Sixty years ago (from 12 to 27 of November, 1965), the armed forces and people of Southeastern Viet Nam launched the Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Offensive Campaign. This was one of the most typical campaigns of the South Liberation Armed Forces during the early years of the resistance war against the U.S. for national salvation. It achieved a high combat efficiency with numerous distinctive features of military art, notably the art of conducting the opening key battle, which created a breakthrough and paved the way for the complete victory of the campaign.

Successive victories of our armed forces and people in the campaigns of Binh Gia, Ba Gia, and Dong Xoai in late 1964 and early 1965 led to the collapse of the “Special War” strategy launched by America and its puppet regime. To salvage the situation and continue the war, the American imperialists shifted to the “Local War” strategy, deploying massive expeditionary forces and troops of allied nations into combat in South Viet Nam. On the northern and northwestern approaches to Sai Gon, the U.S. sent the 3rd Infantry Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One) to occupy the Lai Khe and Bau Bang, coordinating with the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam’s (ARVN) 7th Infantry Regiment to create “steel punches” in key strategic zones, conducting “search and destroy” operations in an attempt to annihilate our main force units and destroy liberated areas.

As far as our side is concerned, implementing the resolution of the Party Central Committee and in coordination with the Plei Me Campaign in the Central Highlands, the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Command of the South Viet Nam Liberation Army decided to launch the Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Campaign to annihilate a significant part of enemy forces and support the political struggle on the outskirts. The participating forces included the 9th Infantry Division, the Local Battalion of Binh Duong Province, and guerrilla and civilian forces of the Bau Bang, Dong So, and Dau Tieng. Following the operational plan, as early as October 1965, the Campaign Command prepared a plan to attack the Dau Tieng Subsector to lure the enemy reinforcements and destroy them. It also prepared a contingency plan for counterattack if the enemy took the initiative. Therefore, when the reconnaissance detected movement of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Brigade towards Bau Bang, the Campaign Command promptly seized the opportunity and ordered the 9th Infantry Division (minus one regiment) to launch an attack as the enemy halted temporarily. The raid achieved a resounding success, inflicting heavy losses on the elite U.S. 3rd Infantry Brigade, the 1st Infantry Division. This was a large-scale assault on U.S. forces and the opening key battle of the campaign, characterised by high combat effectiveness and distinctive features of operational art as follows.

Bau Bang Victory Monument

First, maintaining close surveillance of the enemy, determining the right timing, and preparing for rapid combat. When attacking an enemy force in temporary halt, the situation changes rapidly, and the enemy’s formations are fluid. Only by closely monitoring and accurately assessing the enemy can commanders make precise combat decisions. Recognising this, the Campaign Command and staff directed the reconnaissance element of the 9th Infantry Division, local force, and guerrillas of Bau Bang and Dong So to keep constant surveillance on every movement of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Brigade stationed in Ben Cat and Lai Khe, particularly when they maneuvered along Highway 13 and Provincial Route 16 (toward Chon Thanh) and halted in Bau Bang - Dong So. Although the enemy’s halt locations differed slightly from our initial assessment, due to continuous reconnaissance, our units were able to promptly adjust their combat plans. Consequently, when the attack commenced, our forces struck precisely at designated objectives, rapidly penetrating the enemy’s battalion command post and artillery positions, achieving high combat efficiency.

Based on accurate assessment of the enemy situation, the Campaign Command determined the exact moment to launch a pre-emptive strike. Upon detecting two U.S. battalions moving from Lai Khe and coming to temporarily halt in Bau Bang - Dong So, the Command recognised the opportunity to destroy the enemy outside fortified positions and decided to launch the opening key battle that night. This timely and scientifically grounded decision demonstrated the operational acumen and creativity of the Campaign Command. At that point, the U.S. forces had just come to a halt. Their defensive works and barriers were rudimentary, and their command coordination limited. If our forces could maintain secrecy, close in, and attack swiftly, dividing their formation and isolating infantry from armour, the enemy would be caught off guard and quickly destroyed. Delaying the assault would allow them to fortify positions, deploy obstacles, and enhance reconnaissance, reducing our element of surprise and combat effectiveness.

