Providing logistics support for forces to fight to pin the enemy down and annihilate enemy troops as the basis for offices and factories’ safe movement to revolutionary bases in the first 60 days and nights of national resistance represents a feature of the art of combat logistics support that should continue to be further researched and effectively applied.

Implementing the Party’s strategic guidelines and responding to President Ho Chi Minh’s Appeal for National Resistance, under the drastic, timely leadership and direction of the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defence - the General Command, troops and citizens of Hanoi capital city brought into play the combined strength, creatively applied their ancestors’ unique art of combating enemies, and bravely fought to force French colonialists to get bogged down in the people’s warfare posture in urban areas and completely smash the French plots of conquering Hanoi within 24 hours and then taking control over cities and towns in the North and the North Central Coast for the sake of a reinvasion of our country. In such a people’s warfare posture, “logistics support for combat forces, including the main force and the militia and self-defence force relied on local authorities, unions, and citizens. Units in charge of ordnance and medical care actively took advantage of assistance of authorities, unions, and citizens to receive and opportunely gave materials to combat units.” That was a factor of special importance for troops and citizens of Hanoi to fight to pin the enemy down within the city. Logistics support was primitive at that time, but it provided us with a lot of valuable lessons and expressed the feature of the art of combat logistics support as a solid foundation for building and developing present-day Military Logistics Branch.

Mobilising human resources on the spot to make preparations for the resistance war (file photo: VNA)

First, we built a widespread logistics posture - a people’s logistics posture within urban areas - a feature of the people’s warfare art of Vietnam in the early days of national resistance. Prior to the outbreak of national resistance, the French expeditionary force (about 6.500 troops) was armed with modern equipment and especially tanks; therefore, they blocked many roads and five ancient gates which were connected with safe suburban areas. Meanwhile, our armed forces in Hanoi were comprised of only newly-established units of the National Army and the militia and self-defence force with obsolete equipment; sections in charge of logistics support for the war and particularly for combat in urban areas were yet to be founded at that time. Against that backdrop, grounded on the particularities of each inner-city area, taking advantage of support from suburban areas, Hanoi Capital Front’s Protection Commission, Party Committee, and Command flexibly organised the whole battlefield into 3 inter-zones with an intertwined posture to suppress the enemy’s modern weapons and technical equipment, create a favourable condition for commanding and directing combat, and bring into play the strength of all people in combat services, including on-the-spot logistics support. Many types of goods and especially foods from large markets within inner-city areas were directly provided for combat forces. Due attention was paid to proactively establishing military-civilian medical stations near headquarters of the inter-zones so as to facilitate first aid and medical treatment on the spot for wounded and sick soldiers, opportunely reinforce the Front, and transport severe and moderate cases out of the city - the frontline. In addition to building an on-the-spot logistics posture, we actively mobilised logistics resources from the people and identified places for our depots, factories, and hospitals in our free areas. At the same time, we quickly moved depots, factories, and hospitals towards suburban areas. More specifically, food depots were shifted to Thanh Liet, Me Tri, and some places along Nhue River, hospitals were moved to Van Dien, Cu Da, and Khuc Thuy, and the Central Military Hospital alone was evacuated to Van Dinh (Ha Dong). Those safe places had our authorities and unions; therefore, we could easily mobilise human and material resources to form a rather inter-connected, solid logistics posture.

