementioned characteristics of the Vietnam people’s war directly influence and create a unique and distinctive military art - the military art of the Vietnam people’s war. A prominent feature of the military art in the two resistance wars against the French colonialists and American imperialists is the continuous effort to gain and maintain strategic initiative throughout the war. This is because during the early stages of the war, due to the overwhelming military superiority (in terms of forces, weapons, technical equipment, etc.), the initiative typically belonged to the enemy. However, through the actual process of warfare, the strength of the people’s war was proved, as our forces and postures were gradually built and developed, this initiative began to shift in our favour until the end of the war. The practical experience of the war demonstrates that strategic initiative holds particular importance. Accordingly, the side that holds the strategic initiative will achieve victory, and conversely, the side that loses it will inevitably face defeat; the only question is when, sooner or later. Therefore, transforming the battlefield situation, progressing to gaining and maintaining the strategic initiative, is a major, distinctive, and overarching aspect of Vietnamese military art.

Tanks of the Vietnam People's Army at the Independence Palace on 30 April 1975 (Photo: VNA)

During the resistance war against the French colonialists, that transformation began to emerge after the Viet Bac Autumn-Winter Campaign in 1947, but it was not until after the victory of the Border Campaign in 1950 that we truly gained and maintained the strategic initiative. Because of that, we proactively launched successive major campaigns, such as the Tay Bac Campaign, the Hoa Binh Campaign (1952), and the Upper Laos Campaign (1953), causing the enemy to fall into a passive position across various battlefields. As a result, we successfully destroyed the ambitious and strategically calculated Navarre Plan of the French colonialists - aiming to assemble mobile main forces in the Northern Delta to seize the strategic initiative. However, we prevented them from achieving this scheme, forcing them to act according to our intentions by organising operations in key areas and strategic directions, compelling the enemy to maneuver and disperse their strategic mobile main forces to provide support and respond.

With continuous failures on various battlefields, to stem the tide, the French colonialists had to shift their strategic direction in an attempt to regain the initiative in combat. With American support, they hastily established the Dien Bien Phu stronghold and declared it to be inviolable, the most solid stronghold in Indochina, a “meat grinder” to crush the main forces of Viet Minh. Objectively, the French colonialists’ plan was not baseless, as we had previously faced many difficulties and had not succeeded in attacking the Na San stronghold, which had a similar defensive organisation. However, their mistake was overestimating themselves while underestimating their opponent, especially failing to recognise the full strength of an entire nation, a people’s war, as well as the exceptional strategic leadership of the opponent’s Supreme Command, directly led by the Party Committee and the Command of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. After all, that mistake was a “chronic affliction” of the invaders, leading to their miserable failure in the strategic decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu. That great victory belonged to Vietnam and it was also a triumph for the global national liberation movement, marking the end of the old colonial regime. Therefore, it not only had great significance for our nation, but also had profound international and contemporary significance. Regarding the military, it was a victory of the people’s war, with the key being the distinctive military art under the leadership of the  Vietnam Communist Party, led by President Ho Chi Minh. The victory of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, at that point, represented the pinnacle of campaign art and offensive warfaces; it was the result of the art of transforming the battlefield and forces in our favour, mastering and maintaining initiative, adhering to the principle of concentrating forces, encircling, isolating, and annihilating the enemy in pieces, leading to the total annihilation of enemy forces and achieving a decisive victory in the resistance against the French colonialists. Overall, our military art in the resistance against the French developed gradually and steadily, but only developed to a certain extent due to various reasons. The important aspect is that it laid the groundwork for further development of military art to a higher level in the resistance war against the American imperialists to protect the country.

The resistance war against the American imperialists to protect our nation was the most intense struggle in our nation’s history of resisting foreign invaders. Our military and people, under the leadership of the Party, had to confront an enemy with superior military strength and capabilities. However, this also highlighted the strength of the Vietnamese people’s war and the distinctive military art at all three levels: strategy, operational, and tactical, with a particular focus on operational art, especially offensive operations.

Regarding the strategy, throughout the war, we consistently adhered to and implemented the mindset of strategic offensive, deploying three strategic offensives in the years of 1968, 1971-1972, and 1975; steadfastly maintained the strategic of “Fight to drive out the Americans, fight to overthrow the puppet regime”, liberate the South, and reunify the country. Accordingly, each strategic offensive (strategic operational phase) had its strategic purpose and significance in each revolutionary stage. During the 1968 Offensive, we chose to attack cities (focusing on Hue, Da Nang, and Sai Gon) and launched simultaneous attacks on the eve of the Lunar New Year, catching the enemy off guard and leaving them confused and disoriented. In terms of military art, attacking cities - the enemy’s strongholds - might seem contrary to conventional combat principles (avoiding strong points and attacking weak points). However, this approach created a high level of surprise, achieving effectiveness on many faces and demonstrating creativity and boldness in combat operations. The 1968 Offensive shocked the enemy, shaking the entire South of Vietnam and the United States, forming a wave of anti-war sentiment within the U.S. and around the world, forcing the American government to consider withdrawing U.S. expeditionary forces from Vietnam through international negotiations. This also marked the beginning of the strategic resolve to “Fight to drive out the Americans” by our military and people under the leadership of the Party.