Without missing the window of opportunity, the Command ordered the 9th Infantry Division to advance rapidly toward Bau Bang. The vanguard group, which comprised the division commander, regimental and battalion commanders, conducted on-site reconnaissance and finalised the operational plan while the rest of the units marched and prepared simultaneously. Due to swift preparation, our assault forces deployed on schedule, formed encirclements early, preserved secrecy and surprise, and inflicted heavy losses on two elite, well-equipped U.S. battalions regarded as the “pride of the U.S. Army.”

Second, flexible shift of posture and close combat coordination. The success of the Bau Bang was the result of multiple factors, including the art of transforming the battlefield posture and ensuring close combat coordination, marking an advancement in operational planning of the Liberation Armed Forces during their early encounters with U.S. troops. Initially, the Campaign Command chose the attack on the ARVN 7th Battle Group in Dau Tieng as the opening battle to lure U.S. reinforcements to destroy. The opening battle could be an ambush or pre-emptive strike. It also prepared a plan to counterattack if U.S. troops advanced along Highways 13 and 16. Once the U.S. forces actually moved along these routes and halted in Bau Bang - Dong So, the Command swiftly shifted from the ambush plan to a counterattack, reallocating directions, targets, and concentrating firepower and forces against the U.S. troop formation in temporary halt.

Because of limited preparation time, long approach routes, and multi-directional deployment, units executed the operations according to prearranged coordination plans. When the battle began, only the 1st Infantry Battalion was in position for attack. To maintain surprise and seize the window of opportunity, the 9th Division ordered the 1st Infantry Battalion to open fire to annihilate the enemy. This was also signal for the rest to rapidly advance, engage, and attack assigned objectives. Through close coordination among axes, between infantry and supporting fire, and between main and local forces, our troops flexibly shifted from attacking fortified positions to striking the temporarily halted U.S. units, maintained the initiative, and continuously created favourable posture, leaving the U.S. formations disorganised and defeated.

Third, employment of appropriate tactics. The Bau Bang pre-emptive attack was the first battle our forces used a concentrated formation at the divisional level (minus one regiment) to attack U.S. troops with minimal preparation time. To ensure success, we attacked from multiple directions, forming an encirclement from the outset. The 5th Infantry Battalion attacked from the northwest Dong So to cut off the 1st and 2nd enemy combat groups and later destroyed the 2nd combat group. The 1st, 4th, and 6th Battalions encircled the 1st enemy combat group in Bau Bang from the west, north, and northeast, assaulting the command post of the 3rd Infantry Brigade and artillery positions. The 3rd Regiment (minus elements) positioned west of Dong So to block reinforcements from Lai Khe and destroy the enemy’s 2nd combat group in Dong So.

Applying the principle of dividing to attack and surrounding to destroy, right at the onset, the 5th Battalion cut off the two enemy combat groups, preventing them from mutual support. Exploiting this advantage, the 6th Battalion, in close coordination with the 1st Battalion, penetrated deep into the enemy command and artillery sites, causing chaos and enabling the rest of the assault to advance smoothly. Despite occasional communication breakdowns, high morale and proactive initiative of officers and soldiers allowed units to maintain pressure, close in, encircle, and attack effectively. Combining concentrated firepower and infantry maneuver, frontal assaults with flanking envelopments, our troops shattered elite U.S. formations in a short time. Particularly, by focusing on destroying tanks and armoured vehicles, we neutralised their key advantage and rendered them vulnerable. Following the combat principle of “grabbing the enemy by the belt to strike,” our units fought at close range, negating U.S. air and artillery support, keeping them disoriented and leading to their defeat.

The victory of the opening key battle in Bau Bang - Dong So created a breakthrough and established momentum for subsequent operations, culminating in the second key victory in Dau Tieng. The success of the Bau Bang - Dau Tieng Campaign dealt a severe blow to U.S. and Saigon efforts under the “Local War” strategy. The lessons in the art of conducting an opening key battle remain invaluable for continued research and creative application in the defence of the Fatherland.

Senior Colonel, PhD. NGUYEN VAN PHUC