Thoroughly grasping and implementing the 13^th Party National Congress Resolution, on January 17, 2022, the Politburo issued Resolution No 05-NQ/TW on the Organisation of the Vietnam People’s Army in the period of 2021 – 2030 and the following years. Accordingly, on April 2, 2022, the Central Military Commission issued Resolution No 230-NQ/QUTW that aimed to basically achieve the goal of building an elite, compact and strong military by 2025; creating a solid premise for the development of a revolutionary, standardised, elite and modern military by 2030. This is a sound and innovative policy of the Party and the State; at the same time, it is also a legitimate desire and aspiration of our military and People.

It has been proven in history that, for all armed forces of every nation, the organisation and force organisation adjustment during their development is always necessary, important, and also an objective requirement. If the adjustment of the military organisation is implemented at the right moment, in accordance with the structure, contemporary weapons and equipment, technical capability, military strategy, method of warfighting, and global and domestic situations, etc., it will strengthen the capability of the military as a whole; if it is not done properly, naturally the result will be the opposite. This is a scientific issue, therefore, we cannot just do it if we want to, it requires the emergence of all necessary conditions to be successful. The Vietnam People’s Army is no exception. It is worth mentioning that our Military has experienced nearly 80 years of building, fighting and development. During this process, the Military has implemented several organisational reforms to be more suitable to its functions and tasks and the domestic condition in each revolutionary period. However, these previous reforms were not large-scale and fundamental, some only focused on local issues with limited goals and requirements. This time, the organisational reform in our Military is different, which is more fundamental, comprehensive, and larger in scale to ensure its compactness and capability, making it truly the core force in defending the Motherland in the new situation.

After a thorough study of the orientation, goals, and requirements, etc. of the organisational reform and building of the Military in the period of 2021 – 2030 in accordance with the Party’s viewpoint, in our opinion, to effectively implement these works, we must focus on resolving the following issues.

First, the issue of ideological perception. On the basis of thoroughly grasping the Party’s viewpoint, we need to realise that this time, the organisational reform of our Military is a grand, crucial, sound, essential and urgent policy; at the same time, it is also the key task of the Military in the period of 2021 – 2030. We can all see that in the implementation of this policy, the Party is not presumptuous and impulsive, on the contrary, it has truly approached this issue objectively and scientifically. The Party has persistently led the building of our Military with long enough time, therefore it is experienced and mature enough in handling such issues, and now is the right time to implement this reform. The organisational reform of our Military from 2021 to 2030 can be divided into two periods: 2021 – 2025 and 2025 – 2030. Each period has its own objectives and requirements, but they are closely linked with each other, the former is the premise for the latter, and the latter is the result and the continuation of the former. In particular, the focus of the building of the Military in 2021 – 2025 is the adjustment in organisation for a force that is basically “elite, compact and strong”, creating a solid premise the emergence of a revolutionary, standardised, elite and modern military in 2023. Therefore, the outcome of the organisational reform in this period is very important, and it will affect the result of the next stage. The goals and requirements of the former stage are very clear; their implementation will not be easy but requires great efforts and determination from the Party, the People and the Military, especially the Military. This is because, an organisational reform in the military is a military science issue, to be exact, it is the highly specialised science of force organisation in the military, which is influenced by many direct and indirect factors. Therefore, during the implementation of the reform, we need to always keep in mind its scientific nature, we must conduct deep and careful research on the condition and reality of related matters to minimise mistakes and shortcomings. Based on this mentality, agencies and units of the Military must be meticulous in developing plans and their implementation to ensure that each step of the work is solid and on schedule.