The strategic offensive in 1972 on the Southern battlefield, with the Tri - Thien Campaign as its focal point, held special significance, continuing to shift the battlefield situation in our favour. From that point, we completely seized the strategic initiative, the more we fought, the stronger we became, and the greater our victories. To stem the tide, the American imperialists desperately bet on their “last card”: launching a strategic air raid (codenamed Linebacker II), primarily using B52 bombers to attack Hanoi, Hai Phong, and surrounding areas, in an attempt to gain favourable conditions at the negotiating table. However, they suffered a catastrophic failure in the 12-night-and-day confrontation at the end of 1972 over the Northern sky. The victory of “Dien Bien Phu in the air” of the northern military and people demonstrated the unique military art of the people’s ground-to-air warfare, marking the end of the American invaders’ ambitions and final efforts, forcing them to return to the negotiating table to sign the Paris Agreement on 27 January 1973. Thus, we accomplished the goal of “Fight to drive out the Americans” to move towards “Fight to overthrow the puppet regime” two years later.

The Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975, with successive campaigns culminating in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign - the decisive strategic operation that ended the war, liberated the South, and reunified the country. It fully and clearly demonstrated the strength of the Vietname people’s war, notably in the method of conducting warfare. That was a close combination of offensives and uprisings, as well as uprisings and offensives by main force units and the mass population. The highlight of military art was the conducting of joint operations by large-scale and modern armies with a focus on “fast, bold, and unexpected” attacks, ending the war in the shortest time, with maximum advantage and minimal losses.

The distinctive features of military art in the resistance war against the American imperialists for national liberation are manifested in various aspects, most prominently in operational art, particularly in offensive operations. Throughout the war, there were only two defensive campaigns; the rest were medium and large-scale offensive and counter-offensive campaigns, with the combat method of conducting joint operations by large-scale and modern armies, reaching their peak in the final phase of the war. It can be seen that in each campaign, each battle bore the mark of offensive operation art with flexible combat forms, deeply reflecting the Party’s offensive operational thought. In the Plei Me Campaign (1965), particularly the decisive Ia Drang battle, it was an exemplary display of the military art of “attack the base, annihilate the reinforcements”, achieving high combat efficiency by destroying an entire battalion of American main forces. The Tay Nguyen Campaign, with the Buon Ma Thuot battle as the decisive engagement, marked the beginning of the Campaign that converged many unique elements of military art. Notably were the arts of deception and luring the enemy using modern methods combined with traditional tactics, the “attack the base, annihilate the reinforcements” strategy, and the encirclement and interception of retreating enemy forces. The victory of the Central Highlands Campaign was of special significance, breaking the enemy’s strategic defensive posture, causing them to fall into panic, and creating conditions for us to organise subsequent campaigns, such as the Hue Campaign, the Da Nang Campaign, culminating in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, which ended in complete victory during the Spring offensive and uprising of 1975, liberating the South and reunifying the country.

Regarding the tactics, following the Party’s guidelines for the people’s war, the whole people fought the enemy, with the three-tier armed forces as the core, combined medium and small-scale battles, conducted both day and night, to gradually annihilate enemy units, defeat them step by step, and achieve complete victory. The prominent tactical feature, also partly at the operational level, was the warfare art of “leopard skin”, “interspersed”, “holding on to the enemy’s belt to fight”, which prevented the enemy from forming lines, therefore, minimising the enemy’s advantage in weaponry and technical equipment while maximising our absolute advantage in political-spiritual strength and close combat. This approach caused the enemy to be terrified and panic, leading to their defeat in direct confrontations with our armed forces.

Thus, it can be seen that the military art of the Vietnam people’s war, under the Party’s leadership, developed step by step with a rich, diverse, and creative content, reaching its peak in the final stage of the resistance war against the American imperialists for national liberation. It must be noted that the development of military art is always associated with the development of force organisation, weaponry, technical equipment, and other related factors, with the decisive factor being the correct leadership of the Party.

MANH HA - QUANG HOP - CAO CUONG

(Next issue: III. Requirements for development in the new situation)