Seventy years ago, with the intention of launching the Winter-Spring Strategic Offensive of 1953-1954, we staged the Lai Chau Liberation Operation and won a great victory, creating vital conditions and opportunities for the subsequent operational activities. In this operation, we proactively adopted operational measures flexibly and creatively when situation about the enemy had changed. The operation offers many invaluable lessons on operational art, especially the art of posture establishment and transformation.

After their defeat in the Upper Laos, France decided to withdraw all of their troops in Na San, Son La Province to strengthen the defence of Lai Chau – the last point of their defensive system in the Northwestern theatre of war. Additionally, General Henri E. Navarre hurriedly sent the paratroops to occupy Dien Bien Phu with a view to setting up an intertwined posture in this important area. To put that plan into action, the enemy deployed 3 European-African battalions in Lai Chau Town. Over 20 companies of Thai puppet troops, which were under the command of French officers, seized the heights controlling the town and important traffic nodes. Nevertheless, right after having been informed about the movement of the 316th Division towards Lai Chau, the enemy troops quickly withdrew from Lai Chau to bolster the defence of Dien Bien Phu.

To implement the Winter-Spring Strategic Operational Plan of 1953-1954, the 316th Division was ordered to leave Hoa Binh for the Northwest to work in conjunction with the local armed forces to mount the Lai Chau Liberation Operation. As a result of sound, close leadership provided by the Party, Central Military Commission, and General Command; high combat determination, the spirit of “activeness, proactiveness, mobility, and flexibility,” and creative application of our unique military art, the Lai Chau Liberation Operation won a significant victory and attained the strategic goals of annihilating the enemy troops, liberating the area, forcing the enemy to scatter their strategic mobile main force, thus creating favourable conditions for our subsequent strategic operational activities. This is an excellent opening of the Winter-Spring Strategic Offensive of 1953-1954, which offers many invaluable lessons on military art, most notably the art of posture establishment and transformation.

First, establishment of thorny blocking posture and effective separation of enemy troops in various directions. Facing the risk of being attacked and destroyed by our forces, France hurriedly withdrew their troops from Lai Chau while sending in their reinforcements from Dien Bien Phu to protect this force. Therefore, to timely block and annihilate the two factions requires us to timely set up blocking posture in difficult terrain with the aim of rapidly splitting the enemy troops right from the start, breaking their posture, driving them into disadvantages, defeating their operational ploys, turning them from “the strong into the weak, the many into the few,” thus falling into passivity and failure. To set up our posture in conjunction with breaking the enemy posture, the establishment of blocking posture at the operational level of war is carried out in a prompt, timely, and effective manner by units. Accordingly, the Operational Command decided to set up three operational-level blocking positions. The blocking position at Muong Muon, Muong Pon, in the 174th Regiment’s area of responsibility, ambushed the enemy troops moving from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu. The blocking position at Pu San, taken charge of by the 98th Regiment, was tasked with engaging the enemy troops maneuvering from Dien Bien Phu to Lai Chau. The blocking position at Him Lam – Ban Tau, occupied by the 888th Battalion, 176th Regiment, was ready to respond to contingencies. These are complex terrains and the enemy was forced to go through. The terrains allow us to establish strong blocking positions conducive to deployment of forces and equipment while ensuring secrecy, constant proactiveness, and flexible response. When we open fire, we will be able to halt the enemy formations quickly and put them in a disadvantageous position, passivity, confusion, and failure. Thanks to proactive selection and establishment of operational-level thorny blocking positions, right from the onset of the operation, we formed a posture to separate the enemy, quickly disbanding the enemy troops withdrawing from Lai Chau and the reinforcements sent in from Dien Bien Phu, thus defeating their plan for concentration of force. The operation reveals that when being attacked, the enemy formations were rapidly disintegrated. Their command and control fell into a disordered state and it was every man for himself, finding their own way back to Dien Bien Phu. The situation enabled our units to pursue and kill a large number of enemy troops. Such establishment of robust operational-level blocking positions along the road from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu, especially at the road segment between Muong Pon and Ban Tau, signifies a new development in the art of forming operational-level blocking posture – the operational art our soldiers had not been able to use in three previous operations namely Hoa Binh, Northwest, and Upper Laos. It was until the Lai Chau Liberation Operation that our forces were able to apply and leverage effectively.

