55 years ago, in the Tay Ninh - Binh Long offensive operation, our military and people valiantly fought to eliminate a critical component of the enemy’s strategic mobile forces, disrupting the strategic defence posture of the US – Saigon puppet military forces, contributing to the defeat of the enemy’s “Local War” strategy. The victory in the campaign marked a new development in the capabilities of the main force of the Southern Theatre, illustrating many prominent features of our military art.

Facing successive defeats in the spring and summer of 1968, the US – Saigon puppet forces - were forced to shift towards a passive defensive posture, de-escalating their operations and changing their strategic approach from “search and destroy” to “clear and hold”. Consequently, they primarily concentrated their forces on defending major cities, military bases, and strategic lines of communication. At the same time, they launched military operations to push our forces out of cities’ centres and surrounding areas. In the area around Saigon, they organised three strong defensive perimeters, with a depth of nearly 100 kilometres. Among these, the outermost defensive line in Tay Ninh - Binh Long saw the use of a large contingent of US military forces with the establishment of multiple strongholds to maintain their foothold and prevent our offensive deployment from afar.

On our side, adhering to the directives of the Party Central Committee to shift the main focus of our offensive to cities’ outskirts and launch the 3^rd Phase of the General Offensive and Uprising in 1968, the Central Office and the Theatre Military Commission decided to initiate an operation to advance into the territories of Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces. The aim was to eliminate a critical component of the enemy’s strategic mobile forces, disrupt the defensive posture of the enemy in the north and northwest of Saigon, lure the enemy forces from the central and inner lines outwards, and create favourable conditions for the people’s movement in the inner city and surrounding areas. Despite the short preparation time, with a proactive spirit, sound and creative strategic mind, high determination, and unique military tactics, we delivered a significant blow to the enemy, securing a resounding victory. The success of the operation marked a milestone in the development of the main force of the Southern Theatre in its ability to decisively defeat enemy units of battalion level, displaying many outstanding features of our military art.

First, thoroughly grasp the situation in all aspects, select the appropriate offensive area (direction), and the offensive targets to ensure victory. The 1968 Tay Ninh - Binh Long Operation took place in a relatively large area with a short preparation time, and participating units had just received new reinforcements in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. Therefore, we had to have a firm grasp of the overall situation, make precise choices of areas of operation, and select targets that were within our capabilities to ensure victory and the complete elimination of the enemy’s battalion-level formations with high combat efficiency. Accordingly, the Party Committee and Command of the Operation actively conducted studies, correctly analysed the overall situation, and chose Tay Ninh as the primary direction of the offensive, with Binh Long as the secondary direction, and the outskirt and inner city areas as the areas of coordinated actions. This choice of attacking targets on the flanks, behind, and on the outer periphery, in the “vulnerable” and “weakest” areas of the enemy’s defence system, created surprising tactical and strategic blows, showcasing the sharp and creative thinking and excellent analytical skills and situational assessment of the Party Committee and Command of the Operation. After the first 02 phases of the Tet General Offensive and Uprising, our forces, weapons and equipment suffered significant losses, many revolutionary bases in the inner city were discovered by the enemy, and the leadership organisations of the resistance movement were pushed further away from the centre of action. Besides, the enemy had the chance to reinforce their units, organise enhanced defence, and increase surveillance. Therefore, if we continued to launch an offensive into the inner city at this time, we would face many difficulties. Meanwhile, choosing to advance into the outer line of the Saigon-Gia Dinh defence system (with Tay Ninh as the primary direction) created favourable conditions for us to combine military offensives with political struggles. This was a densely populated area with a strong revolutionary movement. Regarding the battlefield, this area was a wide front, but the enemy primarily established defensive strongholds along Routes 01, 04, 22, and 26 - a “stretched-out” defence system, providing us with an opportunity to encircle and cut off enemy units, and inflict complete destruction on each stronghold, implementing the tactic of “hitting weak points, avoiding strong points”. Furthermore, when we launched an offensive into the areas of Tay Ninh and Binh Long towns - the “point hitting” action, it would be easier to “lure” the enemy, forcing them to use their strategic mobile forces to respond to the threats and protect their lines of communication, creating an opportunity for our main forces to eliminate the major enemy formations outside their defensive fortifications - the “destroying reinforcement” action. At the same time, when the enemy had to redeploy troops from the middle and inner lines, it would create favourable conditions for military actions and political protests of our people in the inner city to develop and allow us to implement the strategy of “striking from within and from outside,” creating a widespread fighting posture that would force the enemy to disperse their strength, causing cracks in their strategic defensive posture. In implementing this plan, the Operation Command focused on analysing and selecting appropriate offensive targets within our capabilities at the time, such as Cha Phi, Ba Den Mountain, Cha La, etc. These were strategic strongholds protecting critical routes, where the enemy’s defences boasted many weaknesses and were stationed with insufficient forces ranging from one reinforced battalion to one battalion. This allowed us to concentrate our forces and firepower, decisively eliminate each enemy battalion, dealing “critical and devastating blows” to the enemy to ensure our success. As a result, thanks to a proactive understanding of the overall situation and the correct selection of the offensive direction (area) and targets, within a short period, we launched relentless strikes to decisively eliminate multiple enemy battalions, including US formations, with high combat efficiency, achieving resounding success that echoed throughout the battlefield and boosted the development of the revolutionary movement.