Second, the organisational reform of the Military must achieve the basic goal of being “elite, compact and strong”. Overall, the plan for the organisational reform of the Military will be completed in late 2025, but not all agencies and units of the Military will implement it simultaneously, those with eligible conditions will urgently realise and complete the plan first, contingents that are unqualified will implement it later. Therefore, from 2021 to 2025, in each quarter and each year, there will be units and agencies to complete the reform. It should also be noted that, by late 2025, “elite, compact and strong” is only the basic goal. “Basic” means that not all units and institutions are “elite, compact and strong”, the rest of the work must be finished in the period of 2025 – 2030. Building an “elite, compact and strong” military is a common trend in every country to deal with the reality of modern warfare, not solely the problem of Vietnam. But what is “elite, compact and strong” and how to achieve this goal”? In fact, these are three different issues closely linked together, so in the process of reforming the organisation of the Military, no issue should be taken lightly. First, regarding the “elite” factor. It deals with the quality of soldiers and weapons and equipment. First and foremost, our military member must be elite in political matters and warfighting – this is the core and fundamental matter of building a military. Like our forefathers said: “for a military, quality is more valuable than quantity”. Regarding the “compact factor”, this means that all agencies and units must have a balanced, uniformed, and appropriate organisation to avoid overlapping responsibilities and inefficiency. Regarding the “strong” factor, this implies the strength of the Military, first of all, the strength in combat – one of the three basic functions of our Military. In order to have a strong military, we must combine many factors including organisation, human resource, weapons and equipment, and Vietnam’s military art to create a synergised strength to gain superiority over the opponents, defeating all enemies in all forms of warfare.

To do this, we need to reform our organisation and structure in the following direction: Regarding organisation, it is necessary to make organisational adjustments from agencies and units under the direct command of the Ministry of National Defence to those at operational and tactical levels. Also, there should be strategic shifts in force dispositions for task execution in all 5 combat domains (air, land, sea, cyberspace, and outer space). In particular, we need to focus on dissolve, merge and transfer some agencies and units under the direct command of the MND, adjust and reorganise units of military regions, services, corps, arms, military schools, research institutes and centres, logistical and technical depots, and defence enterprises. Regarding strength, on the basis of closely following the Party’s regulation on total strength, we must adjust the number of personnel in the direction of increasing the proportion of salaried service members to meet the needs of employing and mastering new and modern weapons and equipment, etc. This is a very important goal, creating a solid basis for the development of a revolutionary, standardised, elite and modern military by 2030.

Third, the organisational reform of regular force must be closely linked with the improvement of the reserve force and the militia and self-defence force. Our military has two components: the regular force and the reserve force. Each force has its own strategic role and position in forming the total strength of the military. Therefore, the development of the military in general, and military organisational reform, in particular, apply to both forces, not just the regular one. In particular, the regular force is responsible for playing a permanent and key role in military activities and national defence. On the other hand, the reserve force is organised and developed right in peacetime and mobilised with different scales to reinforce the regular force when necessary. The combat power of our Military can only be maintained continuously if we have a sizable and effective reserve force. Therefore, it can be affirmed that along with the regular force, the reserve force also has a strategic role, and is one of the decisive factors in national defence. This is not an issue of Vietnam alone; every country needs to implement military mobilisation when necessary. It should be emphasised that, due to many reasons, currently there is a huge disparity in overall quality, especially the combat capability, between the regular force and the reserve force. Therefore, in the process of reforming the organisation of the regular force in particular, developing the military in general, we need to closely link this work with the organisation, development and improvement of the reserve force.

Along with that, the building and strengthening of self-defence militia force must not be underestimated. Because, this is a component of the military with three types of troops (regular troop, local troop, and militia) and has a very important role. In peacetime, the self-defence militia is the main force in protecting Party committees and authorities of junior levels, plays the key role in maintaining social security order and safety, and participates in defence and military activities in localities. Therefore, in order to develop a revolutionary, standardised, elite and modern Military, we must simultaneously develop a strong, effective and sizable self-defence militia.

In practice, the Party’s viewpoint on military building and national defence is always persistent, there are always new and innovative ideas in this matter. The orientation on the organisation and building of the Vietnam People’s Army in the period of 2021 – 2030 issued in the 13^th Party National Congress is the same, it closely follows the 8^th Central Party Resolution (11^th Tenure) on “the strategy to defend the Motherland in the new situation”. The major points mentioned above clearly analysed the orientation of the Party on the organisation and building the Military in each period (2021 – 2025, 2025 -2030); on the other hand, they present inseparable issues in the process of implementing this task.

Major General NGUYEN MANH HUNG – Senior Colonel NGUYEN CONG HUYNH, Military Political Academy