Second, good grasp of situations to timely shift the posture according to the operational plan from attacking the enemy in defence to engaging the enemy on the move with high combat efficiency. In the initial operational plan for the Lai Chau Liberation Operation, we chose to assault the enemy troops in entrenched fortifications in the town and the surrounding bases. However, on discovering the 316th Division maneuvering to Lai Chau, the enemy withdrew from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu to avoid being destroyed by our main force. Having grasped situations, especially the enemy’s fundamental changes, we timely adjusted our operational plan to transform posture flexibly. On the one hand, we still prepared to liberate Lai Chau as planned, but on the other, we further entrusted the 316th Division with the task of blocking and pursuing the enemy troops withdrawing to Muong Thanh for concentration of force and engaging the reinforcements sent in via the road linking Dien Bien Phu with Lai Chau, creating favourable conditions and opportunities for us to conduct following operational activities of the Winter-Spring Strategic Offensive of 1953-1954.

During the preparation process, we considered that the enemy troops were hurriedly abandoning Lai Chau, thus they were in an anxious, confused state and lack of coordination. The remaining enemy force responsible for defending Lai Chau Town was fragile and exposed many weaknesses. Therefore, a small attacking force of the 316th Division was strong enough to annihilate the enemy. Our remaining force focused on the primary task of pursuing and destroying the fleeing enemy troops, preventing them from joining with the force maneuvering from Dien Bien Phu. Despite making every preparation in a short time, given that logical consideration, the Operational Command ordered units to shift the operational plan from mostly attacking the enemy in defence to setting up blocking posture in association with assigning forces to pursue and ambush the enemy in many directions and road segments. Accordingly, the 316th Division was quickly reorganised into three elements namely the element in charge of liberating Lai Chau Town, the element pursuing the enemy withdrawing from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu, and the element ready to counter enemy assault on the direct rear of the operation. Of note, the element tasked with pursuing and engaging the enemy troops withdrawing from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu was the main force.

Given the determination to launch resolute offensives and pursue the enemy until the end regardless of rugged terrain, within a short period of time, the 316th Division and local armed forces chased after and engaged the enemy along a 300-kilometre road and won great victories, defeating the enemy’s plan to withdraw from Lai Chau to reinforce Dien Bien Phu and achieving our designated strategic goal. Thanks to good grasp of situation in every aspect, we timely adjusted the operational plan and posture; maintained the initiative, brought into play the power of each element, timely blocked and, continually pursued and destroyed a large number of enemy troops.

Third, close combination between the blocking, pursuing, ambushing posture established by the main force and on-site force with flexible, creative application of various types of tactics and combat ploys. In the Lai Chau Liberation Operation, our units had to carry out operational activities in short time, in a vast area with rugged, isolated terrain; attack and pursue the enemy in many directions; repeatedly put them under pressure in order to seize and maintain the offensive initiative. To accomplish the assigned tasks, units actively and proactively overcame difficulties to coordinate actions closely; applied various types of tactics and combat ploys aimed to transform the posture flexibly and timely pursue and annihilate the enemy. To realise the operational plan of the Operations Commander, we used the 439th Battalion to attack and destroy two forward areas (Pa Ham and Clavo), then approached to engage the primary target (Lai Chau), driving them into disintegration. Acting in concert with the offensive direction of Lai Chau, the 174th Regiment surrounded and attacked the enemy stopping temporarily in Muong Pon. The 888th Battalion took advantage of the blocking battlefield established in advance in Tram Tau to ambush and destroy a large part of the 1st Expeditionary Parachute Battalion and the 5 Puppet Parachute Battalion maneuvering from Dien Bien Phu to provide support for the incoming force from Lai Chau, defeating their plan concentration of force. Making the most of the operational-level blocking position in Muong Pon, we separated the only road from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu completely, forcing the enemy troops to form two groups to retreat through the forest. The 301st Puppet Battalion and four companies in Nam Lam and Sop Nhom made a detour through the forest to find their way to Dien Bien Phu. The rest in Muong Tong, Muong Bum, and Muong Cha retreated to Laos. On firm grasp of the enemy’s plots, our units pursued and attacked the enemy continually in connection with calling for them to surrender, thereby driving them into rapid disintegration. We destroyed a large part of enemy force, captured many weapons and equipment, minimised our casualties, complete the task of liberating Lai Chau completely, threatened Dien Bien Phu from the North, and achieved the designated strategic operational intention. Thanks to good grasp of situations, proactive selection of tactics in close connection with combat ploys, the 316th Division worked closely with other forces to shift the posture flexibly, timely deal with contingencies, tap into the forte of our combat method, maintain initiative, pursue and engage the enemy continually, kill many enemy troops, and achieve high combat efficiency.

Victory of the Lai Chau Liberation Operation of 1953 served to create favourable conditions and opportunities for us to carry out the Winter-Spring Strategic Operational Plan of 1953-1954. Lessons on military art drawn from the operation remain valuable and need further studies and creative application and development in the war to safeguard the Fatherland.

Colonel, Doctor MAI DUC KIEN, Army College No. 1