Second, organise and employ forces in a rational and flexible manner to continuously advance and eliminate the enemy. Based on a firm grasp of the enemy situation, terrain, tasks, combat intentions, and the principle of “concentrating forces to create a decisive advantage at the right time and place”, the Operation Command launched continuous attacks to decisively eliminate battalion-size enemy units. It organised and prioritised forces on the main direction, the critical objectives, and the key battles of the Operation. In the main direction (Tay Ninh), we used the 5^th Infantry Division, the 9^th Infantry Division, two artillery regiments, two Special Forces battalions, and two local troop battalions from Tay Ninh province. In the secondary direction, we only used the 7^th Infantry Division and the local armed force of Binh Long province for coordinated combat. Thanks to such rational force deployment, we achieved superiority in terms of number and firepower compared to the enemy at each stronghold. This especially applied to the main direction, where the offensives unfolded as planned, allowing us to achieve high combat efficiency. An exemplary case was the two occasions when our forces launched assaults against the Chà Phí stronghold, which was the key engagement of the Operation, we managed to eliminate several US battalions, “enticing” the enemy to come to their rescue, and creating an opportunity for us to continue the attack against enemy strategic mobile forces outside their fortifications. Moreover, the distinctive feature of our military art was also evident in how we organised our forces with appropriate width and depth, creating a strong and complex battle array that enabled us to maintain our combat pace and shift our actions in a timely and flexible manner. In the Tay Ninh direction, our forces were deployed primarily from Dau Tieng to Tapanrobon and from the north of Tay Ninh town to near Go Dau. This deployment allowed us to have enough forces to push deep into Route 22, penetrate into the area around Tay Ninh Cathedral, Thanh Dien, and threaten the enemy’s 25^th Infantry Division headquarters within the town. Simultaneously, we independently carried out attacks in one direction of the Operation and coordinated with local armed forces to intensify military actions in combination with the uprising of the people in the area. Additionally, to coordinate with the forces advancing on the main objectives, our artillery units carried out firepower strikes against important targets in the outskirts and inner city areas, forcing the enemy to scatter their forces between Tay Ninh and Binh Long to counter our activities while also having to maintain a strong defence of Saigon. This placed them in a “dilemma” between “concentrating” and “dispatching” their forces. As a result, they could not risk organising large-scale troop movements and were only able to conduct small-scale rescue and relief operations, providing us with an opportunity to concentrate our forces and decisively eliminate battalion-size formations of the enemy.

Third, flexibly and creatively employ tactical forms and combat methods. With the overarching combat tactic of “hitting point to destroy reinforcement”, placing the main focus on eliminating the enemy outside their fortified positions, the Operation Command directed units to flexibly and creatively apply tactical forms and combat methods to fully employ the strengths of our contingent, resolutely and continuously launching widespread assaults. By closely monitoring and grasping the enemy’s capabilities when they had just transitioned into a defensive posture, in which their defensive positions had not been consolidated and properly organised and their ability to coordinate between units was still limited. To create the element of surprise, we launched raids against critical targets such as Chà Phí (twice), Ông Hùng Spring, Bến Củi (thrice), Cà Tum, Chà Là, Núi Bà Đen, etc., and carried out resolute offensives, boldly launched deep thrusts into the main objectives from the beginning. This left the enemy bewildered and unable to react in time, resulting in heavy casualties. For enemy reinforcements, their forces and equipment exposed outside their fortified positions, we flexibly and creatively employed ambush tactics to completely eliminate multiple enemy battalions. Notable examples include the three ambush battles of the 88^th Regiment on Route 2, the 33^rd Regiment’s ambush against the enemy mechanised convoy on Route 22, and the ambush by the anti-aircraft company of the 320^th Regiment action which resulted in the downing of the helicopter carrying US Army Major General K. Ware, in the southwestern part of Village 2 towards the end of Phase 1 of the Operation, etc. In addition to this, between combat phases, we organised cushioning activities to maintain continuous offensive pressure through minor, independent actions, such as raids against enemy ranger camps in Bến Sỏi, Thiện Ngôn, Cà Tum, and ambushes on Routes 2, 22, 26, causing significant losses to the enemy and disrupting their plans for outer defence. Their plan to carry out sweeping operations starting from Tay Ninh and Binh Long to push our main forces away from cities and outskirt areas was utterly defeated.

Operation Tay Ninh - Binh Long marked the maturity of our Theatre main force, opening up the possibility to organise and conduct operations on a larger scale with larger forces to defeat the U.S. “Local War” strategy. The lessons and experiences drawn from the Operation remain valuable and should be further studied and creatively applied in the cause of defending the Motherland today.

Senior Colonel, PhD. DINH VIET HAI, Army Academy