Second, we promoted the synergy of all people and organised logistics forces in accordance with combat reality. At the onset of the resistance war, logistics support from higher echelons was almost nothing; therefore, combat units had to carry out logistics work by themselves. To deal with that problem, Hanoi Capital Front’s Protection Commission, Party Committee, and Command opportunely promoted the strength of all people in logistics work, particularly in suburban areas. Offices of the Party and the Government focused on encouraging the people to contribute human and material resources to combat. Thus, immediately after entering the war against the French expeditionary force in the capital city, citizens in our free areas donated a huge amount of materials. Typical example was Ta Thanh Oai; within 2 days only (20th and 21st of December, 1946), we received over 150 tons of rice. With the revolutionary spirit and great determination of mass organisations, particularly Women’s Unions, all outlying communes and districts founded Supply Committees to reinforce and directly serve combat in inner-city areas. Military Chef Teams and Female Militia Transport Squads played a central role in feeding troops, transporting food and materials for combat from suburban areas, giving first aid on the spot, and carrying wounded and sick soldiers from inner-city areas to hospitals in suburban areas for medical treatment.

To receive logistics materials from the outside and directly provide logistics support for combat, units of our armed forces quickly set up ordnance, medicine, and catering teams. That was our first force in charge of providing food, giving first aid and treatment, and transporting wounded and sick soldiers and martyrs; given its limited organisational structure, this force helped ensure smooth, constant logistics support between lines during combat. As a result, although the enemy launched fierce attacks to control the whole city, particularly the five ancient gates, the logistics force of our combat units and Hanoi’s authorities and citizens provided rather sufficient food for our main combat force and militia and self-defence force. The establishment of the logistics force during combat expressed our Party and President Ho Chi Minh’s creative, flexible leadership as the scientific basis for founding main combat units (Capital Regiment, Regiment 48, and Regiment 52) and preparing a long-term resistance war.

Third, we proactively, flexibly ensured logistics support for combat. In the early period of national resistance, anticipating that logistics support from other places would be very difficult, Hanoi Capital Front’s Command directed combat units to work with inner-city citizens to prepare sufficient essential materials, such as rice, salt, dry food, and water for a month; Inter-Zone 1 alone was required to provide food for forces’ prolonged combat within 3 months. That elaborate preparation proved our flexibility and proactiveness as we had anticipated difficulties in logistics support for fierce combat areas, especially Inter-Zone 1 due to the enemy’s isolation. Flexibility in logistics support was demonstrated in the organisation of female military chef teams whose members had been tasked with giving food and drinking water to battlefields. In daytime, catering teams were assigned to do cooking; at night-time, they secretly crossed the enemy’s blockades to Red River and adjacent fields to seek vegetables and food for units. Moreover, our transport force flexibly took advantage of bridges, sewers, and riparian areas at night-time to cleverly transport logistics materials from suburban areas and at the same time carry wounded and sick soldiers to hospitals and citizens’ houses for safe, secret medical treatment. In spite of a lack of experience in logistics support for long combat within urban areas, we thoroughly grasped the Party’s guidelines, overcame all difficulties and hardships, relied on the people, and opportunely encouraged the people to take part in ensuring logistics support for the armed forces in the best way. Units well mobilised and employed resources on the spot and from localities to significantly contribute to pinning the enemy down within our capital city, preserving and developing our forces, and creating a favourable condition for our forces to safely withdraw to Viet Bac.

Bringing into play lessons on logistics support within the capital city in the early days of national resistance, in the new period, the Military Logistics Branch will continue implementing measures for building logistics potential and posture and developing projects and methods of logistics support for the armed forces to opportunely, effectively deal with situations in both peacetime and wartime. In the medium term, the Branch will keep grasping and well executing resolutions, directives, and action programmes for building the Military and itself, particularly Resolutions of the 13th National Party Congress and the 11th Military Party Resolution and the Central Military Commission’s Resolution 623-NQ/QUTW. At the same time, it will give advice to the Ministry of National Defence on constructing logistics bases, depots, and stations in each area and region in accordance with defensive zones’ posture, military regions’ defensive posture, and nationwide strategic logistics posture to opportunely serve the tasks of training, combat readiness, and combat in all situations. Due attention will be paid to building a strong Military Logistics Branch and a contingent of logistics cadres and employees to meet the requirements set by the Homeland construction and protection.

Lt. Gen. TRAN DUY GIANG, Director of the General Department of Logistics